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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the 
Fourth District Court, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED 
INDIVIDUAL OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44701 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
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KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
APPELLANT PRO SE 
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RAY J. CHACKO 
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000002
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-20864 






Location: Ada County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F. 
Christopher Rich, Idaho Department Of Corrections Filed on: 12/07/2015 
Case Number History: 
CASE INFOR.I\L\TIOX 
Statistical Closures AA- All Initial District Court 















Case Flags: Converted Clerk Alert 





Workman, Kenneth M 
CASE ASSIGNl\lENT 
CV-OC-2015-20864 
Ada County District Court 
07/06/2016 
Schroeder, Gerald F. 
PARTY INFORMATION 
Idaho Department Of Corrections 
Rich, Christopher 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
Motion & Affidavit 
Motion & Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees 
Order 
Order Requiring Partial Payment of Fees and Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Initiating Document - All Other 
New Case Filed - Prisoner Civil Rights 
Petition 




Miscellaneous Payment: Partial Fee's Paid by: Workman, Kenneth M Receipt number: 
0/2843/ Dated: 12/31/2015 Amount: $25.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous 
$25.00 paid by Plaintiff, !DOC Ck#679701, Receipt No. 0128431 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service (01/26/16) 
Affidavit of Service 
PAGE I OF4 
INDEX 





















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
Affidavit Of Service (01/27/16) 
Notice 
Notice of Filing Affidavits of Service with Court 
Motion 
Motion to Disqualify Judge without Cause 
Notice of Appearance 
Notice Of Appearance (Karin Magnel/ifor /DOC) 
Motion 
IDOC's Motion For Extension O/Time To File Motion To Dismiss Or Answer 
Affidavit 
Affidavit Of Karin Mage/Ii In Support Of JDOC's Motion For Extension O/Time To File 
Motion To Dismiss Or Answer 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service (01/26/15) 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service (01/27/15) 
Motion to Dismiss 
Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to JRCP 
Order Denied 
Order Denying Motion to Disqualify 
Motion 
Idaho Department Of Corrections Motion To Dismiss 
Memorandum 
Memorandum In Support Of Idaho Department Of Corrections Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit 
Affidavit Of Shirley Audens In Support Of Idaho Department Of Corrections Motion to 
Dismiss 
Affidavit 
Affidavit Of Karin Magnel/i In Support Of Idaho Department Of Corrections Motion to 
Dismiss 
Motion 
Motion To Reconsider The Court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion To Disqualify Judge 
Order 
Order Granting IDOC's Motion/or Extension o/Time to File Motion to Dismiss or Answer 
Order 
Order for Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Reply 
Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant Christopher Rich's Motion to Dismiss 
Order 
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
Reply 
Defendant Christopher Rich's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant 
tolRCP 12(b) 
Notice 
Notice of Clarification And Withdrawal of I 4th Amendment Claim 
Response 
Plaintiffs Response To Defendant IDOC's Motion To Dismiss 
Declaration 
Declaration Filed of Kenneth "Mike" Workman In Support of Plaintiffs Response To 
Defendant JDOC's Motion To Dismiss 
Declaration 
Supplemental Declaration Filed of Kenneth "Mike" Workman In Support of Plaintiffs 
Response To Defendant IDOC's Motion To Dismiss 
Memorandum 
Idaho Department Of Corrections Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss 
Decision or Opinion 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment 
Civil Disposition Entered 
Civil Disposition entered/or: Idaho Department Of Corrections, Defendant; Rich, 
Christopher, Defendant; Workman, Kenneth M, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/18/2016 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
Judgment - Other: 
Converted Disposition: 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment 
Party (Idaho Department Of Corrections) 
Party (Workman, Kenneth M) 
Party (Rich, Christopher) 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Motion & Affidavit 
Motion & Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees 
Change Assigned Judge: Administrative 
Judge Change: Administrative 
Notice of Appeal 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appeal Filed in District Court 
Order Granted 
Order Granting Motion/or Fee Waiver On Appeal 
Order 
Order Governing Procedure on Appeal 
Order 
Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal 













ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
Brief Filed 
Brief of Appellant 
Brief Filed 




Brief of Appellant 
~ Decision or Opinion 
on Appeal 
t9 Notice of Appeal 
~ Motion & Affidavit 
for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees 
~ Declaration 
Supplemental Declaration of Kenneth Workman in Support of Motion and Affidavit for 
Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees re Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
m Order Granting Fee Waiver 
on A ea/ 
Plaintiff Workman, Kenneth M 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 






Printed on 02/16/2017 at 9:14 AM 
000006
,. ' ,,. 1 
l~s R E C E I V E D 
~ r 1..,_ • 
REC.E i'VE o 
,:·' DEC 2015 DEL .. 0 2015 
Ada County Clerk 
Kenneth M. Workman# 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 




NO·----=:e---q...---FILED AM, ____ __r..M __ ...._ __ _ 
DEC 3 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ROSE WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN.THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDI~IAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk 
of the Fourth District Court, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS 















) __________________ ) 
IV OC 1520864 
Case No. --------
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT 
I 
COMES NOW, Kenneth M. Workman, ~laintiff acting prose in the 
above entitled matter, brings forth this civil complaint against the 
above named defendants and states the following in support: 
A. PREDICATE 
This is a civil action to address the illegal conduct of the de-
fendants and a stated declaratory judgment claim. brought under the 
constitution and laws of the State of Idaho, as herein more particulary 
described. 
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT Pg. 1 
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B. PARTIES 
PLAINTIFF. Kenneth M. Workman is a citizen of the State of Idaho, who 
is currently incarcerated by the Idaho Department of Corrections, under. 
the custody and care of Warden Keith Yordy. He is located at ISCI P.O. 
Box 14, Boise, Idaho 83707. 
DEFENDANT. Christopher Rich is the Clerk of the Court for the Fourth 
District Court of the State of Idaho. Defendant Rich is named asa ·primary 
defendant and is being sued in his official capacity, where he was work-
ing under color of law at the time this complaint arose. His business 
address for the purpose of this action is located at the Ada County 
Courthouse 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
DEFEND.ANT. Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) is a state govern-
mental department created by the constitution and laws of the State 
of Idaho. The IDOC and its unnamed employees involved in this action 
are named as a primary defendant and are being sued in their official 
capacity while working under color of law at the time the claim in this 
complaint arose. The Department of Corrections main office is located 
at 1299 North Orchard Boise, Idaho 83702. 
C. JURISDICTION 
This is an action seeking relief and/or damages for a violation 
of a protected right as guaranteed by _the constitution and laws of the 
State of Idaho. Jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to I.C.§ 1-705 and 
I.C.§ 18-310(1). 
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT Pg. 2 
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D. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is a state prisoner who owed restitution from an order handed down 
by the Fourth District Court in April of 2003. InF'ebruary of 2014. the Idaho legis-
lators enacted a new law, I.C.§ 20-209H, to provide for the I1X)C to mandate the with-
drawel of Inmates funds for owed restitution. The law went into effect on March 1,~ 
2015 and has now become a statewide practice by the n:xx:::!. Plaintiff's case is one 
of those rare cases where the new law does not apply as his court order for restitution 
became unenforceable as of April. 2008. This is supported by the law which was .i:r:i . . . 
effect at the time which is I.C.§10-1110 and I.C.§ 10-1111. The law which is applicable. 
to this case states, in order for a victim or concerned party of whom the restitution 
is owed, in order to keep the restitution order of judgment· an active, collectable 
order, the parties must file a timely motion to renew judgment within five (5) years 
from the date of entry and thereafter every five (5) years. The court must further 
grant this motion to renew to make it valid. 
The record in this case shows conclusively that no motion to renew judgment has 
ever been filed in the 13 years this case has lingered. Plaintiff has presented his 
case to the I1X)C administration of which has been exhausted through the grievance 
process. (See attached Exhibit A) In giving the I1X)C the information and facts to 
correct this matter, they have chosen to disregard the law on this issue and have 
continued to deduct funds from the plaintiff's inmate account. 
In order to exhaust all avenues, the Clerk of the Court was sent two (2) separate 
letters s~owing the Clerk's offices involvement in illegally taking the plaintiff's 
money. 'Ih~ Clerk was given adequate time. to respond. Defendant Rich _choos£= ·_t~ _s~d a 
belated respons.e .. on .11 /17 /15 two days after .the complaint. wa~ initi~lly received by the 
I • • • , ' 
coi.ri:t-on 11/15/15. The ;esponse·circumvents the allegation against them. (See Attached 
'kiiibit~-B~Ttlis-~tt~-~h;ula''have been resolved th~. Pl~intiff a~sertsthat unde~ ' 
IRCP Rule·11 a party who allows a frivolous pleading to proceed can be held account-
for their failure to concede to the merits of the issue raised in the complaint before 
them. Plaintiff states this is the case now before this court. Defendants have all been 
infonned of the facts and the laws that govern this action, but yet have done nothing 
to correct it. As a matter of law, defendants order for restitution.became unenforce-
able as of April. 2008. All funds deducted must be returned after this date and all 
future attempts to deduct funds must cease and desist. 
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT Pg. 3 
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E·. CAUSE OF ACTION 
Claim one: 
PLAINTIFFS RESTITUTION ORDER IS NO LONGER ENFORCEABLE 
BASED ON THE OPPOSING PARTIES FAILURE TO TIMELY RENEW 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT UNDER I.C.§ 10-1201 SEG. 
Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
the monies placed in his inmate account. The taking of any funds for Restitution by 
the Idaho Department of Corrrections is governed by the 14th Amendment of the State 
of Idaho and the U.S. Constitution. The defendants in this case while acting under 
color of state law have been illegally removing funds from plaintiffs inmate account 
as of April, 2008, as a·result of an existing court order that is no longer enforcable 
and forwarding it the Clerk of the District Court for further processing. 
The order for restitution and civil judgment in the amount of $ 32,391.44 was 
ordered pursuant to I.C.§ 19-5304 in plaintiffs case No. H0101303 on April 28, 2003 
over 13 years ago. Under I.C.§10-1110 and I.C.§10-1111, a money judgment must be renew-
ed within Five ( 5) years of the judgment to remain enforceable. The record shows con-
clusi vley that there has been no motion to renew filed in this case. The failure to 
timely file a motion to renew judgment makes the debt uncollectable, expired and 
unenforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court has made this very clear in their holdings 
in Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013) Therefore since no motion for 
renewal of judgment was filed and granted within five (5) years of April 28, 2003, 
the jud~ent expired well over seven (7) years ago on April 28, 2008. Once the 
judgment expires the debt is no longer collectable. 
I.C.§10-1110 was amended recently, changing the fonnal renewel period from five 
(5) years to Twenty (20) years. This has no bearing or effect on the plaintiffs 
restitution order as it had already expired seven (7) years earlier under the former 
five(5) year rule. The 2015 amendment to I.C. 10-1110 specifically states that the,r 
rule only applies to judgments entered on or after July 1 , 2015. The new Twenty 
(20) year renewal period only affects orders issues after July 1, 2015 and has no 
application to the plaintiffs restitution order in this case •. I.C. 20-209H which 
went into effect on March 1 , 2015 only applies to res,titution "still owing". As the 
plaintiff's restitution expired years before the enactment of I.C. 20-209H, the new 
legislation is not applicable to plaintiff's restitution order. 
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT Pg. 4. 
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The issue raised in this complaint is supported by law. Therefore plaintiff 
has raised a genuine issue of material fact that mandataf for this court as a matter 
of law to find that the restitution owed by the plaintiff is no longer enforceable, 
collectable and for all purposes has expired. 
F. PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF 
Plaintiff has not filed any state civil action on the subject matter now being 
brought before the court in this complaint. A timely notice of Tort was submitted 
in this matter with no response in return. Further plaintiff has sought formal relief 
from IlXlC .Aaministrative officials regarding the issue before this court by completing 
the grievance process to exhaustion.(see Attached) Plaintiff gave notice to the Court 
Clerk that they were in violation for failing to order the IlXlC to cease and desist 
in its deducting of plaintiff's funds for restitution. (~,::,e Attached) 
G. PREVIOUS DISMISSED ACTIONS OR APPEAL 
Plaintiff has no dismissed actions or appeals to declare in this matter. 
Plaintiff requests for this honorable court to issue an order for injunctive 
relief by ordering all defendants to cease and desist the deductions of his funds 
for restitution. To order that the April, 2003 restitution order expired and unen-
forceable. Damages are requested for funds deducted after April, 2008 up onto the 
present. Sanctions on the opposing defendants for forcing this matter to be taken 
up and wasting this courts valuable time. All costs associated with this case, to 
include filing fees, cost of litigation preparation, serving process fees. etc. of 
which an itemized list will be submitted to the court. 
DDated this 3rd ,day of December, 2015 
'enneth M. Workman 
Plaintiff 
PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT Pg. 5 
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EXHIBIT A 




WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
61342 
I Offender Grievance Information· 
Date Received: 07/28/2015 








!DOC is taking money from my inmate account for restitution illegally. The restitution is almost 14 yrs. old and has 
expired. Idaho code for restitution plainly states, "that to keep an order enforceable it must be renewed every 5 yrs." The old 
guidlines apply to me and the record shows by fact there never has been a motion to renew restitution filed in my case, 
therefore the order is unenforcable and the deduction must cease, further there is no S.O.P. policy that has authorized these 
deductions. 
I have tried to solve this problem informally by: 
See attached concern form from Shirley Audens dated 7/8/15. 
I suggest the following solution for the problem: 
Reimburse my account the amount taken and cease and desist all restitution deductions for case no. H0101303 
I Level 1 - Initial Response ' 
Date Forwarded: Date Returned: 08/13/2015 
Date Due Back: 
07/30/2015 
08/13/2015 Level 1 Responder: AUDENS, SHIRLEY A 
The response from the staff member or person in charge of the area/operation being grieved: 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 114.03.03.024, page 6, Child Support Withholdings, Garnishments, and Court Filing 
Fees -- "The fiscal unit sets up and enters all court orders for withhold child support, garnishments, and court filing fees 
into the inmate trust accounting attachment module. Monetary gifts are not exempt from attachments or inmate trust 
account garnishments unless an order for child support withholding stipulates an exemption." It goes on to state that child 
support is the primary obligation and " the secondary obligation is deducted at a rate determined by the court for each 
deposit made until the court-ordered obligations are satisfied or paid in full." This language has been part of the fiscal SOP 
for several years: 
I contacted the court regarding Mr. Workman's concern. I was informed by the court that the restitution was still owed by 
the inmate. According to the Idaho Code sited above, if you have been ordered to make restitution and were in custody on 
or after March 01, 2015, this statue will apply and 20% of the funds in your inmate account will be paid to the state board 
of correction for payment to the clerk of the proper court. Mr. Workman has been incarcerated since August 2002 and has 
an Order for Restitution and Civil Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code 19-5304. He fulfills the requirement to attach his 
account under 20-209H. 





II 150000798 WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
I Level 2 - Reviewing Authority Response 
Date Forwarded: 08/13/2015 




Your grievence has been reviewed and I find: 
61342 
Grievance Disposition: 
Level 2 Responder: 




I have reviewed Mr Workman's grievance, Ms Auden's response, IDOC's SOP 114.03.03.024, and Idaho Statue Title 20, 
Chapter 2, Section 20-209H, and concur with Ms Auden's finding. In the SOP it does state that after child support the 
secondary obligation, in this case court ordered restitution, is dedu-::ted at a rate determined by the court for each deposit 
made until the court-ordered obligations are satisfied or paid in full. 
Secondly, as for Idaho Statue Title 20, Chapter 2, Section 20-209H. The provision of this section shall apply to any inmate 
confined in a correctional facility on or after the effective date. This requires IDOC by law to deduct the 20% from all 
moneys received by Mr Workman, because he was incarcerated at the time the statue went into effect. 
Grievance is denied. 
I Offender Appeal 
Offender Comments: 
When Shirley Auden called the court did she specifically ask the clerk whether any parties had filed a motion to renew 
judgment as required under LC. 10-1110 and 1111 and whether the judgment/ order is rendered unenforceable after 5 years if 
the parties have in fact not filed a motion to renew judgment? The law is very clear on this matter and I can only assume 
that Ms Auden did not look at the ROA from my restitution case and order as it will show by fact this order has never been 
renewed and is therefore unenforceable. 
I suggest that Ms. Auden contact the court clerk again and get verification and /or clarification of what I have stated. 
Whether IDOC upholds the law here or I take this matter back to court for resolution you have been given notice of the 
wrongful action taking place here and I ask it to be stopped. 
I Level 3 .,. Appellate Authority Response 
Date Appealed: 
Date Forwarded: . 






Your appeal has been reviewed and I find: 
Grievance Disposition: 
Level 3 Responder: 




The first issue is whether the withholding of restitution payments under the new JRI legislation is retroactive. Section 6 of 
Senate Bill 1357 created a new statute--Idaho Code Section 20-209H--which requires the Board of Correction (i.e.-IDOC) 
to deduct 20% of an offender's inmate account each month in order to satisfy any outstanding restitution. Specific to your 
question, the last sentence of this statute states: "The provisions of this section shall apply to any inmate confined in a 
correctional facility on or after the effective date of this section." This particular section is not effective until March 1, 
2015. Therefore, any offender in IDOC custody with an outstanding restitution order as of March 1, 2015 is subject to the 
mandatory 20% withholding each month until the restitution is satisfied. 
Second, 10-1110 was amended during the 2015 session to include the following: 
"A lien arising from an order for restitution to a crime victim where the order ofrestitution has been recorded as a judgment 
pursuant to section 19-5305, Idaho Code, continues until twenty (20) years from the date of the judgment unless the 
judgment be previously satisfied, or unless the judgment is stayed or set aside." 
Date: 10/07/2015 12:06 Created By: jwhittin Page 2 of 3 
CIS/Facilities/Main/Misc/Grievance Detail 
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II 150000798 WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 61342 
House Judicial Committee minutes from March 6, 2015 indicate that the intent of the legislature specifically applies the 20 
year extension to current judgments for restitution. In addition, the statement of purpose for the legislation discusses how 
many crime victims do not realize the judgment has to be renewed, and the extension to 20 years is an effort to enable 
victims to recognize their right to restitution. Based on the lack ciflanguage stating the amendment was only effective 
going forward, and the purpose behind the statutory change, the 20 year amendment applies to restitution orders that were 
entered prior to the amendment. · 
In summary, the language ofldaho Code Sections 10-1110 and 11-1111 authorizes IDOC to deduct funds from inmate bank 
accounts in order to satisfy restitution orders pursuant to Idaho Code 20-209H. Because the restitution order is less than 20 
years old, the IDOC will continue to withhold from your account and forward those payments to the court. Your grievance 
appeal is denied. 
LISA JOHNSON 
Idaho Department of Correction 




Kenneth' M. Workman# 61342 
ISCI Unit 9A 14A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 July 21, 2015 
TO: Clerk of the Court 
lN RE: Restitution COPY 
Case No. H0101303 
Dear Clerk, 
Based upon the new mandatory restitution law that came into effect 
in March of 2015, the Idaho Department of Corrections have been deduct-
ing money from my inmate ac.count and forwarding it to your office for 
processing. De advised that these deductions are being taken illegally 
from me of which you have the authority to stop. This is based on my 
original order for restitution being imposed in January of 2003. Under 
the law that applies to my case, to make and keep a restitution order 
active, the order must be renewed every 5 years. There has been no 
motion to renew judgment filed in my case, which renders my restitution 
judgment expired and unenforceable. As such I'm specifically requesting 
all money received by you from the IDOC starting from 6/29/15 to the 
present·be reimbursed to my inmate account and that you give notice 
to the IDOC to cease and desist any and all deductions for the aboce 
case number. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. I 




Clerk of the Cburt 
Ada Cbunty Cburthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
EXHIBIT B 
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9-A-14A 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
October l:l., 2015 
Re: state v. Workman, Case No. H0101303 
Dear Cburt Clerk, 
I 
The Order For Restitution and Civil Judgment in the amount of $32,391.44 was 
filed pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 in the above-referenced. case on April 28, 2003, 
well over twelve (12) ·years ago. Under Idaho coae §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111, a 
money judgment must be renewed within five (5) years of the judgment to remain 
enforceaJ:;>le. Failure to timely· file a notion for renewal of judgment makes 
the debt llllcollectable, expired and unenforceable. See; e.g., Grazer v. Jones, 
154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013). Therefore, since no motion for renewal 
of judgment was filed and granted within five (5) years of April 28, 2003, the 
judgment expired on April 28, 2008, well over seven (7) years ago. Once it 
expired, ·I no longer owed the debt. 
Idaho coae Section 20-209H, which went into effect on March 1, 2015, only applies 
to·restitution "still owing." Since my restitution judgment expired years before 
I.e.§ 20-209H was enacted and I no longer owed the restitution, the statute 
does not apply to me or the prior restitution order. 
I am aware that I.C. § 10-1110 was amended-recently, changing the former renewal 
period, as to restitution orders, from five (5) to twenty (20·) years. But my 
restitution order had already expired seven ( 7) years ear lier under the former 
five (5) year rule, and·the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 10-1110 specifically states 
the new rule only applies to judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015. Thus, 
the new twenty (20) year·renewal period also has no application to my restitution 
order. · 
Nonetheless, the Idaho Deparbnent of Cbrrection ("I~") has been garnishing 
20% of the rroneys being deposited to my Inmate Trust Account, has been sending 
these noneys to you as :i;:ayment on the expired restitution order in this case, 
and is representing they are cbing so on your behalf. See attached IDOC 
Grievance document (Level 1 - Initial Response by Shirley Audens: "I contacted 
the court regarding Mr. Workman's concern. I was informed by the court that 





Please be advised that it is my position that you and IOOC are engaging in 
illegal collection activit~es on an expired, unenforceable debt that I no longer 
owe. 
I respectfully request that you immediately return to me all rroneys collected 
on the restitution order since March 1, 2015. I also respectfully request that 
you promptly contact IOOC and instruct them that my restitution order is- expired 
and thus, no longer "still owing" and _instruct IIX)C to.stop all collection 
activities on my fonner restitution order. 
I thank you for your prompt attention and response to this letter. If I do not 
receive:a letter in response within.ten (10) days which confirms your compliance 
with my requests herein I will construe them to be denied and will proceed on 
that basis. 
Sincerely, 
Kenneth M. Workman 
-2-
000017
November 17, 2015 
Kenneth M. Workman 
ISCI Unit 9-A-14A 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ld~½.o 83707 
EXHIBIT B 
RE: Request to Cease Restitution Collection 




The Order for Restitution was entered in April of 2003, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. It 
was never recorded in the Ada County records in order that it might be executed upon in the 
same manner as a civil judgment, as provided by statute. It is such judgment lien that is valid as 
per Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111. 
Notwithstanding, a criminal restitution order is a permanent order that does not expire and is not 
dischargeable through bankruptcy (Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)). Further, the recently 
enacted Idaho Code § 20-209H requires that twenty percent of each deposit in an inmate's 
account "shall be paid to the state board of correction who shall ... pay such moneys to the clerk 
of the court in which the restitution order was entered for payment to the victim." The 
continuing garnishment of your inmate account, therefore, is in compliance with statute. 
000018
.. 
Kenneth M. Workman# 61342 
Full Name of Party Filing This Document 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
Boise, Idaho 83707 




DEC O 7 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ROSE WAIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF __ A_D_A ____ _ 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CHRISTPOPHER RICH, Court Clerk 
IDAHO DEPAR~dQi~'t. CORRECTIONS 
Case No.: CV O C 15 2 0 8 6 4 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of _A_D_A ____ ~) 
[ X) Plaintiff ] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) __ C_i v_i_l_C_o_m_._p_l_a_i_n_t ______ . I 
believe I'm entitled to get what I am asking for. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 




2. [ ] I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [ ] I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages 
if more space is needed for any response. 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: Kenneth Workman Other name(s) I have used: __ -=..;N;.,../..;;.;A=-------
Address: ISCI P.O. Box 14 Boise, Idaho 83707 
How long at that address? 2 years Phone: N / A ----------- --------
Date and place of birth: May 6, 1953 Morton, Washington 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am [ x] single [ ] married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: ____ N-'/"'"A _____________________ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2/25/2005 
PAGE2 
000020
My other dependents (including minor children) are: __ N_/_A ___________ _ 
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ 5 0 • O O per [ ] week [ }1 month 
Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: Periodic gift money from 
family. 
My spouse's income:$ NIA per [ ] week [ ] month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City State 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Cash 
Notes and Receivables 
Vehicles: 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit 
Trust Funds 
Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s 




MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 



























Credit Cards: (list each account number) 











MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 





































How much can you borrow? $ __ 0.c.------- From whom? __ N~/_A _______ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? __ N_/_A __ Amount of refund: $ NI A 




MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2/25/2005 
Phone Years Known 
~-dm~ S"nature 
Kenneth M. Workman 





· ... ' 
= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
Doc No: -~:61342 Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
Account: . CHK Status: ACTIVE 
li..H•, •}, 
' . . 
•"f _; o1;:• ; '!;";'r ,~ I 
·Transaction Dates: 11/0l/2014-12/03/2015 
12/03/2015 = 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-14 
·1 Beg'inning Total Total Current 
::-r:J; :,.-,~ · Balance Charges Payments Balance 
.· .···. 1.23 2238.16 2301.56 64.63 
== :. = : _- =·. ====================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
--·------- ------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------
11/03/2014 II0689477-545 099-COMM SPL 0.78DB 0.45 
11/.03/2014 II0689584-017 223-0CT PAY UNIT 9 74.40 74.85 
11/05/2014 HQ0689909-005 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 100.00 174.85 
ililJIDOf2014 .HQ0690605-004 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80.00 254.85 
11/;1-0,12014 II0690649-746 099-COMM SPL 20.00DB 234.85 
11/10/2014 II0690649-747 099-COMM SPL 64.40DB 170.45 
11/17/2014 II0691290-619 099-COMM SPL 79.06DB 91.39 
iDID¢2 ff 1>2 0 lli4 II0692029-609 099-COMM SPL 39.47DB 51.92 
a:.z.,{:.pJ.L /,?;014 II0692942-553 099-COMM SPL 10.00DB 41.92 
12°/dl/2'..014 II0692942-554 09.9-COMM SPL 34.99DB 6.93 
12 /rJJ']'/,i0 Ji.~ II0693436-022 223-NOV PAY UNIT 9 72.00 78.93 
12/.08/2014II0693974-7341099-COMM SPL 10.00DB 68.93 
12/08/201•~mio693974-735 099-COMM SPL 44.86DB 24.07 
12/;1-5/2014 II0694744-672 099-COMM SPL 24.06DB 0.01 
12/16/2014 HQ0694883-008 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80.00 80.01 
fu2-f2-TI:/2QJ=4 II0695528-566 099-COMM SPL 38.09DB 41. 92 
ID~-7-24/2014 HQ0695870-005 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 50.00 91.92 
12/28/2014 II0696083-637 099-COMM SPL 10.00DB 81. 92 
12/g8/2014 II0696083-638 099-COMM SPL 39.14DB 42.78 
12/~1/2014 II0696568-011 072-METER MAIL 230363 2.24DB 40.54 
(').1/02/2015 II0696669-001 223-IMF PAYROL DEC PAY 74.40 114.94 
01/.l}B/-2015 II0696837-617 099-COMM SPL 56.28DB 58.66 
cn/tD.s/2015 II0696837-618 099-COMM SPL 10.00DB 48.66 
Ql/(l)9/2015 II0697815-016 070-PHOTO COPY 230362 4.lODB 44.56 
01/12/2015 II0697970-,752 099-COMM SPL 32.46DB 12.10 
0111(.::e 3'/12 o :i;;5 HQ0698206-013 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80.00 92.10 
ca.1;f:m9 / i-o 1 s II0698867-621 099-COMM SPL 5.30DB 86.80 
CD.:E/Jis/:iOl5 II0698867-622 099-COMM SPL 36.73DB 50.07 
0 :E /216/20 ],5 II0699467-609 099-COMM SPL 0.20DB 49.87 
0.]/96/2015 II0699467-610 099-COMM SPL 23.51DB 26.36 
CD:E/2'i/,/2015~i'i·I'I06 996 02- 003 071-MED CO-PAY 726561 8.00DB 18.36 
0:E/30/201:5 II0699932-004 223-IMF PAYROL JAN PAY 74.40 92.76 
02/0.2/2015 II0700072-650 099-COMM SPL 17.13DB 75.63 
0:2/0·s/i01-s II0701065-719 099-COMM SPL 75.58DB 0.05 
~2J~0/2015 HQ0701203-011 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80.00 80.05 
0.2/16/2015 II0701772-682 099-COMM SPL 43.84DB 36.21 
t2/2d/2015 HQ0702486-019 061-CK INMATE 230437 2.00DB 34.21 
~2/1j/io15 II0702663-658 099-COMM SPL 22.95DB 11. 26 
03../ 02/2015 II0703476-608 099-COMM SPL 10.87DB 0.39 
0:1/Cv§'I,· ?.'. 
l.il 1 1D,Er +c · I··· f ,.,_, 
C!J l /.lli 9 / Z O l : 
llil/"' "J /201 v:: . i_j "' ... 
Ci3?/-'~ if' "·:Wl!f. 
A 'tl"l·,41•'i':..Y . ,. ,. 
000024
r. ~<-:f,,-;""' •,;, i' ~f <1<1,1,-·..,;; -~;I,.-_ 
l!•,J,·.:lm,r i,() ~ 
,,.,,.~ 1l,-,.-t1 1 ·l.:- ... 
l"!l i': l.~l c-~ ? 0 : 
"""· ';\ : •• \; .. •• ·:--"': "-'! 
~;).2 /flt~·~ 1:-:16,)~. 
0~l' ..I36/2t)lr!?~ :1.::_. 
~~ .. '"', ) f\o;) I 1 / r, 1 ~ t >"" .... ": ~~JP,Rf;1~PST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES========== 12/03/2015 = UILIJ .-· • .J.lJ 1 .:1 .. ~0 · 
D. ~j /_(:ll& /2 0 , : 
t~:.'!;/(i!!}/-2{{ ·:~ 
R~f~:F!r9~~~_6i342 Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
AG1yf?)li;l:t:~:·· CHK Status: ACTIVE 
~-J..,:.,.-J; .?,iJ 
2~~~t~J~action Dates: 11/0l/2014-12/03/2015 
\; ..... / f...J,~ •' .... 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-14 
(ll;iJ;!::;·~, ' . 
,. , • ··:::i ~ ,; ... Beg1.nn1.ng Total Total Current 
~~:··<'~~:'./i~:·:~ Balance Charges Payments Balance 
,,t,1,.,1, t:-',~\.\ 1. 23 2238 .16 2301. 56 64. 63 
tll: ····": ,·-~.,.}. ====================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
p!t;r -·:;?~ Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
~"Jlrt}i.;:it:\i; ,.~f ,,, 1 - - - - - - - - - - -:q~,i-9,~f~~ts II0703529-004 ------------------ ;;;-;~;--- ----------
03j,~f,bl~ II0704282-654 
P-~iJ~t~:qtl:HQ0704443-010 
:ifa'%.~~t;?;q'~5·. II 0 7 04 9 9 0 - 6 21 
~3'¼2~'/4':2~15 II0705728-582 Rii.~%i#~r,~ II0706925-009 




'' :0~1/,27 /2b15 II0709942-480 
~$·~~i'/:~·015 II0710593-011 
• 05¼041/2015 II0710714-469 
' b~/cigf~b15 HQ0710790-004 
os1,riEZ2rlts II0111243-018 






















osif>4/1015 II07213 99-020 
OS/,cM;/;tdi5 HQ0721401-005 
&~/~d~~bf~ II0722436-573 
(Jg1,~i1~-gi$_ ... B'.~0722678- 012 
otr~~1~w.}it· , .. 
~jh\{,P~~;~ ·:~ 
Q~i'. PWk.2C '.;.· 
' ·H ·/ "'' ,1· ll,1 (• ·i: 
p.ryklf!}l~!l,·t.~ "'tr 
lJ-lttf!f!'H,21-'1 ,_,. 







































































































































f':'··· ,- 41 ,.h ,·- ,~ j •'• 
r;i::i...'~t~};{.;.;,,. , 
~ .t3,11:·,~ !il' y>~~ H ·:y~-· {f 1~ ;.;,!.{ ~ .• , . 
/'! ~ .t/J:'!t"f · .. ·4 l~ "" • ·~ 
ti 'f].'1:, VI 6f.1?,"' 
:!'-'~. /J 4~ ... '°J',\. 
;•,t.Jl."',t .. ~ 
ii r;> P f..., 1,r ~ .. J 
~-A/l'ti ~ .,·., ,~~· 
,,. r., tn~/-'. ~· 
'-~.,.I')',\ .. ~,.' .. 
i::',/,II1)0G:;r;rRUST ----------- OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ---------- 12/03/2015 = 
~;t L,"1 tt·; i:i .. 'J/¼\ r 
."! ~, J fr ~~ "; ~:: =-~ :& • 
ri''J''/11, ~ '/''}?\ i ). 
Y ·.!4,. "4· J"!' ,-. ".-.,w+~-
1''-, <'.! / ./', r'~ t. r',, ··~ i: .; J ,/I , ~~ tf,. \Jf" . .J':., !.1. ,/ ~, 
-: .. t'- >;-;)..·... ..\ ,..· 
~e~t-No:06~342 Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
:A-e6~un:tW~cHK Status: ACTIVE 
;4tj I,.; : ,° ~:1:, '1,.r 'i ;,,,., .._.. 
~ 1~ / \Jl•~f 4-.,.7t 'o, 
d~J.~f~:a~~~tion Dates: 11/0l/2014-12/03/2015 ,,, ff. :_; ?.li :;'t:f .. , r;. ,; ~ ~·-;,r,, 
1-;,.,-t /, ~~,~ J, .~'pr.~ ~1.~ ~-i,1,_. 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-14 
'·,:) ;.?. j t ~-- ,,;.~.it,5 :,~ 't,, 't~.. .. • ' 
t.f;j/l'vii;,i',· ... ; •.• ,Beg1nn1ng Total Total Current 
bt·/;-~\%',~c· .·· Balance Charges Payments Balance 
'.\~~ 't'·li; /•,.-;r.f.t '·. • 
ldti,i~,./,.'.J:}: -; 1. 23 2238 .16 2301. 56 64. 63 
t=-·;ii:.'/il,l'JD,'.<.,'f ='· ====================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
oiti\:::~·l!l -•, Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
;i.-~i·'X:~·";;·t:~~ ·.:.. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
p·ijJ:fil:i)~Jh5 HQ0722679-002 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 20. OODB 100. 32 
<fB/ili:Z/2.C>lS II0723332-490 099-COMM SPL 69. 63DB 30. 69 
D8J.2°i4../2bl5 II0724132-461 099-COMM SPL 25.45DB 5.24 
:@ajJi-mY~2G15 II0724912-470 099-COMM SPL 5 .19DB O. OS 
09/03/~015 TI0725430-016 223-IMF PAYROL AUG PAY 74.40 74.45 
o13fbt\J~6is HQ0725432-002 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 14.88DB 59.57 
·cJ'.§1oa/1fo1s II0726021-567 099-COMM SPL 43. 20DB 16. 37 
6'&¢,i~:/:i6:iis II0726783-450 099-COMM SPL 6. 94DB 9. 43 
· ti:~f~fu/12.~iS II0727564-452 099-COMM SPL 8. 77DB O. 66 
, 09/Q3/ff0i5 II0727928-045 100-CR INM CMM 2 .12 2. 78 ~- ",;) ,~·r. .,.., . ,.,~,..n ,,.;; 
0-9f,2'.8·ft·2-'.0ill,BtIJ:0728395-414 099-COMM SPL 2. OODB O. 78 
(, h!'0/osf2:0'is.-.. j 1I0729258-008 223-IMF PAYROL SEP PAY 72. 00 72. 78 
~ ... Y'•.,. ,,~,;""'t.:1 :, .. , ~·. ,. ~--· • 
fOj/.,0;!3'/.2P15 HQ0729260-004 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 14.40DB 58.38 
~ •• ,:I'; l ... J",. ·~ )",_ • 
~.Q/.;£.~./.~fllS II0730318-579 099-COMM SPL 43.86DB 14.52 
10/a:9/2Bl.S II0731010-467 099-COMM SPL 14.49DB 0.03 
,Kt,.. : O'/ !'' •• £\. ~ '~ 
ili(ff.2!7-/2015 HQ0732059-002 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 150. 00 150. 03 
frfo.;l2-7/2tll5 HQ0732060-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 30. OODB 120. 03 
....... ~'. ·'i"' ~- ....... i, •. 
~l:'0/29/2015 II0732406-011 072-METER MAIL 239665 1. 64DB 118. 39 
ill~/~9/iblS II0732412-009 070-PHOTO COPY 241075 0.50DB 117.89 
:9.l~/.!H2/:lo1s II0732717-478 099-COMM SPL 82 .16DB 35. 73 
ilifilf,O.ij/'2015 II0732717-479 099-COMM SPL 21. 57DB 14 .16 
illill1:-0'ifii;ifo1s II0733201-015 223-IMF PAYROL OCT PAY 74.40 88.56 
IDhl/p<it/.:2.(!hs HQ0733203-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14. 88DB 73. 68 
m~/09/Qois II0733938-557 099-COMM SPL 12.0SDB 61.63 
m':fll,fil2f2'015 II0734282-017 072-METER MAIL 241602 2.30DB 59.33 
j~(:·nH5/20l!5 II0734758-467 099-COMM SPL 18. 45DB 40. 88 
filiR.ffu7.,/20i5 HQ0734897-007 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 120. 88 
rufu/i#/Q015 HQ0734898-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 16.00DB 104.88 
Mi/~~0i,iitII0735408-004 070-PHOTO COPY 241603 2.70DB 102.18 
~W,/.~t~f~§i~--J:±0735459-455 099-COMM SPL 24. 76DB 77 .42 
~J\l/~~/.?.~fS II0735459-456 099-COMM SPL 70.39DB 7.03 
1~/6:Il/2015 II0736262-025 223-IMF PAYROL NOV PAY 72.00 79.03 
[fii,mi~26is HQ0736264-005 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14.40DB 64.63 
ff~i-~,if;g ~ :f 
n2otrn--r2~ · -
b .>-~·-j_"'•,-4,!,1.,·.;., ... ., 
!f 0 ;)! 9 /'~ 0. 
:.rti\ u:-1{· .. ,,~r 
~'cil/~~!.~ "', 
ID\!1/,.~};J. .{r 
' : -w, ; ;.~ "'•t• ' ' " 
::if Bi}- U!;l\.>'21. 
tm'7/,:Htt':Jt~ 
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A.M. / 0)_2. Fl~-~'----
DEC 15 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






) Case No. CV-OC-2015-· W SLt '-\. ~ 
) 
) 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, ET AL., ) 
Defendants. 
) ORDER REQUIRING PARTIAL 
) PAYMENT OF FEES AND NOTICE OF 
) INTENT TO DISMISS 
) 
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion for fee waiver in the above-
entitled case. 
In determining whether to grant a partial fee waiver in a prisoner's civil rights case 
the court looks to Idaho Code § 3 l-3220A(3) which provides: 
Upon review of the information provided and considering the prisoner's ability 
to pay all court fees at the time of filing the action, the court shall order the 
prisoner to pay all or part of the court fees as set forth in sections 31-3201 and 
31-3201A, Idaho Code. 
Taking into account the plaintiff's ability to pay, the court is willing to allow the 
plaintiff to pay an initial partial payment towards the full filing fee. 
In sum, the plaintiff is required to pay $25 of the court fees as the initial payment of 
fees, as calculated following LC. § 31-3220A( 4). The plaintiff is also required to make 
monthly payments of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income into the 
Order Requiring Partial Payment of Fees and Notice oflntent to Dismiss 1 
000027
) 
plaintiffs inmate account, until the full amount of all applicable court fees are paid. I.C. § 
31-3220A(5). 1 
The plaintiff must make the payments to the Clerk of the Court. The Department of 
Correction (or jail) is not responsible for making any payments for the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
must request or otherwise secure payment and arrange for its delivery to the Clerk of the 
Court. The Department of Correction ( or jail) should not make any payments on behalf of the 
plaintiff unless otherwise instructed by the plaintiff. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS / '-~ay of December 2015. 
Q~ll/J 
Magistrate Judge 
1The initial filing fee was waived pursuant to LC. § 31-3220A. That statute does not provide any authority for 
the court to provide for (i.e., pay for) service of process in a prisoner civil rights action. See Murray v. Spalding, 
141 Idaho 99, 101, 106 P.3d 425, 427 (2005) ("The district court had no authority to waive any fee that may be 
charged to serve the summons and complaint ... The district court likewise had no authority to order that any 
fees for service of the summons and complaint be paid at public expense. Idaho Code § 31-3220(6) provides 
that if the court finds that a person who is not a prisoner is unable to pay the fees for service of process in a civil 
lawsuit, such fees 'shall be paid out of the district court fund of the county in which the action is filed.' Idaho 
Code § 31-3220A, which applies to indigent prisoners, does not contain a similar provision. Finally, the district 
court had no authority to order that service of the summons and complaint be accomplished by mail. It could not 
disregard the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure specifying the manner of accomplishing service."). 
Order Requiring Partial Payment of Fees and Notice oflntent to Dismiss 2 
000028
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 
77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
Date: ·eEt :( 6 2.01 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Order Requiring Partial Payment of Fees and Notice oflntent to Dismiss 3 
000029
c•f\ EC E \ \t E 0 
.; DEC 3 O 2015 
,f<oar~~\\Wlifl:r_k Workman # 61342 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
~.M. ____ F'--~. ?f : == 
DEC 3 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ROSE WRIGHT 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk 














:)1 _____________ ) 
Case No. CV O C 15 2 0 8 6 4 
SUMMONS 
·" 
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF. THE COURT -- --- --- --- -- -- ------ ------··,v 
MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU 
RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. 
READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, 
an appropriate written response must be filed with the above designated 
court within 20 days after service of this summons on you. If you 
fail to respond the court may enter judgment against you as demanded 
by the plaintiff in the complaint. 
A copy of the complaint is served with the summons. If you wish 
to seek the advice of_or representation by an attorney in this matter 
you should.do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may 
be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
SUMMONS 1 of 2 
000030
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 
10 (a)(1) and other Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of the case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain 
admissions or denials of the separate allegations of the com-
plaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the 
signature, mailing address and telephone number of your 
attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response 
to plaintiff's attorney as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response 
contact the Clerk of the above named court. 
Dated thisjo day of ~' 2015 
SUMMONS 2 of 2 
000031
~· ' 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
}.;(;, ~ 
1~M.-_-,_-_-_-_-_-_ciF...:1i"i:~;;:;--_-'U,'-~-~-'1~~------~ 
Case: '- . Court: County: Job: JAN 2 9 2016 
CVOC1520864 IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ADA, ID 759074 (120122-2) 
DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE G~4~!@TOPHER D. RICH, Cle 
COUNTY OF ADA Sy JAMIE MARTIN 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner: Defendant I Respondent: UC.-UIY 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OFIDAHO. 
Received by: For: 
Forty Dollar Serve Loyal To One Ministry 
To be served upon: 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
I, Shawn Kimmell, being duly sworn, depose and say: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action, and that within the 
boundaries of the state where service was effected, I was authorized by law to make service of the documents and informed said person of 
the contents herein 
Recipient Name/ Address: KAREN MAGNELLI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Company: 1299 N Orchard St #110, BOISE,, ID 83706 
Manner of Service: Authorized BY DELIVERING TO THE HAND OF KAREN MAGNELLI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Jan 26, 2016, 
4:20pm MST 
Documents: SUMMONS AND PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT; EXHIBIT "A" AND "B" (Received Jan 22, 2016 at 4:14pm MSTI 
Additional Comments: 
1) Successful Attempt: Jan 26, 2016, 4:20 pm MST at Company: 1299 N Orchard St #110, BOISE,, ID 83706 received by KAREN MAGNELLI, 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. Other: 
Phone: (208) 658-2000; 
Shawn Kimmell Date 
Forty Dollar Serve 
10400 Overland Road PMB#240 
Boise, ID 83709 
208-695-6428 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by the affiant who is 
~ 1-a. - -1-/~ 
Date Commission Expires 
JENNIFER SHUMAKER 
NOTARY PUBLIC 




,,.M. __ - -_-_--_--_FiuF1~m. 2~-~i-f--: 
: QI n;· ~ i'. N\'/f 
Case: Court: County: Job: JAN 2 9 2016 
CVOC1520864 IN THE DISTRICT C~lg ~~ 1§1:(!J@RIH JUDICIAL ADA, ID 759073 (120122) 
DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE ,:;,-,RISTGPHiiA D. RICH C/9 
COUNTY OF ADA Dy JAMIE MAAr, • ~N 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner: Defendant I Respondent: 
__ .,,y 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
Received by: For: 
Forty Dollar Serve Loyal To One Ministry 
To be served upon: 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I, Shawn Kimmell, being duly sworn, depose and say: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action, and that within the 
boundaries of the state where service was effected, I was authorized by law to make service of the documents and informed said person of 
the contents herein 
Recipient Name I Address: CHELSEA CARATTINI, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
COURTHOUSE: 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE,, ID 83702 
Manner of Service: 
Documents: 
Additional Comments: 
Authorized BY DELIVERING TO THE HAND OF CHELSEA CARATTINI, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO 
CHRISTOPHER RICH,Jan 27, 2016, 4:06 pm MST 
SUMMONS AND PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT; EXHIBIT "A" AND "B" (Received Jan 22, 2016 at 4:14pm MSTI 
1) Successful Attempt: Jan 27, 2016, 4:06 pm MST at COURTHOUSE: 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE,, ID 83702 received by CHELSEA CARATTINI, 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
Shawn Kimmell 
Forty Dollar Serve 
10400 Overland Road PMB #240 




Subscribed and sworn ta before me by the affiant who is 
Date Commission Expires 
JENNIFER SHUMAKER 
NOTARY PUBLIC 




FEB O 5 2016: 
Ada ca1O11~n~~rR1. Workman 
IS~ P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
# 61342 
NO.-:--:--=----:;:~----
\ ~')')- • FILED AM . ......, __ ...,;...; __ _,P,M ____ _ 
FEB O 5 2016 
CHRISTOPH:R D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of 
Fourth District Court and 
















) ______________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-1520864 
NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVITS 
OF SERVICE WITH COURT 
COMES NOW, Kenneth M. Workman, plaintiff acting prose in the 
above entitled matter, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule S(e) HEREBY GIVES 
NOTICE to this Honorable court that the attached Affidavits of 
Service confirm that the above named defendants have been officially 
served requiring this court to schedule this case for adjudication 
in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this';J.1vct9 day of f-e-bvucu-'1 , 2016 r 
f~-uMm~ 
'~enneth M. Workman 
Plaintiff 





https://us-mg5 .mail. yahoo.com/neo/launch? .rand=48q0nvdn5fb53# 119 ... 
Subject: [ServeManager] Job #759073 Served 
From: Shawn Kimmell (notifications@mail.servernanager.com) 
To: loyalto1 ministry@yahoo.com; 
- • - - ·- -- - - -- ...i- --· - - - - --- - - - --- ----- - - -- --- -- -- ..... -- - -
Date: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 9:55 AM 
Served 
Shawn Kimmell shared a service notification with you: 
Details 
Process Server: Shawn Kimmell 
Date & Time: Jan 27, 2016, 4:06 pm MST 
Service Type: Authorized 
Description of Service: 
,t • • ' 
' : 
-,_ . ··. - CHELSEA CARATTINI, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT 
Recipient: SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Description of Recipient: 
Service Address 
200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE,, ID 83702 
Job & Case 
Job: 759073 · _ .. . 
. ~ . 
Client Job: 1201~7 ,' /· ·1. : : . 
t ,,- • . ~ / , 
-~_ecip_ient: CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
1STAIB OF IDAHO -
Case: CVOC15i°0864 
Plaintiff: KENNETH M. WORKMAN 





https://us-mg5 .mail.yahoo.com/neo/launch? .rand=48q0nvdn5fb53# 119 ... 
Defendant: CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
Court: IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
County: ADA 
Shared with you by: 
Shawn Kimmell 
Forty Dollar Serve 
fortydollarserve@yahoo.com 
208-695-6428 





https://us-mg5.mail.yahoo.com/neo/launch? .rand=48q0nvdn5fb53#534 ... 
' I 
Subject: [ServeManager] Job #759074 Served 
From: Shawn Kimmell (notifications@mail.servemanager.com) 
To: loyalto1 ministry@yahoo.com; 
Date: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 9:46 AM 
Served 
Shawn Kimmell shared a service notification with you: 
Details 
Process Server: Shawn Kimmell 
Date & Time: Jan 26, 2016, 4:20 pm MST 
Service Type: Authorized 
Description of Service: 
Recipient 
. . KAREN MAGNELLI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT 
Recipient: SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
Description of Recipient: Phone: (208) 658-2000 
Service Address 
1299 N Orchard St #110, BOISE,, ID 83706 
Job & Case 
Job:759074 
Client Job: 120122-2 
Recipient: IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
Case: CVOC1520864 
Plaintiff: KENNETHM. WORKMAN 
Defendant: CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO 
1/27/2016 3:50 PM 
000037
I 
·Print https://us-mg5.mail.yahoo.com/neo/launch?.rand=48q0nvdn5fb53#534 ... 
'- ' . . 
2 of2 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; UNI(NOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
Court: IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
County: ADA 
Shared with you by: 
Shawn Kimmell 
Forty Dollar Serve 
fortydollarserve@yahoo.com 
208-695-6428 





Kenneth M. Workman# 61342 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
NO, _ ___,_---==-----tc.?,'l-- FILED A.M. P.M, ____ _ 
FEB O 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
.. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR, THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk 
of the Court, 
















) _____________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-1520864 
MOTION TO DISQUAL~~y JUDGE· 
WITHOUT CAUSE 
COMES NOW, Kenneth M. Workman, plaintiff acting prose in the 
above entitled matter, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(1 ), brings 
forth this motion to disqualify judge without cause. 
WHEREFORE, piLainiE:tf·f respectfully requests that Honorable Judge 
George Hicks be disqualified from the above case number. 
f) Dated thisfJ,vJ day of i_- Febru~ry, 2016 





LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI, ISB #5275 
NO ___ --;;;~--;-~~-
A.M. ____ F_,,_1Le.~ \\ 3<) : 
FEB 11. 2016 
Lead Deputy Attorney General, Department of Correction 
CHRISTOPHER D, RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DePUTY 
KARIN MAGNELLI, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile (208) 327-7485 
E-mail: mkubinsk@idoc.idaho.gov 
E-mail: kmagnell@idoc.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant IDOC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
Defendant Idaho Department of Correction, by and through their attorneys of 
record, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, hereby notifies the Court that Deputy 
Attorney General Karin Magnelli enters her appearance, and notifies the Court that she 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE--1 
000040
.. . , 
should be listed as an attorney of record in the above-referenced matter for the Idaho 
Department of Correction. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: b J/Jl/r· 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendant IDOC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appearance by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Christopher D. Rich 
Ada County Clerk of the District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE--2 
0U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[:gj Inmate Mail Service 
[:gj U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
Deputy Attorney General 
000041
., 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI, ISB #5275 
N0---~=--1------
A.M., ____ F,~~ \: ~ 
FEB 11 2016 
Lead Deputy Attorney General, Department of Correction CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
Dl!PUTY KARIN MAGNELLI, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 .North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile (208) 327-7485 
E-mail: mkubinsk@idoc.idaho.gov 
E-mail: kmagnell@idoc.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant IDOC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _____________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
IDOC'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"), by and 
through their counsel of record, the Idaho Office of Attorney General, and hereby moves 
this Court pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an extension of 
time to file a motion to dismiss and/or answer to Plaintiffs Civil Complaint. Defendant 
IDOC'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR ANSWER--1 
000042
IDOC requests an extension until February 22, 2016. This Motion is supported by the 
Affidavit of Karin Magnelli, filed herewith. 
By way of this Motion for Extension of Time, Defendant IDOC does not waive 
the right to service under the rules or concede that service of the summons and complaint 
was proper in this matter. Defendant IDOC retains all defenses or objections to the 
lawsuit or the jurisdiction or venue of the court. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of February, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: ~f1ll'Jir {i_. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendant IDOC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing !DOC 's Motion for Extension of Time to File 
Motion to Dismiss or Answer by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Christopher D. Rich 
Ada County Clerk of the District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
IZ! Inmate Mail Service 
IZI U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
Karin MagneHi 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDOC'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR ANSWER--2 
000043
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI, ISB #5275 
NO----F"""1LE=o--+-\ ... ,.-'161Jo-'!! 
A.M. ____ P,.M ___ _ 
FEB 11 2016 
Lead Deputy Attorney General, Department of Correction 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
O!'PUTY 
KARIN MAGNELLI, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile (208) 327-7485 
E-mail: mkubinsk@idoc.idaho.gov 
E-mail: kmagnell@idoc.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant IDOC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _____________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTYOFADA ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN 
MAGNELLI IN SUPPORT OF 
IDOC'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR 
ANSWER 
KARIN MAGNELLI, being duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Deputy Attorney General assigned to this matter through the 
Idaho Office of Attorney General and I am over the age of eighteen and competent to 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN MAGNELLI IN SUPPORT OF IDOC'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS OR ANSWER--1 
000044
l 
testify to the matters herein. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge as 
counsel of record for Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"). By way of 
this Motion for Extension of Time or Affidavit, Defendant IDOC does not waive the right 
to service under the rules or concede that service of the summons and complaint was 
proper in this matter. 
2. Plaintiffs Civil Complaint ("Complaint") was filed on December 30, 
2015. A Complaint and Summons was served on the Idaho Office of Attorney General on 
January 26, 2016. 
3. The Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint is due on February 15, 2016. 
4. Due to my current work load, I require additional time to prepare an 
answer or motion to dismiss in this matter. I request an extension until February 22, 
2016, to file Defendant IDOC's answer or motion to dismiss in this matter. 
5. Given that a motion to dismiss will potentially dismiss Plaintiffs claims 
against Defendant IDOC in this matter and that these proceedings are in the preliminary 
stages with no scheduling order and no trial date, I do not believe Plaintiff will suffer 
prejudice if the requested extension is granted. 
6. This is the first requested extension by Defendant IDOC in this matter. 
7. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2016. 
~~-arinMagne1li 
SUBSrRIRPD AND SWORN To before e this / 11\...d ,,,l"~, •• ,. 
"'''' ~\ :10 3,1. ,:,,,, 
~ .. ~~~""'",,.,, 
/oJ'·,-t'dOf/1 \ 
: I " : R 'd' : : · • ..- : es1 mg at . A t,,(,,,fi 
\ \ ,<~v.1.0~ ~ .r--j CommissionE ires: 'k-20-//2 ~~--. .-~.: 
AFFIDA~~F.~~~MAGNELLI IN SUPPORT OF IDOC'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION.~.tilwit TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS OR ANSWER--2 
000045
l • <• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Karin Magnelli in Support of IDOC's 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Dismiss or Answer by the following 
method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Christopher D. Rich 
Ada County Clerk of the District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[g] Inmate Mail Service 
[gj U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
~v?~ 
Karin Magnelli 
Deputy Attorney General 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN MAGNELLI IN SUPPORT OF IDOC'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS OR ANSWER--3 
000046
AM FILED I) , ,-, '-----~.M.~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE FEB 1 2 2016 
Case: Court: County: Job: CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~ 
CVOC1520864 IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ADA, ID 759074 (120122-2) By ROSE WAIGI-IT 
DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE DePU'TY 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner: Defendant I Respondent: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
Received by: For: 
Forty Dollar Serve Loyal To One Ministry 
To be served upon: 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
I, Shawn Kimmell, being duly sworn, depose and say: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action, and that within the 
boundaries of the state where service was effected, I was authorized by law to make service of the documents and informed said person of 
the contents herein 
Recipient Name I Address: KAREN MAGNELLI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Company: 1299 N Orchard St #110, BOISE,, ID 83706 
Manner of Service: Authorized BY DELIVERING TO THE HAND OF KAREN MAGNELLI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Jan 26, 2016, 
4:20pm MST 
Documents: SUMMONS AND PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT; EXHIBIT "A" AND "B" (Received Jan 22, 2016 at 4:14pm MSD 
Additional Comments: 
1) Successful Attempt: Jan 26, 2016, 4:20 pm MST at Company: 1299 N Orchard St #110, BOISE,, ID 83706 received by KAREN MAGNELLI, 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. Other: 
Phone: (208) 658-2000; 
Shawn Kimmell Date 
Forty Dollar Serve 
10400 Overland Road PMB #240 
Boise, ID 83709 
208-695-6428 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by the aftiant who is 
~ /-;;J. - -1-1;z.. 
Date Commission Expires 
JENNIFER SHUMAKER 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
000047
ru .. cu 
RECEIVED 
FEB 1 2 2016 
----.J'..M V-f6:J ··-·· 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE FEB 1 2 2016 
l\ ,J_ ,.... - -· -· ·- -C~~;w VVUI lco'tf~@U{ County: Job: -· "··- • vrna;;;n U. Mil. By ROSE WRIGI-P 
CVOC1520864 IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ADA, ID 759073 (120122) DEPun· 
DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner: Defendant I Respondent: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
Received by: For: 
Forty Dollar Serve Loyal To One Ministry 
To be served upon: 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I, Shawn Kimmell, being duly sworn, depose and say: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action, and that within the 
boundaries of the state where service was effected, I was authorized by law to make service of the documents and informed said person of 
the contents herein 
Recipient Name/ Address: CHELSEA CARATTINI, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
COURTHOUSE: 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE,, ID 83702 
Manner of Service: 
Documents: 
Additional Comments: 
Authorized BY DELIVERING TO THE HAND OF CHELSEA CARATTINI, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO 
CHRISTOPHER RICH,Jan 27, 2016, 4:06 pm MST 
SUMMONS AND PRISONERS CIVIL COMPLAINT; EXHIBIT "A" AND "B" (Received Jan 22, 2016 at 4:14pm MSTI 
1) Successful Attempt:Jan 27, 2016, 4:06 pm MST at COURTHOUSE: 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE,, ID 83702 received by CHELSEA CARATTINI, 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON CHRISTOPHER RICH, COURT CLERK OF THE FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
Shawn Kimmell 
Forty Dollar Serve 
10400 Overland Road PMB #240 
Boise, ID 83709 
208-695-6428 
Subscribed and swam to before me by the affiant who is 
Date 
Date Commission Expires 
I· ,; .. ·. 
,~,._ ...-:--, ............ --1 
JENNIFER SHUMAKER 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
000048
JAN M. BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
KALED. GANS 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 9013 
'ID., ___ "'i:'11i:~-&&-~sa--
AM., ____ F..JIL~~ 3dL 
FEB 16 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIOAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the Fourth ) 
District Court, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTIONS, UNKNOWN AND ) 






Case No. CV OC 1520864 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.12(b) 
Defendant Christopher Rich, Ada County Clerk, through his counsel of record, the Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, moves this Court for aii order dismissing all claims and this action in its entirety 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)-PAGE 1 
g:\kdg\torts\workman\pleadings\motion to dismiss.docx 
000049
-~ 
as to Defendant Christopher Rich on the grounds and for the reasons the Plaintiffs Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
This Motion is made and based upon the Memorandum filed contemporaneously 
herewith, as well as the pleadings and other documents on file with the Court. 
DATED this Mday of February 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Pro 
By: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i6 day of February 2016 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b) to the 
following persons by the following method: 
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI, P. 0. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
--==---- Hand Delivery 
>< U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)- PAGE 2 
g:\kdg\torts\workman\pleadings\motion to dismiss.docx 
000050
,• 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
KALED.GANS 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 9013 
FEB \ 6 20\6 
CHR\SB:f~~;:A~i!~~K Clerk 
If OEP\JT'( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
,I 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the Fourth ) 
District Court, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTIONS, UNKNOWN AND ) 






Case No. CV OC 1520864 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b) 
Defendant Christopher Rich, Ada County Clerk, through his counsel of record, the Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, submits this Memorandum in Support of 
his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b). 
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE. 
The Plaintiff, Kenneth Workman, is incarcerated with the Idaho Department of 
Correction (IDOC). He claims that IDOC, co-Defendant in this case, "illegally" garnished his 
inmate wages, because-he alleges-the restitution order supporting the garnishment has 
expired. The Plaintiff further claims, as best can be gathered, that Ada County Clerk Christopher 
Rich violated the Plaintiff's rights by allegedly accepting these garnished funds, not returning 
them, or both. 1 
The Plaintiff's Complaint was served on the Clerk on January 29, 2016. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
To comply with I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) a plaintiff's pleadings must state, among other things, "a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As a general 
rule, Idaho Courts considering motions to dismiss such complaints look "only to the pleadings to 
determine whether a claim for relief has been stated" by a Plaintiff. Colafranceschi V. Briley, 
355 P.3d 1261, 1264, 2015 Ida. LEXIS 187, *8 (Idaho 2015) (quoting Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
Cnty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409, 258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011)). Courts make "every 
reasonable intendment" to sustain to a complaint upon review. See Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. 
Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P .2d 281 (1948). But, if it "appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle [the plaintiff] to 
relief," then the 12(b)(6) motion should be granted. Briley, 355 P.3d at 1264, Ida. LEXIS 187, 
*8. 
1 In a letter to the Clerk, attached to and incorporated in the Complaint, the Plaintiff avers and requests the 
following: "the Idaho Department of Corrections [has] been deducting money from my inmate account 
and forwarding it to your office for processing. [Be] advised that these deductions are being taken 
illegally from me of which you have the authority to stop .... As such I'm specifically requesting all 
money received by you from the IDOC starting from 6/29/15 to the present be reimbursed to my inmate 
account and that you give notice to the IDOC to cease and desist any and all deductions for the [above] 
case number." 
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Additionally, in pro se cases such as these, "civil litigants are not accorded special 
latitude merely because they chose to proceed through litigation without the assistance of an 
attorney." Briley, 355 P.3d at 1264, 2015 Ida. LEXIS 187, *8 (quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 148 
Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009)). Accordingly, pro se litigants in civil cases "are held 
to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Briley, 355 P.3d at 1264, 
2015 Ida. LEXIS 187, *8 (quoting Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842,846,275 
P.3d 857, 861 (2012)). 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Plaintiff's Wages Were Garnished According to Statute and Pursuant to an 
Ongoing Criminal Restitution Order; Therefore, Any Alleged Actions Taken by the 
Clerk Pursuant to that Garnishment are Lawful, and Not a Violation of the 
Plaintiff's Rights. 
The Plaintiff's essential claim is the Order of Restitution at issue has "expired"; thus, he 
argues, any action taken pursuant to it-such as the garnishment of his inmate wages-violates 
his constitutional and statutory rights. According to his Complaint, "[t]he order for restitution 
and civil judgment in the amount of $32,391.44 was ordered pursuant to LC. § 19-5304 in 
plaintiff[']s case No. H101303 on April 28, 2003 over 13 years ago."2 
Mr. Workman goes on to claim that, "[u]nder LC.§ 10-1110 and LC. § 10-1111, a money 
judgment must be renewed within Five (5) years of the judgment to remain enforceable." The 
Plaintiff alleges that no such motion to renew was filed here, and that consequently, his 
restitution debt is "uncollectable, expired and unenforceable." He cites to Grazer v. Jones3 for 
this proposition and concludes: "since no motion for renewal of judgment was filed and granted 
[ within five years of the date of the Order of Restitution], the judgment expired well over seven 
2 Based on the Title-19 statute he cites to, the Order of Restitution is plainly an order stemming from a 
criminal case, in which Mr. Workman was a Defendant. 
3 154 Idaho 58,294 P.3d 184 (Idaho 2013). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LR.C.P. 12(b) 
PAGE3 
g:\kdg\torts\workman\pleadings\memorandum re mot. to dismiss.docx 
000053
-
(7) years ago on April 28, 2008. Once the judgment expires the debt is no longer collectible." 
Hence, he reasons, any alleged efforts taken by the Defendants to collect on the Order of 
Restitution are a violation of his rights. 
The Plaintiffs argument must be dismissed because he fails to distinguish between a civil 
judgement and a criminal restitution order-the latter of which he admits was entered against 
him, and for which he proffers no evidence it ever went away. From the start of his first and 
only claim, Plaintiff concedes that restitution was ordered against him, in a criminal case, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. That statute provides the following: 
(2) Unless the court determines that an order of restitution would be 
inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any crime 
which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim. 
An order of restitution shall be a separate written order in addition to any other 
sentence the court may impose, including incarceration, and may be complete, 
partial, or nominal. The court may also include restitution as a term and 
condition of judgment of conviction; however, if a court orders restitution in the 
judgment of conviction and in a separate written order, a defendant shall not be 
required to make restitution in an amount beyond that authorized by this chapter. 
Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the victim actually 
suffers. The existence of a policy of insurance covering the victim's loss shall not 
absolve the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution. 
( 4) If a separate written order of restitution is issued, an order of restitution shall 
be for an amount certain and shall be due and owing at the time of sentencing or 
at the date the amount of restitution is determined, whichever is later. An order 
of restitution may provide for interest from the date of the economic loss or 
mJury. 
(Emphasis added.) The Plaintiff then cites to Idaho Code 20-209H, which provides the 
following: 
Duty to establish inmate accounts - Payment of restitution. The state board of 
correction shall establish an account in the name of each inmate confined in a 
correctional facility. All moneys in the inmate's possession upon admission, all 
moneys earned from institutional employment and all moneys received by the 
inmate from any other source, other than money that is contraband, shall be 
deposited in the inmate's account. If the court ordered an inmate to make 
restitution under section 19-5304, Idaho Code, and the restitution is still owing, 
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then twenty percent (20%) of each deposit in the inmate's account shall be paid to 
the state board of correction who shall, within five (5) days after the end of the 
month, pay such moneys to the clerk of the court in which the restitution order 
was entered for payment to the victim. The provisions of this section shall apply 
to any inmate confined in a correctional facility on or after the effective date of 
this section. 4 
(Emphasis added.) The sum of these statutes, taken together, is plain: assuming the facts pleaded 
by the Plaintiff are correct, he owed money pursuant to a criminal restitution order at the time 
Section 20-209H took effect. That statute mandated that his inmate wages be garnished to 
satisfy the Order of Restitution. And therefore any of the alleged actions taken by the Ada 
County · Clerk-who had a duty to receive and process garnished funds provided by the 
co-Defendant-would have been entirely according to statute. 
The Plaintiff argues that that it was necessary to "renew" the Order of Restitution, as if it 
were a civil judgment, and that because it was not renewed it expired on April 28, 2008.5 His 
error stems from misreading the statute that gives crime victims the option-and simply the 
option-of recording orders as civil judgments: 
Collection of judgments. (1) After forty-two (42) days from the entry of the 
order of restitution or at the conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of 
restitution, whichever occurs later, an order of restitution may be recorded as a 
judgment and the victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments. 
I.C. § 19-5305. (Emphasis added.) 
4 As the Plaintiff points out, that effective date was.March I, 2015. 
5 The Plaintiff cites to Grazer v. Jones for this proposition; but Grazer concerns a civil judgment, in a 
civil case, and is unenlightening to the issue of whether Orders of Restitution function, as the Plaintiff 
seems to argue, solely as civil judgments. See Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 62, 294 P .3d 184, 188 
(Idaho 2013). Case law specifically regarding restitution orders suggests he is incorrect: in State v. 
McCool, the Court cites to Idaho Code Section 19-5305. 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 P.3d 291,293, 2004 Ida. 
LEXIS 34, *6 (Idaho 2004). The McCool Court quotes the statute and notes that: "'[A]n order of 
restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may execute as provided by law for civil 
judgments.' Thus, the order of restitution provided in Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) becomes, in essence, a 
civil judgment for the amount of such restitution." Id; see also State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886, 292 
P.3d 273, 277, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 4, *7 (Idaho 2013). The Court seems to say that if an Order of 
Restitution was recorded as a civil judgement, that, logically, it would function like a civil judgment. 
However, the Court did not hold that all restitution orders simply become civil judgements as a matter of 
law, nor did it conclude that this unexplained alchemy would somehow terminate the underlying order. 
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The Plaintiff assumes that because victims may record restitution orders as civil 
judgments, that all restitution orders are civil judgments. This is a leap of logic: a criminal 
restitution order was entered, as a criminal penalty, against the Plaintiff. Whether or not this 
order was subsequently recorded as a civil judgment, it did not cease to function as a court order. 
And the Plaintiff does not allege that he satisfied the Order, does not allege any Court disrupted 
the Order, nor can he point to a coherent theory of law as to why it would have expired. As a 
result, any garnishment of his wages based on that restitution is lawful-and is indeed required 
by statute. 
The Plaintiff is serving a life sentence and the corresponding Order of Restitution against 
him lives on as a matter of law. Even taking the facts pleaded in his Complaint as true, the 
Plaintiff has not presented a valid claim to the contrary. That claim, and this Complaint, must 
thus be dismissed. 
B. The Statute of Limitations bars the Majority of the Plaintiff's Claims. 
The Plaintiff requests injunctive relief, costs, and "[ d]amages ... for funds deducted after 
April 2008 up onto the present." He appears to allege that any garnishment of his wages from 
that point on would be a conversion of his property. 
Even assuming that such garnishment occurred since 2008, and assuming that Defendant 
Christopher Rich participated in garnishing the Plaintiffs wages since 2008, the majority of the 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Jdaho._Cod~ __ sets a three-year statute of 
limitations for any "action for taking, ~~t~ining or injuring any goods or chattels, including 
actions for the specific recovery of personal property." Idaho Code § 5-218. To the extent 
Mr. Workman's theory escapes dismissal on the grounds explained above, he can only recover 
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on alleged conversion that occurred from December, 2012, until the present. The remainder of 
his claims for damages should be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, the Ada County Clerk respectfully requests that he be dismissed 
from the Plaintiffs Complaint for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
. ~ 
DATED this N day of February 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ILL~ day of February 2016 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R. C.P. 12(b) to the following persons by the following method: 
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI, P. 0. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
-- Hand Delivery x U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail --
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) ORDER DENYING 
) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
) 
On February 5, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned 
without cause. The motion is denied. 
The time for filing such a motion has expired and/or the motion has not been filed in 
compliance with the Idaho rules. See I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B) ("A motion for disqualification 
without cause must be filed not later than seven (7) days after service of a written notice or 
order setting the action for status conference, pretrial conference, trial or for hearing on the 
first contested motion, or not later than twenty-one (21) days after service or receipt of a 
complaint, summons, order or other pleading indicating or specifying who the presiding 
judge to the action will be, whichever occurs first; and such motion must be filed before the 
commencement of a status conference, a pretrial conference, a contested proceeding or trial 
before the judge sought to be disqualified."); I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(H). 
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• 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 
77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
IDOC#61342 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
Date: ----"--'FE~B:........c....2_2_2_01_6_ 
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,1 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI, ISB #5275 
:~= \JU b FIL~~----
FEB 2 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH. Clerk 
t;1y AUSTIN LOWS 
Ql'Ji!'U'tV 
Lead Deputy Attorney General, Department of Correction 
KARIN MAGNELLI, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile (208) 327-7485 
E-mail: mkubinsk@idoc.idaho.gov 
E-mail: kmagnell@idoc.idaho.gov 
,Attorneys for Defendant IDOC 
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CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
, COMES NOW the Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"), by and 
through the undersigned counsel, and hereby moves the Court for an order dismissing 
Workman's Prisoner Civil Complaint (Complaint) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56(c) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as Workman has failed to state a claim for which 
relief may be granted and Workman's claim is barred by res judicata and the statute of 
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limitations. This Motion is supported by a memorandum and affidavits filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By:~~-
KARIN MAGNLJ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendant IDOC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Idaho Department of Correction's Motion to 
Dismiss by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Kale Gans, Deputy Prosecutor 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Counsel for Defendant Rich 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
!ZI Inmate Mail Service 
D U.S. Mail 
!ZI Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
KarinMagnelli 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _____________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
COMES NOW Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"), by and 
through the undersigned counsel, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Idaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant IDOC moves to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure based on Workman's failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted 
and his claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inmate Kenneth Workman filed a Prisoner Civil Complaint ("Complaint") on 
December 30, 2015. Workman argues the deduction of funds from his inmate account at 
the IDOC to satisfy a judgment of restitution ordered against him violates his 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint, p. 4. Workman is 
seeking injunctive relief, damages in the amount of funds deducted from his inmate 
account since April 2008, and sanctions against defendants, including costs incurred by 
Workman to pursue this case. Complaint, p. 5. 
' 
Defendant IDOC was served with the Complaint on January 26, 2015, and 
February 11, 2016, filed a motion for an extension of time to file an answer or motion to 
dismiss, now timely files this Motion to Dismiss and seeks dismissal of the Complaint on 
the grounds that Workman has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
and his claim is barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. Alternatively, 
Defendant IDOC moves this Court to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant 
IDOC because, based on the record as a whole, there is not a genuine issue of material 
fact in dispute. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Workman is in the custody of the IDOC and is currently housed at the Idaho State 
Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). Complaint, p. 2. An order for payment of restitution in 
--- -· ··--·-· 
the amount of $32,391.44 was entered against Workman in Ada County Case number 
H0101303 on April 28, 2003. Complaint, p. 4; Affidavit of Shirley Audens ("Audens 
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Aff."), Ex. A. IDOC began deducting funds from Workman's inmate account on 
September 30, 2003 to be paid towards his restitution order. Audens Aff., 1 6. These 
deductions from Workman's inmate account have continued, with the most recent 
deduction being made on February 9, 2016. Id. These funds have been paid to the Clerk 
of the Fourth Judicial District. Id., 17. 
IDOC has established inmate accounts since at least 1999. Audens Aff., 1 2. 
Deductions from inmate accounts for restitution and other court-ordered obligations have 
occurred since at least 1999. Id., 13. Inmates receive a monthly statement of their inmate 
account showing all deposits to and withdrawals from their account. Id., 1 5. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A Court may grant a 12(b )( 6) motion when it appears beyond doubt that there is 
no set of facts that will support the claim for relief. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
129 Idaho 171, 175 923 P.2d 416 (1996); Ortham v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 
962, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences in the 
record viewed in his/her favor. Id. To the extent that the Court considers matters outside 
of the scope of the pleadings, the Court may consider a 12(b)(6) motion as one for 
summary judgment. See I.R.C.P. 12(b); I.R.C.P. 56(c); Merrifield v. Arave, 128 Idaho 
306,307,912 P.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1996). Rule 9(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that allegations concerning a violation of constitutional rights must be state with 
particularity. 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the "Court must liberally 
construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party and determine whether there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Quinlan v. Idaho Com 'n for Pardons and Parole, 138 
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Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003). "The nonmoving party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and 
' 
produce evidence by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules, to set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. WORKMAN'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
JUDICATA 
The doctrine of res judicata serves three purposes, 
(1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute 
resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would 
follow if the same matter were twice litigated to 
inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious 
litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose 
from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanio.n, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007) citing 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 
Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct.App.1983). "Res Judicata is comprised of claim 
preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Stoddard v. 
Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190, 207 P.3d 162, 166 (2009) citing Hindmarsh, 138 
Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805. Different tests are applied to determine whether claim 
preclusion or issue preclusion applies. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d 617. 
Claim preclusion prevents subsequent litigation between the same parties based 
upon the same claim or a claim related to the previous cause of action. Stoddard, 14 7 
Idaho at 190,207 P.3d at 166 citing Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617. 
To establish claim preclusion, three requirements must be met: (1) the subsequent action 
involves the same parties; (2) the subsequent action is based on the same claim; and (3) 
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there was a final judgment in the prior action. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d 
at 618. 
Issue preclusion prevents relitigating an identical issue in a subsequent action. 
Stoddard, 147 Idaho at 191,207 P.3d at 167 citing Rodriguez v. Dep't o/Correction, 136 
Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). To establish issue preclusion, 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided 
in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior 
litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present 
action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually 
decided in prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on 
the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against 
whom the issue was asserted was a party or in privity with 
a party to the litigation. 
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401,404 (2001). 
As discussed below, the Complaint filed by Workman is barred by res judicata 
under both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
A. Prior Claims Raised by Workman 
i. U.S. District Court Case No. l:10-CV-00081-BLW 
On February 16, 2010, Workman filed a Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Case No. 1: 1 0-cv-00081-BL W 
("District Court Complaint"). Affidavit of Karin Magnelli ("Magnelli Aff. "), Ex. B 1. 
Workman raised claims against the IDOC, the director of IDOC, and others regarding the 
deductions from his inmate account to pay court-ordered restitution.2 He argued that the 
deductions violated his due process rights because he was never afforded a hearing or 
received a Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment. Magnelli Ajf., Ex. B, p. 2. 
1 A Court may take judicial notice of the record from prior actions. City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 
897, 899 n.l, 576 P.2d 495 (1978). 
2 Workman was only allowed to proceed-against the IDOC director, Brent Reinke. 
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Workman requested that the court issue an order refunding Workman the amount of 
funds deducted from his inmate account beginning in September 2003, and be awarded 
damages for each due process deprivation and for income lost as a result of not pursing 
an institutional job or receiving family financial aid due to the deductions. Id. 
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on September 22, 
2011, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Reinke. Magnelli Alf, Ex. C. A 
Judgment was entered on September 22, 2011, dismissing Workman's District Court 
Complaint with prejudice. Id., Ex. D. The District Court found Workman had not been 
denied due process of law. Id., Ex. C, p. 13. The District Court found Workman had 
notice that he owed restitution to the victims of his crime and that IDOC had been 
deducting the funds from his inmate account since September 2003. Id., p. 14.3 The 
District Court also acknowledged IDOC's authority under Idaho Code § 11-108 to 
execute judgments against prisoners and IDOC's policy requiring the deduction. Id., pp. 
14-15. Finally, the District Court found requiring additional procedures would not aid the 
government's compelling interest in collecting restitution on behalf of a victim. Id., p. 15. 
The District Court concluded by finding "that [Workman] has been provided with the 
process to which he was due under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., p. 16. Workman did 
not appeal this decision. 
B. Claim Preclusion 
The Complaint currently before this Court is barred by claim preclusion as it 
involves the same parties and claim that was litigated by Workman in his 2010 District 
Court Complaint which resulted in a final judgment. "A valid final judgment rendered on 
3 This District Court also cited to Motion to Cease and Desist Restitution and Tenninate Restitution 
Withholding Order on July 21, 2004, filed by Workman in Ada County Case No. H0101303, to support its 
finding Workman received adequate process. Id. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORTOF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION'S MOTION TO DISMISS--6 
000067
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action 
between the same parties upon the same claim." Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 
805. 
i. The subsequent action involves the same parties 
In the 2010 District Court Complaint, Workman named as respondent the IDOC 
director, Brent Reinke, who was a state employee at that time. In the current Complaint, 
Workman has named Christopher Rich the clerk of the Fourth Judicial District, the 
IDOC, and other "unknown and unnamed individuals of the State of Idaho." It has long 
been recognized that parties named in their official capacity are representatives of the 
State, and therefore both complaints are against the State rather than those specific 
individuals. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 903, 854 P.2d 242, 246 (1993). Therefore, 
the parties in both the current Complaint and the 2010 District Court Complaint involve 
the same parties, Workman and the State. 
ii. The claim in the Petition is the same claim raised in the 2010 
District Court Complaint 
Workman has asserted the same claim in the current Complaint as he asserted in 
his 2010 District Court Complaint. When evaluating whether the same claim is at issue, 
the claim asserted must not be identical but also includes other matters which could have 
been raised and litigated in the first action. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at 
620 citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 
110 (1993) (emphasis added). After the conclusion of the case all other claims are 
"extinguished." Id. (quoting Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 
P.2s 319, 323 (1990). "This Court has noted that the 'transactional concept of a claim is 
broad' and that claim preclusion 'may apply even where there is not a substantial overlap 
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between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those 
theories."' Id. (quoting Aldape, 105 Idaho at 259,668 P.2d at 135.) 
In the instant case, a broad application of the "transactional concept" of what 
constitutes a claim is not necessary. Workman's claim in the 2010 District Court 
Complaint is the same claim he makes in the current Complaint, which is that the IDOC 
is violating his constitutional right to due process by deducting of funds from his inmate 
account to satisfy the order of restitution entered against him. The only difference 
between the two complaints is the theory upon which Workman relies for relief. In his 
2010 District Court Complaint, Workman relied upon the argument that he was entitled 
to additional due process before the IDOC began deducting funds from his inmate 
account. In his current Complaint, Workman relies upon the theory the order for 
restitution has expired because the judgment was not timely renewed and therefore, his 
due process rights have been violated. According to Workman, the restitution order 
expired in April 2008 pursuant to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111. Complaint, p. 3. 
In a decision regarding the applicability of res judicata to a lawsuit for personal injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident which was filed after a small claims judgment for 
property damages resulting from the same automobile accident had been entered, the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated "[t]he fact that Hindmarsh is seeking a different remedy and 
broaching new issues in the district court action does not matter - res judicata bars 
subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were 
actually made or which might have been made." Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 
805 (emphasis added). At the time Workman filed his 2010 District Court Complaint, his 
argument that the 2003 restitution order had expired was an argument he could have 
raised but did not do so. At least one deduction for restitution had been made from his 
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inmate account to after the restitution order allegedly expired in April 2008, on July 6, 
2009. Audens Alf.,~ 6. 
Workman cannot and has not asserted any facts to establish that his claim in the 
20 IO District Court Complaint that his due process rights had been violated by the 
deduction of funds from his inmate account pursuant to the April 2003 restitution order, 
is any different than his current Complaint that his due process rights have been violated 
by the continued deduction of funds from his inmate account based on the same 2003 
order of restitution. Workman already raised this claim that the deduction of funds from 
his inmate account violates his due process rights in 2010 and his current reliance upon 
Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 to support his expired judgment theory, was an 
argument that existed at the time of his 2010 Complaint and he failed to raise it. 
iii. The 2010 District Court Complaint resulted in a final judgment 
The final judgment must not resolve the "precise point or question in the present 
action" and the final judgment applies to "every matter which might and should have 
been litigated in the first suit." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 citing 
Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994). There can be 
no dispute that there was a final judgment dismissing with prejudice the 2010 District 
Court Complaint in which the court stated Workman's due process rights were not 
violated by IDOC's deduction of funds from his inmate account pursuant to an order of 
restitution. 
iv. Conclusion 
This current claim by Workman is precisely why claim preclusion exists. 
Workman raised this claim in 2010, and while Workman's argument was based on 
different theory or argument, the claim in the current Complaint is the same. Otherwise, 
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there is nothing to prevent Petitioner from filing a third complaint alleging a different 
constitutional violation or different theory to support his claim that funds are improperly 
being deducted from his inmate account to satisfy the restitution judgment entered against 
him. The Complaint is barred by claim preclusion and must be dismissed. 
C. Issue Preclusion 
The issue before the Court in the current Complaint is whether IDOC can rely 
upon an order of restitution to deduct funds from an inmate's account to satisfy a . .,. 
judgment of restitution. As explained below, the current Complaint is also barred by issue 
preclusion as this issue was previously litigated in the 2010 District Court Complaint. 
i. Workman had a full and/air opportunity to litigate the issue in the 
2010 District Court Complaint proceedings 
The 2010 District Court Complaint provided Workman with a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate whether Workman's due process rights were violated by the IDOC 
relying upon an order of restitution as a basis to deduct funds from his inmate account. 
Workman himself raised the issue in the 2010 District Court Complaint, to which the 
Defendant Reinke filed a motion for summary judgment. Magnelli Alf, Ex. A (see docket 
entry 37). Workman had the opportunity and did in fact submit a response to the motion. 
Id. (see docket entry 39). The district court granted Defendant Reinke summary judgment 
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Id., Exs. C & D. The district court found 
Workman was provided with sufficient process to satisfy any due process requirements 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., Ex. C, p. 16. Workman did not file an appeal. Id., 
Ex.A. 
Workman had and took advantage of all his opportunities to litigate this issue as 
part of the 2010 District Court Complaint proceedings. 
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ii. The issue decided in the 2010 District Court Complaint is identical 
to the issue in the current Complaint 
The issue decided in the 2010 District Court Complaint is identical to the issue in 
the present Complaint with the only difference being the theory relied upon by Workman 
to support his claim. The issue is whether Workman's due process rights have been 
violated by Defendant IDOC's reliance upon an order of restitution to deduct funds from 
his inmate account. In the 2010 District Court Complaint, Workman argued the IDOC 
could not rely upon solely an order of restitution because he was entitled to additional 
due process, and in the current Complaint Workman argues IDOC cannot rely upon the 
order of restitution because the judgment has expired. 
iii. The issue was decided during the 2010 District Court Complaint 
proceedings 
As stated above, whether Workman's due process right have been violated by 
Defendant IDOC's reliance upon an order of restitution to deduct funds from his inmate 
account was decided during the proceedings for the 2010 District Court Complaint. When 
determining whether an issue was decided in a prior litigation in Western Industrial and 
Environmental Services, Inc., v. Kaldveer Assoc. Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court looked at 
whether issue preclusion applied to a claim for damages based upon negligence by 
Kaldveer, despite Kaldveer not being a party to a prior arbitration proceeding involving 
another party. Western Industrial and Environmental Services, Inc., v. Kaldveer Assoc. 
Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 887 P.2d 1048 (1994). The Court stated that while negligence 
specific to Kaldveer was not litigated during the arbitration proceeding, "the issue to be 
estopped, that is the causation of the damages, was clearly litigated by the parties and 
determined by the arbitrator." Id., 126 Idaho at 546, 887 P.2d at 1052. In this case, the 
issue to be estopped, whether IDOC can rely upon an order of restitution to deduct funds 
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from an inmate's account, was litigated and determined by the courts. A final decision 
finding IDOC did not violate Workman's due process rights by relying upon an order of 
restitution to deduct funds from h!s inmate account was made by the district court when it 
dismissed the 2010 District Court Complaint. 
iv. The 2010 District Court Complaint resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits 
The decision by the district co~ during the 2010 District Court Complaint 
Petition proceedings had a conclusive effect. The district court provided an opportunity 
for the parties to be fully heard and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order setting 
forth the basis for its decision. The decision was not appealed by Workman. There can be 
/ no dispute that the 2010 District Court Complaint was subject to a final adjudication on 
the merits. 
v. Petitioner was a party to the February 2010 Petition 
"[T]he party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted must have 
been a party to or in privity with the party in the earlier case." Western Indus., 126 Idaho 
at 545, 887 P.2d at 1052 citing Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 184, 731 
P.2d 171, 178 (1987) (emphasis added). Defendant IDOC is asserting collateral estoppel 
against Workman, who was a party to the 2010 District Court Complaint. Id., citing 
Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 841 P.2d 413 (1992) (finding lack of 
mutuality of parties is not a bar to the application of collateral estoppel.) 
vi. Conclusion 
The elements of collateral estoppel have been met. This issue of whether IDOC 
can rely upon an order of restitution to deduct funds from an inmate account without 
violating the inmate's due process rights was decided by the dismissal of the 2010 
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District Court Complaint by the district court. Workman had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue and there was a judgment on the merits. The Complaint must be 
dismissed based on collateral estoppel. 
D. Conclusion 
When measured against the above, Workman's claim that his due process rights have 
been violated is barred by res judicata and must be dismissed. 
2. COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Idaho Code § 6-905 requires all claims against the state or an employee be 
presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred (180) days "from the 
date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." If a 
resolution has not been reached, a claim against a governmental entity must be filed 
within two (2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. See Idaho Code § 6-911. See also Hauschulz v. State, Dept. of Correction, 
143 Idaho 462,467, 147 P.3d 94, 98 (Id. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the two-year statute of 
limitations in LC. § 6-911 to a claim for recovery of personal property). Pursuant to these 
statutes and based upon Workman's allegations in his Complaint that the restitution order 
became unenforceable on April 25, 2008, Workman would have been required to file a 
notice of claim within six months of April 25, 2008, or October 22, 2008, for any 
deductions occurring after the expiration of the order. Arguably, Workman would not 
have discovered the claim until the first deduction that was made after April 25, 2008 
which was on July 6, 2009. Audens A.ff., ,r 6. Therefore, Workman would have had to file 
a notice of claim on or before January 2, 2010. Regardless of whether proper notice of 
claim was filed with the secretary of state on or before January 2, 2010 pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-905, Workman's Complaint is untimely. 
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Based on the July 6, 2009 deduction from his inmate account for restitution, 
Workman would have had to file his complaint no later than July 6, 2011, and therefore, 
his Complaint filed on December 30, 2015, is untimely.4 As explained in Farber v. State, 
where there is a coincidence of a negligent act and the occurrence of 
damages a 'wrongful act' has been committed for which a legal 
remedy in damages is generally available. Therefore the applicable 
statutes begin to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act albeit the 
full extent of the damages may be unknown or unpredictable at that 
time. 
Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 401, 630 P.2d 685, 688 (1981) citing Ralphs v. City of 
Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227 (1977). Workman attempts to side-step this statute of 
limitations by arguing the deductions are being made pursuant to Idaho Code § 20-209H 
which only went into effect on March 1, 2015, but yet requests all amounts deducted 
since April 2008 to be reimbursed. Workman's reliance upon Idaho Code § 20-209H is 
misplaced and had no impact on Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 or 10-1111 which Workman 
relies upon to support his argument the restitution order has expired. Inmate accounts 
have existed since at least 1999, and deductions for restitution have also occurred since 
that time. Auden Alf.,~~ 2-3. In Workman's case, deductions from his inmate account for 
restitution have occurred since the restitution was ordered in 2003. Id., ~ 6. The only 
change with the implementation of Idaho Code § 20-209H is to require a certain a 
percentage, 20%, be deducted from an inmate's account and it reinforces Idaho Code § 
11-108(3) that funds in inmate accounts are not considered exempt property. Idaho Code 
§ 20-209H does not provide any new authority to IDOC. 
4 Even under the limitations in Idaho Code§ 5-218 as argued by Defendant Rich, Workman's claims are 
untimely. 
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It cannot be disputed that Workman had knowledge of and was aware of the 
deductions made from his inmate account for restitution following the alleged April 25, 
2008 expiration date. Workman's Complaint must be dismissed as untimely. 
3. WORKMAN'S ORDER FOR RESTITUTION HAD NOT EXPIRED 
Defendant IDOC joins in Defendant Rich's argument that an order or restitution 
does not expire and Workman misinterpretation of the statute allowing a victim to file the 
order as a civil judgment. See Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) and 
supporting memorandum filed on February 16, 2016 by Defendant Rich. The policy to 
fully compensate crime victims for any economic loss has long been recognized by the 
courts. State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 171,345 P.3d 226,229 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations 
omitted). It is the clerk of the court that is authorized to collect restitution payments as 
provided in Idaho Code § 19-5305. See State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 172, 345 P.3d 
226, 231 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding the clerk of the district court is authorized to determine 
how and when a restitution order is collected.) Workman has provided no legal basis to 
find the clerk of the district court is prevented from performing its statutory duty to 
collect restitution. 
V. Attorney Fees 
Defendant IDOC requests reasonable attorney fees be awarded pursuant to Idaho 
Code 6-918A, or alternatively Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Workman is unable to present any set of facts that will support his claim for relief. 
The Complaint is barred by res judicata, under both claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Even if res judicata is deemed to not apply, Workman's Complaint is 
untimely. Additionally, Workman has failed to state a claim against Defendant IDOC for 
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., . ~ 
which relief may be granted. The Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety and 
Defendant IDOC is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 2016. 
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1. I am competent to testify to matters herein and I have personal knowledge 
of the facts stated below. 
2. I am employed with the Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") in the 
Fiscal Office as the Financial Specialist Senior. I have held this position since 1999. One 
of my duties as the Financial Specialist Senior is to open and manage trust accounts for 
IDOC inmates. Inmate trust accounts have been established by IDOC for the entire time I 
have been in this position. Due to my position, I am familiar with the IDOC policies and 
procedures regarding the administration of inmate trust accounts. 
3. As part of my duties in this position, I have been instituting garnishment 
of an inmate's trust account when I receive an order from the court, including for 
restitution, since 1999. 
4. Prior to March 1, 2015, I would garnish up to 50% of a prisoner's inmate 
trust account, and send the funds to the district court to distribute to the named victim. 
After the implementation of Idaho Code § 20-209H, effective March 1, 2015, I now 
garnish 20% of every a deposit made into a prisoner's inmate trust account for 
distribution to the named victim by the district court. 
5. I send a monthly statement to all inmates which lists all deposits to and 
withdrawals from an inmate's account for the prior month. 
6. I am familiar with Kenneth Workman and his complaints regarding the 
deductions made from his inmate account to satisfy his restitution obligation. I received 
the restitution order from the district court following Mr. Workman's criminal sentence. 
A true and correct copy of the restitution order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Pursuant 
to this restitution order, I began garnishing his inmate trust account on September 30, 
2003, and a total of thirty-three (33) deductions for restitution have been made from Mr. 
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Workman's inmate trust account up until February 9, 2016. Of those 33 deductions for 
restitution, ten (10) were made between September 30, 2003 and May 10, 2005, seven (7) 
between July 6, 2009 and June 16, 2010, one (1) on July 31, 2012, and fifteen (15) were 
made between June 29, 2015 and February 9, 2016. 
7. All funds garnished from Mr. Workman's account pursuant to the 
restitution order have been paid to the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District. 
8. I received a letter from the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney dated May 
21, 2015, confirming the restitution ordered in Mr. Workman's case has not been 
satisfied and is still owing. 
9. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this .c2L day of February, 2016. 
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{ GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO. 
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·A.M, I_, 30P.M. 
1 ---
APR 2 8 2003 
IN THE PISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF . . 
· THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. H0101303 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
) AND CIVIL JUDGMENT 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, ) 
~~¥~~~@ ) Defendant. ) 
) 
WHEREAS, ,on the 5th day of August, 2002, a Judgment of Conviction was entered 
against defendant KENNETH M. WORKMAN; and therefore pursuant to Idaho Code §19-
5304 and based on evidence presented to this Court, 
IT. IS HEREBY ORDE;tlED, that the defendant, KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
shall make restitution to the victim(s) in the following amounts of:_ 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND CIVIL JUDGMENT (WORKMAN), Page I it:. 
o.} • · · 0001  
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•••••••• -·····. ol r·: ..... : •. ::: .•.... , •. ::-. :~-::-::-:-:: ..... ___________ , ____ ,t ••. 
•• 
Diane King 
a. Approximate amount of recent surgery 
b. Out of pocket medical through 0~/10/03 
SUBTOTAL 
Anthony Barton 
a. Out of pocket medical through 11/02 
b. Cobra reimbursement 
I .. ·• 
. ..... . . . ... c. 2003"deductible and out of'pocket medical expenses for·-· 
December, 2002 and to present in 200~ · 
SUBTOTAL 
TOTAL: 






.... ·--·- - · $3,3°oo;ocf · · 
·'$19,874.45 
J-,!? $32,391.44 
Interest on said restitution amount shall be computed at 
annum. 
z· %per 
FURTHER, this Order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the defendant, 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN. 
IT IS SO ORDE~D. 
DATED, this 1,J day of-+--n'"'Fb~---1+--11---r1H1J} 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AN~ CML JUDGMENT (WORKMAN) , Page 2 
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1. I am a Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, assigned to the 
Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"). I make this affidavit based upon my personal 
knowledge as counsel of record for Defendant IDOC. 
2. Attached hereto as exhibits are a true and correct copies of printouts for 
U.S. District Court Case No. 1:10-CV-00081-BLW I personally obtained, by using the 
internet and going to the webpage maintained by the United States Courts at 
https://ecf.idd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl, and logging into the electronic records 
database for the U.S. District Court of Idaho. 
a. Exhibit A is a printout of the civil docket for U.S. District Court Case 
No. 1:10-CV-00081-BLW. 
b. Exhibit B is a printout of Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint 
(Document 3) dated February 16, 2010. 
c. Exhibit C is a printout of Memorandum Decision and Order 
(Document 41) dated September 22, 2011. 
d. Exhibit D is a printout of Judgment (Document 42) dated September 
22, 2011. 
3. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2016. 
Notary Public or Idaho 
Residing at ----\:=r'-'"-" .. ..,.,..."-r---:-----
Commission Expires:....,._._"-"-'"'~~---,..,.,,, \ 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARIN MAGNELLI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT IDAHO 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of February, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Karin Magnelli in Support of 
Defendant Idaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss by the following method 
to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI. 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Kale Gans, Deputy Prosecutor 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Counsel for Defendant Rich 
OU.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[gl Inmate Mail Service 
OU.S.Mail 
[gl Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IRDONE,LC4,PROSE,TERMED 
U.S. District Court 
District of Idaho (LIVE Database)Version 6.1 (Boise - Southern) 
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 1:10-cv-00081-BLW 
Workman v. County of Ada et al 
Assigned to: Judge B. Lynn Winmill 
Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights 
Plaintiff 
Kenneth M. Workman 
V. 
Defendant 






Idaho Department of Corrections 
TERMINATED: 07/20/2010 
Defendant 
Brent D Reinke 
Date Filed: 02/16/2010 
Date Terminated: 09/22/2011 
Jury Demand: Defendant 
Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil 
Rights 
Jurisdiction: Federal Question 




PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
PROSE 
represented by Michael J Elia 
MOORE & ELIA LLP 
702 W. Idaho Street Suite #800 
PO Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 336-6900 
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Defendant 




Unknown and Unnamed Individuals 





Date Filed # Docket Text 
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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Craig D Stacey 
Moore and Elia 
PO Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-336-6900 
Email: craig@melawfirm.net 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
represented by James R. Stoll 
Arkoosh Law Offices 
POB 2900 




ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
Kirtlan G Naylor 
NAYLOR & HALES 
950 W Bannock Ste 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 383-9511 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com 
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED 
02/16/2010 l APPLICATION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Plaintiff Kenneth M. 
Workman. Responses due by 3/12/2010 (cjm) 
02/16/2010 6. Statement of Prisoner Trust Fund Account, This is a sealed document. re l 
APPLICATION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis by Kenneth M. 
Workman. (cjm) 
02/16/2010 l COMPLAINT against Deborah Bail, Correctional Corporation of America Inc, 
County of Ada, Idaho Department of Corrections, Brent D Reinke, Unknown 
https://ecf.idd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?965705296173 704-L _ 1 _ 0-1 2/20/2016 
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and Unnamed Individuals, filed by Kenneth M. Workman. (Attachments: # 1 
Memorandum in Support, # i Exhibit)( cjm) 
02/16/2010 1 MOTION for Appointment of Counsel with Affidavit in Support by Plaintiff 
Kenneth M. Workman. Responses due by 3/12/2010 (cjm) 
02/16/2010 2. ORDER of Conditional Filing - ( cjm) 
02/16/2010 Q NOTICE of Assignment to Magistrate Judge and Requirement for Consent sent 
to counsel for Kenneth M. Workman re 1 Complaint, (cjm) 
03/16/2010 1 MOTION for Leave to Amend Civil Rights Complaint With Brief Statement 
and Affidavit in Support Thereof 1 Complaint, by Plaintiff Kenneth M. 
Workman. Responses due by 4/9/2010 (Attachments:# 1 Exhibit)(cjm) 
(Entered: 03/17/2010) 
03/16/2010 ~ DISREGARD per Corrective Entry of 4/5/2010 MOTION to Lift Stay and 
Amend to the Lodging of State COurt Record With Statement in Support 
Thereof by Plaintiff Kenneth M. Workman. Responses due by 4/9/2010 (cjm) 
Modified on 4/5/2010 (cjm). (Entered: 03/17/2010) 
03/24/2010 2 NOTICE of Change of Address by Kenneth M. Workman (cjm) 
03/24/2010 10 A REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT TO A DISTRICT JUDGE HAS BEEN 
FILED IN THIS CASE( cjm) 
03/24/2010 DOCKET ENTRY NOTICE of Case Number Change, Case reassigned to Judge 
B. Lynn Winmill for all further proceedings. Judge Candy W. Dale no longer 
assigned to case. Please use this case number on all future pleadings, CV 10-
081-S-BLW. (cjm) 
04/05/2010 CORRECTIVE ENTRY -The entry docket number~ MOTION Lift Stay and 
Amend to the Lodging of State COurt Record With Statement in Support 
Thereof filed by Kem1eth M. Workman was filed incorrectly in this case as it 
was filed in the wrong case by Clerk error. Re-filed in correct case CV 08-052-
S-EJL.(cjm) 
04/28/2010 11 MOTION for Leave to Amend Civil Rights Complaint with Statement in 
Support Thereof by Plaintiff Kenneth M. Workman. Responses due by 
5/24/2010 (Attachments:# 1 Exhibit)(cjm) (Entered: 04/29/2010) 
07/20/2010 12 ORDER re: Kenneth M Workman, #61342 (Notice sent to Finance). The 
Director of the IDOC or his designee shall collect from Plaintiffs prison trust 
account the $350 balance of the filing fee and shall forward payments to the 
Clerk of Court in accordance with 28 USC§ 1915(b)(2). The Clerk of Court is 
directed to serve a copy of this order on the Director of the IDOC as follows: 
Brent D Reinke, Director, Dept of Correction, Attn: Inmate Accounts, 1299 N 
Orchard, Suite 110, Boise, ID 83706. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the 
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm) (Entered: 07/21/2010) 
07/20/2010 14 INITIAL REVIEW ORDER granting 1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma 
pauperis; denying 1 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; granting 1 Motion to 
Amend/Correct; granting 11 Motion to Amend/Correct. It is further ORDERED 
https://ecf.idd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?965705296173 704-L _ 1 _ 0-1 2/20/2016 
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that claims against the following Defendants are DISMISSED from this action 
without prejudice: Deborah Bail, Ada County, Idaho Department of Correction, 
and Correctional Corporation of America. It is further ORDERED that the 
remaining Defendants shall be allowed to waive service of summons. 
Accordingly the Clerk of Court shall forward a copy of the Complaint l and a 
copy of this Order, and a Waiver of Service of Summons to the following 
counsel: Paul Panther, Kirtlan Naylor, and Steve Groom. Signed by Judge B. 
Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the 
addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm) (Entered: 
07/21/2010) 
07/21/2010 13 CERTIFICATE of Clerk re 12 Order. Mailed to Brent D Reinke, Director, 
Department of Correction, Attn: Inmate Accounts, 1299 N Orchard, Suite 110, 
Boise, ID 83706. (cjm) 
07/21/2010 12 CERTIFICATE of Clerk re 14 Initial Review Order mailed to Paul Panther. 
(cjm) 
07/21/2010 16 CERTIFICATE of Clerk re 14 Initial Review Order mailed to Kirtlan Naylor. 
(cjm) 
07/21/2010 17 CERTIFICATE of Clerk re 14 Initial Review Order mailed to Steve Groom. 
(cjm) 
08/02/2010 li WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Phillip Valdez. Phillip Valdez 
waiver sent on 7/21/2010, answer due 9/20/2010. (Naylor, Kirtlan) 
08/03/2010 19 NOTICE of Appearance by James R. Stoll on behalf of Phillip Valdez (Stoll, 
James) 
08/17/2010 20 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Brent D Reinke. Brent D Reinke 
waiver sent on 7/21/2010, answer due 9/20/2010. (Elia, Michael) 
08/17/2010 21 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J Elia on behalf of Brent D Reinke 
(Attachments:# l Supplement Special Deputy Attorney General)(Elia, Michael) 
08/18/2010 22 AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Brent D Reinke. Correcting the 
case number as to 21 Notice of Appearance. Gm) 
08/25/2010 23 ANSWER to l Complaint, Complaint by Phillip Valdez.(Stoll, James) 
09/10/2010 24 MOTION for Voluntary Dismissal of Civil Action by Plaintiff Kenneth M. 
Workman. Responses due by 10/4/2010 (cjm) (Entered: 09/13/2010) 
09/14/2010 25 RESPONSE to Motion re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Non-Opposition filed by 
Correctional Corporation of America Inc, Phillip Valdez. Replies due by 
10/1/2010.(Stoll, James) 
09/28/2010 26 ANSWER to l Complaint, Complaint by Brent D Reinke.(Elia, Michael) 
09/28/2010 27 RESPONSE to Motion re 24 MOTION to Dismiss Non-Opposition filed by 
Brent D Reinke. Replies due by 10/15/2010.(Elia, Michael) 
10/13/2010 28 Plaintiffs RESPONSE to Brent Reinke's Answer to Complaint re 26 Answer to 
Complaint filed by Kenneth M. Workman. (cjm) (Entered: 10/18/2010) 
https://ecf.idd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl ?965705296173 704-L _ 1 _ 0-1 2/20/2016 
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10/13/2010 29 REQUEST for Trial by Judge by Plaintiff Kenneth M. Workman for (cjm) 
(Entered: 10/18/2010) 
12/14/2010 30 ORDER granting 24 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Kenneth M. Workman, 
(Discovery due by 5/20/2011., Motions due by 6/2712011.). All claims against 
Phillip Valdez are dismissed. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. ( caused to be 
mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of 
Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm) (Entered: 12/15/2010) 
12/22/2010 n First REQUEST by Plaintiff Kenneth M. Workman for Discovery to Defendant 
Brent D Reinke. (cjm) (Entered: 12/23/2010) 
02/11/2011 32 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE by Defendant Brent D Reinke re 30 Order, 
Set Deadlines, Terminate Motions, Order, Set Deadlines, Terminate Motions. 
(Elia, Michael) 
02/24/2011 33 MOTION for Permission for Leave of the Court to Proceed With Presenting 
Exhibits With Statement in Support Thereof by Plaintiff Kenneth M. Workman. 
Responses due by 3/21/2011 (cjm) (Entered: 02/25/2011) 
03/24/2011 34 RESPONSE to Motion re 33 MOTION filed by Brent D Reinke. Replies due by 
4/11/2011.(Stacey, Craig) 
03/31/2011 35 NOTICE of Attempt to Bring Request to Court's Attention by Kenneth M. 
Workman (Attachments:# 1 Exhibit)(cjm) (Entered: 04/04/2011) 
04/04/2011 36 REPLY/Rebuttal to Response to Motion re 33 MOTION for Permission for 
Leave of the Court to Proceed With Presenting Exhibits filed by Kenneth M. 
Workman.(cjm) (Entered: 04/07/2011) 
06/27/2011 37 First MOTION for Summary Judgment Michael J Elia appearing for Defendant 
Brent D Reinke. Responses due by 7/21/2011 (Attachments:# l Memorandum 
in Support,# I Supplement Statement of Undisputed Fact,# l Affidavit,# 1 
Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # .§ Exhibit, # 1 Affidavit, # ~ Exhibit, # .2 Exhibit, # 10 
Exhibit, # 11 Affidavit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit)(Elia, Michael) Modified on 
6/28/2011 to Seal Attachments # 12 and # 13 for personal identifiers ( offender 
bank balances) (cjm). 
06/28/2011 38 NOTICE to Pro Se Litigants of the Summary Judgment Rule Requirement re 37 
First MOTION for Summary Judgment (cjm) 
07/08/2011 39 RESPONSE to Motion/Plaintiffs Rebuttal in Objection to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment re 37 First MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by 
Kenneth M. Workman. Replies due by 7/25/2011.(cjm) 
07/27/2011 40 REPLY to Response to Motion re 37 First MOTION for Summary Judgment 
filed by Brent D Reinke.(Elia, Michael) 
09/22/2011 41 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 33 Motion for 
Permission for Leave of the Court to Proceed With Presenting Exhibits With 
Statement in Support Thereof; granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered 
Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by 
cjm) 
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09/22/2011 42 JUDGMENT dismissing case with prejudice. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. 
( caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the 
Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm) 
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I Transaction Receipt 
I 02/20/2016 15:39:00 
:Login: 
rACER I idoclegal:2676463:0llclient Code: II 





14 llcost: 110.40 I Pages: 








Case 1 :10-cv-,~81-BLW 
Kenneth M. workman # 61342 
ICC S 21 C 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Document 3 Filed 02/1 ~~ 'Cffl.JFffS 
FEB 16 2010 
Acvct Fifed .TI me 
1 ELIZABETH A. SMITH.:---0-ERI{, D!STRICT OF ID~HO' .:·,· ;, _ 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT c.ooRT • ,.. ·:. ,· ~-t Jt 
FOR THE DISTRicr OF IDAHO 






COUNTY OF ADA, DEBORAH BAIL ) 
IDAHO DEP!'.OF OORRECI'IONS, BRENT ) 
D. REINKE, CORRECl'IONAL CORPORATIONS ) 
OF AMERICA, UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDI- ) 
VIDUALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, THOSE ) 
INDIVIDUALS ARE BEING SUED IN THEIR ) 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY ) _______________ ) 
case No 1 0 - 0 0 8 1 - C V CWD 
42 u.s.c. § 1981 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 
PRISONERS CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
KENNErH M. Workman is the plaintiff for the above entitled matter and 
alledges as follows: 
A. PARTIES 
1. PLAINTIFF- Kenneth M. Workman is the complaintant who is currently under the 
care, custody, and control of Warden Phillip Valdez of the Idaho correctional 
center owned and operated by Correctional Corporations of America, P.O Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707. 
2. DEFENDANT :- County of Ma is the primary defendant currently located at 200 
West Front St. Boise, Idaho 83702. 
3. DEFENDANT- Deborah A. Bail is the primary defendant currently located at 200 
West Front St. Boise, Idaho 83702. 
4. DEFENDANT - Idaho Department of Corrections is the primary defendant located 
at 1299 North Orchard Boise, Idaho 83702. 
5. DEFENDANT- Brent D. Reinke is the secondary defendant currently located at 
1299 North Orchard Boise, Idaho 83702. 
6. DEFENDANT- Correctional Corporations of America is the secondary defendant 
located at 13500 S. Pleasant Vally Rd. Kuna, Idaho 83706. 
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7. DEFENDANT - Warden Phillip Valdez is the primary defendant located at 13500 
s. Pleasant Valley Rd. Kuna,, Idaho 83706 •. 
8. DEFENDANT - Unnamed and unknown individuals of the state of Idaho and the 
Correctional Corporation who have failed to sign their names to the documents 
relating to this action. 
B. JURISDICTION 
1 •. This is an action seeking re'llief and / or damages for a violation of a protect-
ed right guaranteed by the Constitution of Idaho and the U.S. Constitution. This 
court has_jurisdiction pursuant to title 28 u.s.c. §1331,1343(3) and (4) and 2201. 
~ . 
These:actions are.allowed by 42 u.s.c. §1983 • 
.. ... >, ..... a ~, ~• '"• 
C. VENUE 
1. Venue is applicable under 2au.s.c.A. § 1391 and this court has subject matter 
jurisdiction to review this case. 
NATURE OF THE CAUSE 
1. This piaintiff, Kenneth M. Workman in the above entitled action alledges that 
the defendants named and those unnamed acted under color of law to deprive, plaintiff 
of his fundamental rights which included violating the Sovereignty of the State of 
Idaho's statute by failing to serve plaintiff with docl.lJlte!1ts supporting the alleged 
Orders and Writs, which authorized the victums and Courts Assistance Officers to 
garnish plaintiffs wages and funds frcm his Inmate Trust Account without due process 
of law while he is incarcerated. 
2. Had the State held ahearing to facilitate the due process rights of the plaintiff 
but failed to thereby, violating the administrative procedures and due process of 
the i;:olicy and Rules goveming the excecution of a writ of execution and the service 
of the notice and action of garnishment. 
3. Plaintiff has still never received any documents from either the court or the 
Deparbnent of Corrections allowing the victums or the courts assistance office to be 
authorized to accept or take money from the plaintiff without due process of law. 
4. In construction with a felony conviction the plaintiff was ordered to pay rest-
itu~ion~ W~s ~at Order seperate in the fact that_it was civil in nature and s~ould 
the courts have required a civil hearing before allowing the victums and the State 
. to illegally take money? 
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Wherefore, the plaintiff demands that in accordance with-Federal Law that 
the question of whether the State violated due process and if in the Governments 
opinion that the State has taken malicious actions through illict misconduct, that 
they be held accountable to pay back the funds taken and allot money for stress 
and anguish caused as well as the violation of law, which should be imnediate 
and without delay. The allegations will be further set forth in the memorandum 
of l~w in support of this complaint. 
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IDAHO DEPT. OF CORREC!'IONS, BRENT ) 
D. REINKE, CORRW.l'IONAL OORPORATION ) 
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STATEMFNI' OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Has the Courts allowed the state to violate the due process of plaintiff by 
allowing the victums to l~vy a lien against the plaintiffs Inrrate Account with-
out allowing the plaintiff due process of law in violation of the State of Idaho 
and u.s. Constitution? 
2. Is the state of Idaho allowing the constitutional violation of plaintiffs 
rights by continually allowing the removal of funds from the plaintiffs Inmate 
Trust Account without verification of service and in violation of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure protecting the rights of the plaintiff? 
3. Has the Department of Corrections been furnished with documents to substant":-. 
iate a valid claim to procure funds from plaintiff while violating his due pro-
cess rights? 
4. Has the State and CCA hindered, obstucted and failed to provide names of the 
individuals directly and indirectly involved in this action based on the knowl-
edge that they are acting with a culpable state of mind to " Actually Harm II the 
plaintiff through a depravation of a protected liberty interest which has been 
violated? 
5. Did the District Court initially order a garnishment of Inmates Account and 
.. thereby allowing _the _deprivation of du: process/"since~ restitution 'is a civil:. "f 
' judg~t totally' seperate from criminal judg:emen't. which requires a seperate ~ 
: '·hear~ · 1 · ; ·_ ...... · .- · -· ·:_ · · · · · · ·. -' 
·--..... - ... - ,. - • h .. 11. 
6. Did congress intend to create a protected right in which this plaintiff is 
entitled to due process of law in holding that a civil judgement be seperate 
from a criminal judgement in a restitution case ? 
STATEMENT OF FAC'l'S 
IN conjunction with the plaintiffs felony conviction a civil judgement was 
ordered by presiding Judge Deborah A. Bail on the 5th day of August, 2002, pur-
suant to Idaho Code 19-5304 and based on the evidence of the court. On April 25, 
2003 a hearing was held and restitution was order~ i:1 the amomit of$ 32,391.44 • 
. The District Court imposed Restitution without any consideration of the plaint-
iffs financial resources, the financial,J11eeds or the future earning ability of 
the plaintiff as required under Idaho and Federal Law. Plaintiff became aware of 
the Writ of Execution and Garnishment not through the proper Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, but through deductions made to his prison Inmate Account. The Balance 
sheet shows that on September 30, 2003, money was deducted through a writ of Ex-
MEMORANDUM OF LAW PAGE ••• 2. 
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ecution ••• HQ0233264-001, 041-Writ of Ex., H0101303-$7.50. The plaintiff received 
no documentation or hearing from either the court or the Dept. of Corrections, 
that.either a Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment had been ordered by the 
court or other official party and served upon the I.D.O.c. to effect the depre-
vation of funds from the Inmates Account. . 
_The plaintiffs has requested numerous times for copies of the Writ of Exe-
cution and the Notice of Garnishment and for the I.o.o.c. to provide-clarification 
of this matter, specifically, but have received only copies of the original courts 
order for civil judgement, bearing a cr~l case number issued on April 25, 2003 
and each time the IDOC's Inmate Account Officers have failed to sign there names 
to the returned documents ( concern fonns) • 
In the requests to Inmate Accounts, plaintiff requested clarification on who 
the •parties-·.,.: were,. who levied the above-entitled action against plaintiff, as 
well as, the party that established the 25% deduction standard that was placed in-
to effect on his inmate accOl.ll'lt. The response from the IDOC was that, 11 they alone 
have the authority to set whatever standard they find applicable". There was no 
Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment included as requested. Again the only 
doc'IEleiltation ever received £rem I1JOC was the copies of the original order for 
restitution from April 25, 2003. PLaintiff further wrote to the District Court 
Clerks office asking for copies of the Writ of Execution that was supposedly an 
active order filed with the court. There response does not affirm the existance 
of an writ or notice or include any information that would resolve plaintiffs 
concerns. (See Attached Exhibit--Letter) 
ARGUMEm' 
Due process of law is a protected liberty interest by which individuals can 
persue litigation in an administratively timely manner Likewise they can also be 
protected from malicious deprevation of a right to be notified in a timely and 
legal manner. Plaintiff was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under 
I.e. § 19-3501, the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. 
When an individuals right to a speedy trial is an issue, this court must 
first determine if the statute, I.C.§19-3501 has been abridged, state Vs. Hobson 
99 Idaho 200, 579 P.2d 697 (1978) if there is no "Good Cause" for. delay or if the 
notification was through dilatory actions, then the Government must be held liable 
and the erroneous actions ceased. In this instant case the plaintiff assrts that 
I.e. §19-3501 must be construed liberally in the civil aspect because it relates 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW PAGE ••• 3. 
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to a restitution order which was ordered as part of a civil judgement from the 
criminal conviction. 
DUE PROCFSS 
we now tw:n to the Constitutional Provisions. 
Although the state guarantee is not neccessarily identical to the federal 
guarantee, our Supreme Court utilizes the Federal test to determine whether the 
speedy trial guarantee under the state constitution has been violated. Barker 
Vs. Winoo 407 U.S. 514, 92 S ct. 2182, 33 LED 2nd 101 (1972) The U.S. Supreme 
Court announced a four point balancing test to detennine whether the feder~l 
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied. The four facts to be 
balanced are ( 1 ) the lenght of the delay ( 2) the reason for the delay ( 3) the de-
fendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial or due process, and (4) the 
prejudice occassioned by the delay. Under the Idaho Constitutional Provision the 
time of delay is measured from the point when formal charges are levied or from 
the commencement of an action as proscibed by Civil Rules of Procedure Rule 3. 
Rule 3 (2) Commencement of Action--A civil action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint with the court, which may be denominated as a complaint, Petition, 
or Application, and the party filing the same shall be designated as the plaintiff 
or petitioner, and the party whom the action is filed against shall be designated 
as the defendant or respondent. No claim, Controversy or dispute may be submitted 
to an~ court in the state for detennination or judgement without filing a cc:mplaint 
or petition as provided in these Rules; nor shall anyjudgement or decree be en-
tered by any court without service of process upon all parties affected by such 
judgement or decree in the manner as proscibed by these Rules 
A civil action is comnericed under Rule 3 on the date on which this complaint 
was filed, not the date of service. This dating function is important for many pur-
~s.e!t , including the tdlling of the statute of limitations, because there is 
also a federal question raised here, through tl:lis civil litigation. This plaintiff 
asserts that the defendants only receive the benefit of this Rule if they serve 
the summons and the complaint on the defendant within 120· days after comnencement 
or have good cause for not doing so. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (m). 
The fact that the court and both Idaho Dept. Of corrections and the ~~r-f: • 
ional Corporation of America have failed to served a Writ of Execution and Notiqe . . - ~ - ~ 
of Garnishment upon the plaintiff, is respective of the negligence and faulty 
actions· of the state employees and court officials both in their individual and 
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official capacities. Plaintiff asserts that any unserved papers or pleadings should 
be found to lack any legal force and effect, until service is accomplished. However 
plaintiff understands when a party is not served, but receives actual notice of 
the oocument and is not prejudiced by the lack of service, the document may still 
be acccepted as effective. Plaintiff must also remind the defendants that a docu -
ment will not be deemed fit unless it is seperately and formally filed with the 
court. Thus attaching a document as an ehibit to another paper will not constitute 
a filing of the attachment. Desin Vs. Kugel 9 F.3d 1042, 1045 (2nd Cir. 1993) 
A. LENGm' OF DEIAY 
In considering the lenght of delay factor, the court must look at the aggregate 
lapse of time to determine whether an inquiry concerning denial of speedy trial 
right has been triggered. The court must then substract any defense caused by delay 
and any reasonable period of time attributed to a court, in detennining the" Cog-
nizable Delay" fUJr the speedy trial analysis. state Vs. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306 
629 P • .2ni 702 (1981) 
. On April 25, - 2003, a hearing was -held and the. District Court ordered the piain-: 
t_iff. to pay restitutiori ,in the amount of,$ 32,391.44. ~~ ~~~~ 30,: 2093, plaint:.. 
iffs account was ·aed~cted,-$.,7~50.-:Pi~i~tiff_reguested that he be given a·copy of the, 
< ~ "': • - • ,.., ~ H < •• .)' <'• .,. ... • .. ,I ,., • ..... , '• ,. ~ • • , ¥ .. 
Noti~"of~Garn!-shment and alsb'the Writ of Execution at.that time, but was sent a 
-copy'of the-District Courts original Order for Restitution'is~ued-on.April 25, 2003: 
.. , ~.,. , ..... .. ... ,h .... .. , - ...... ~ ~ • •• ·~ , h .,.., ,..,., • • ' , 
Plaintiff has since renewed an interest and again has requested documentation and 
has been continually impeded with in sufficient information and without names on the 
concerned fo:rms ;· After 7 years 'the IfX)C. Inmate Accounts has now come ,forward and-, ;· 
:conceded that th&e ne~er has been~ writ ~f execution,· falsely leading pi~i~tift' 
',, , . . . . . . " . ~ 
.: to believe there was a Writ of Execution in place. 
B. REASON FOR DEIAY 
The 6 year 9 month II Cognizable Delay II in this case primarily occured during 
the period after the withdraw! of funds from the plaintiffs account. Qilestions_were 
raised by the plaintiff numerous times throughout the years of incarceration. The 
IIXlC Inmate Accounting staff has maintained a reasoning that everything being levied 
on the plaintiff was legal and provided for under Idaho law. After years of subter-
fuge of the IOOC and their maintained reasoning to effect the deduction of 
the plaintiffs funds it has now become apparent through several different sources 
that the process in which the IDOC has iniated garnishment action against him is 
under_state and Federal law illegal. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW PAGE •••• 5. 
000102
Case 1:10-cv-001-BLW Document3-1 Filed 02100 Page 6 of 10 
' Plaintiff is aware that in ordering restitution, the district court must oon-
sider the effect of a defendants financial situation or his ablity to pay restitu-
tion immediately,but understands that his financial status upon release did not 
eviserate the district courts discretion to order restitution. 18 u.s.c. (1994 ed) 
§ 3664 ( 2) • It should be noted for the record in th.is case that none of the above 
criteria was observed by the court when it imposed restitution and the most rele-
vant of all factors is the fact that the plaintiff was given 2 natural life sentences 
without the possibility of parole. In essence the plaintiff will die in prison and 
never have viable means to meet such an obligation as restitution. 
C. PLAINTIFFS ASSERTION OF DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY TRIM. 
Plaintiff has established that on numerous occassions that he invoked his right 
to a speedy trial and due process by contacting the courts and all the individuals 
involved in the depreivation of the protected right to due process. These shalli,be 
offered upon request of production of and disclosure of documents from the plaintiffs 
central file at the n:xx:. 
D. PREJUDICE OCCASSIONED BY DELAY 
PLaintiff identifies three interests the due process clause was designed to 
protect: (1) Preventing obstruction, Hinderence and Dismissal of valid issues(2) 
minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) Limiting the possibility 
that the plaintiff would have been impaired. Here at one titre the plaintiff was 
forced to quit his prison job due to, gami:ishrnent of his monies leaving him with no 
alterative then to stay indigent for over four years in order to be allowed the 
basic minimal needs as in hygiene items which are only available to inmates that 
are indigent or maintain O balance on their account. 
The U.S. Constitution provides that: No state shall deprive any person of prop-
erty without due process of law. U.S. Amed. 14. THe Idaho constitution· similarly 
provides that: no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. 
PLaintiff argues that both the filing of the restitution lien without actual notice 
to him and the method and actual taking of his funds violates his right to due 
process. States throughout the U.S. have made their postition clear on cases where 
individuals have been deprived of due process in property taken. One such case is 
remarkably similar to the plaintiffs. He raises this to this courts attention as a 
. . - ., .. 
applicable authority that should give direction to this court in making a decision 
that is bases on precedence. see state of Arizona Vs. O'Conner 827 P.2d 480 (1992) 
ilfflMORANDUM OF LAW PAGE... 6. 
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2. COLOR OF STATE LAW 
To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must alledge that the defendants 
while acting under color of state violated a constitutional right of the challeng-
ing party. Since the conduct challenged by the plaintiff constitutes II State Action" 
for purposes of the 14th Amendment, the conduct is also action i.mder the 14th Amend. 
through the 5th Amend. 11 wider color of state law' for porposes of a §1983 claim. 
Willis vs. City of Marshall, w.D.N.C. 2003, 293 F. Sllpp. 2d 608 Civil Rights 
Defendants were acting under" Color of state law 11 when they deprived the plaintiff 
of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Section § 1983 provides redress for 
these violations- arising under the Federal Constitution or laws of the U.S. which 
are caused by persons acting under the color of state law. Mosley v. Yaletsko, E.D. 
Pa 2003, 275 F. SUpp 2d 608 Civil Rights 1305 In order to prevail on this claim 
the plaintiff must prove: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by federal 
constitution or laws of the u.s.; and.(2) that he was subjected to this deprivation 
by persons acting under color of state law. Hale V. Vance S.D. Ohio 2003, 267 f. 
SUpp. 2d 725 Civil Rights 1304 
Plaintiff for the purpose of this claim first states that the deprivation was 
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state and by a 
person fex; whom the state is responsible, and second the defendants charged with this 
deprivation are state actors or are empowered to work as a state actor. What this 
court must assert is that in this action the individuals were empowered by the state 
and with deliberate indifference did deprive the plaintiff of due process. Plain-
tiff asserts that these individuals are being sued in their individual capacity and 
are not imnune from suit in federal court even if performing acts within their 
authority and neccessary to fullfilling goverment responsibilities. !eris V. Board 
of Fduc. of Talbort Co. D.MD 2003, 262 F. SUpp. 2d. 608 Federal Courts 269 
A.CTUAL INJURY 
Through"Deliberate Indifference" a stringent standard o~f fault in 
§ 1983 action, the state and its symbiotic actors have deprived the 
plaintiff, Kenneth M. Workman C?f due process as found under the United States Con-
stitution. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW PAGE... 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district courts consideration of the statutory factors are non-existant 
in this case, because it allowed state actors to effect a deprivation of plaintiffs 
due process rights, violating the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Even though the 
court must order restitution when found warranted with a criminal conviction and 
ordered at the time of sentencing, it may not delegate its authority to schedule 
restitution payments during the plaintiffs incarceration to the Idaho Deptrnent of 
Corrections. united states v. Mortimer, 94 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) The United 
States Constitution provides: No state shall deprive any person of property, without 
due process of law. In this case the due process violation has occured when, without 
notice of service state actors debited plaintiffs Inmate Trust Account under the 
guise of a fictious state statute and by levying a action through a non-existant 
Writ of Execution to deprive the plaintiff of his property. Due process requires 
actual notice be given in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure before the 
carmencement of the action. 
Wherefore;'"PI.aintiff r~~st~ the amount: of funds deducted from· September, 2003 
up to ·t11e: present be returned; and th~ ~unt ~f, $ 1 ,so(to,$ 3,soo· do~l~s fo~< 
,. -· - ~ ' ' • '"' > ·• > • ' - -· .. • • " " • \' 
~ _each deprivation of due process and$ 500 to $·1,000 dollars for each day that the~ 
. ' - ,. 
plaintiffs. existance was placed_ in, jeopardy from being forced to iose his prison job; 
the _forfeiture' of family aid arid the undue stress placed ~n the. plaintiff ~ ~ave .: 
t~ maintain a indigent status for years to j~t' have th~ basic priso~ needs • i 
Respectfully suhnitted tllis/1-,,..aay of P-e6rll{f),t., 
j 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KENNErr'H M. WOR'KMAN 
I Kenneth M. workman, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and 
says the following in supr;x,rt of his civil rights claim: 
1. I am the Affiant/Plaintiff in the enclosed civil action. 
2. In September, 2003 the Idaho Depbnent of Corrections began deducting funds from 
Imnate Trust Account for the alledged purpose of Writ of Execution. 
3. I timely contacted IlOC Irnnate Accounts for copies of the Writ of Execution or 
Notiqe of ~spment ~ts. 
• I ~, l 1A • • J ' ~ > A 1 "' • 4 1 ._ • 
4. No documents were provided except the original District Court Order for 
Restitution of Civil Judgement issued on April 25, 2003. 
5. At no time has the IOOC given me notice that they would be deducting my funds, 
other than the direct deducting of my funds as established through the monthly 
Offender Bank Balance Sheet. 
6. Dealing with the loss of my extremely limited funds has placed substantial 
mental stress on me over the years as I have been unable to provide myself with 
basic living necessities that the deductions were helping to provide. 
7. I have been forced to quit my minimal paying prison job ($30.00 a month) due 
to the burd~ of my deducted funds of 25%, cornr;x,unded with an existing child support 
withholding order of 50%, where 75% of my $30.00 was deducted, literally leaving me 
no money to pay monthly prison medical expenses and cost of my ongoing legal pro-
cessing costs. I was occurring a monthly debit that was accumulating on a monthly 
basis that left me with no options other than to become II Indigent." 
8. Due to gift money sent to me from family being taken for the Writ of Exe-
cution, my family has ceased sending any assistance, as they feel it is not proper 
to have their money used for purposes other than what it was intended, which was 
my basic prison needs, not my financial obligations. 
9. I have been forced to maintain an " Indigent Status II due to the burden of 
the deduction of funds £ran my Inmate Account since April of 2004 up until Septem-
ber of 2007, at which time the Affiant was relocated to an out of state facility 
in Oklahoma. 
1 0. While housed out of state in Oklahoma I was not subjected to any Idaho Writ 
of Execution and was allowed to maintain a prison job and family began sending me 
periodic gift money. 
AFFFIDAVIT OF KENNEl'H M. IDRKMAN P~GE 1 of 2 
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11 • Upon the IOOC returning me back to a Idaho Facility in July, 2009, the IDOC 
began deducting funds again from me for a Writ of Execution. 
12. ·Affiant is now once again being subjected to garnishment of his Inmate funds 
without any given notice by the I[X)C. He is without employment or funds and is now ,, 
facing a troublesome future of having to stay Indigent to have the Basic and min-
imal needs as provided to Inmates by the IDOC that have no ftmds or means to take 
care of themselves. 
13. I declare that the illegal action by the n:xx: has and is causing me severe 
mental and physical hann. 
Further Your Affiant Sayeth Naught. 
Dated t:hls/i!!;_aay of Wr1.1a7 , 201 o 
~-wk . th M. Workman 
Affiant/Plaintiff 
4~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisj_!__day of fe~ ftid'<'f , 2010, 
~~~~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNEl'H M. WORKMAN 
Connnission Expires: o/jto I, 1 
I 
PAGE 2 of 2 
000107
EXHIBIT C 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
000108
Case 1:10-cv-000-., ... -BLW Document 41 Filed 09/22/1_ Page 1 of 17 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRENT REINKE, Director of IDOC, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:10-cv-00081-BLW 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Before the Court in this prisoner civil rights matter is Defendant Brent Reinke's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37). Also pending is Plaintiffs Motion for 
Permission for Leave of the Court to Proceed with Presenting Exhibits (Dkt. 33). The 
Court finds that decisional process would not be aided by oral argument, and it will 
resolve these matters after consideration of the parties' written briefing. D. Idaho L. Civ. 
R. 7.l(d). 
After being fully advised, the Court enters the following Order granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2001, Plaintiff was the driver of a vehicle on Interstate 84 that crashed into two 
pickups that were legally parked, one in front of the other, on the shoulder of the 
. . . 
highway. (Dkt. 37-5, Ex. B.) Diane King and Anthony Barton were standing between the 
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pickups when they were struck, and both were seriously injured. (Dkt. 37-5, pp. 11-14.) 
Plaintiff had high le~els of heroin, amphetamine, and methadone in his blood at the time 
of the crash, and the State charged him with two counts of aggravated driving under the 
influence (DUI), one count of possession of a controlled substance, and a sentencing 
enhancement of being a persistent violator of the law. (Dkt. 37-5, Ex. B.) 
Plaintiff eventually agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated DUI counts and to the 
persistent violator charge, in exchange for the State's dismissal of the possession count 
and its agreement to recommend a sentence of life in prison with 25 years fixed. (Dkt. 37-
5, Ex. B.) Ada County District Judge Deborah Bail did not follow the recommendation 
and instead sentenced Plaintiff to life in prison without the possibility of parole on each 
count. (Id.) 
Under the plea agreement, the State was also allowed to seek restitution, and the 
prosecutor filed a Motion for Civil Judgment for Restitution in the amount of $700,000. 
(Dkt. 37-6, Ex. F.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel at a restitution hearing, after 
which Judge Bail ordered him to pay $32,391.44 in restitution, with interest accruing 
annually. (Dkt. 37-6, Ex. G.) JudgeBail's order.also serves as a civil judgment against 
Plaintiff. (Id.) 
The restitution order was sent to the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), and, 
beginning in September 2003, IDOC began deducting 25% of the funds in Plaintiffs 
inmate trust account on a monthly basis to go toward satisfying the judgment. (Dkt. 37-
11, Affidavit of Shirley Audens at ,r 9.) These automatic deductions occurred pursuant to 
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IDOC written policy, and the employee who implemented the policy has no discretion in 
the matter. (Audens Aff. at ,i,i 3, 6-7.) Monetary gifts to prisoners are not exempt from the 
automatic withholding, unless the court that issued the order expressly exempts them. (Id. 
at,i8.) 
On October 6, 2003, Plaintiff began filing concern forms at the prison to complain 
about the deduction of funds and to request a copy of a garnishment order or a writ of 
execution. (Dkt. 37-7, Affidavit of Chester Penn at ,i 10.) Plaintiff received responses 
from staff indicating that the restitution order was sufficient to justify the deductions, and 
a copy of the order was sent to him. (Dkt. 37-7, Ex. D.) These responses were 
unsatisfactory to Plaintiff, so on July 21, 2004, he filed a Motion to Cease and Desist 
Restitution and Terminate Restitution Withholding in the state district court. (Dkt, 37-6, 
Defendant's Exhibit D.) In his Motion, Plaintiff argued that the monthly deductions had 
placed a significant hardship on him while he was in prison. (Id. at 2-3.) The district court 
denied the Motion without comment. (Id. at 1.) 
Plaintiff was transferred to an out-of-state prison in 2007, where the deductions 
apparently stopped. (Dkt. 39, p. 2.) When he returned to Idaho in 2009, prison officials 
again starting deducting funds from his account. Plaintiff submitted new concern forms 
on this subject, followed by grievances, all of which were unsuccessful. (Dkt. 3, Exhibits 
. -·~ . .;. ~ -• C 
D,E.) 
·. . On February 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint in this 
Court under 4~ U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 3.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has not 
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been presented with notice or had an opportunity to object before the funds are taken out 
of his account, as required by state law. (Id. at 2.) Based on this, Plaintiff claims that his 
property has been taken from him without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 2-3.) 
The Court conducted an initial review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 
and 191 SA, and allowed Plaintiff to go forward with his claims against IDOC Director 
Brent Reinke, Warden Phillip Valdez, and "others responsible for deducting funds who 
are presently unknown to Plaintiff." (Dkt. 14, p. 3.) All other named Defendants were 
dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff later chose to dismiss Valdez and all other unknown employees 
at the Idaho Correctional Center and to proceed only against Director Reinke. (Dkts. 24, 
30.) 
Reinke has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that (1) Plaintiff did 
not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit, (2) Plaintiffs claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations, (3) his due process rights have not been violated, (4) 
there is no evidence that Reinke participated personally in any alleged violations that may 
have occurred, and (5) Reinke is entitled to qualified immunity from damages. (Dkt. 37-1, 
p. 2.) Also pending is Plaintiffs motion requesting permission to submit prisoner 
affidavits without identifying the prisoners' names, which the Court will address as part 
of its summary judgment discussion. 
· For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Plaintiff exhausted his 
administrative remedies and that this action is timely as to claims based on deductions 
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from Plaintiff's account that occurred after February 16, 2008. Claims that accrued before 
that date are untimely and will not be considered. The Court further concludes that 
R.laintiff was not deprived of due process of law, and, moreover, that Reinke is entitled to 
qualified immunity from damages. 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
1. Standard of Law 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that "[n]o action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title ... until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "There is 
no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims 
' 
cannot be brought in court." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,211 {2007). This requirement is 
intended to give "prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the 
exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court." Id. at 204. 
Proper exhaustion is required, meaning that "a prisoner must complete the 
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 
including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court." Woodford v. Ngo, 
548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). "The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the 
grievance procedures will vary from syste~ to system and claim to _claim, but it is the 
prison's requirements, ancl not the PLRA, t9-at define the boundaries of proper 
._ ...... :_ - • ~ -~.: ., • .-:--:. • ._ .. - K.':." ••• _·; -
exhaustion." Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. 
Although Defendant has raised the exhaustion defense in his Answer and in a 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, a claim that a prisoner failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies is an affirmative defense that should ordinarily be argued in an unenumerated 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyatt v. 
Terhune, 315 F .3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Unlike when reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court has the discretion to resolve disputed factual issues, if 
necessary. Id. 
2. The Administrative Review Process 
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center 
(ICC), which is a private prison that contracts with IDOC to house prisoners for the state 
of Idaho. ICC follows the same three-step administrative grievance procedure that IDOC 
uses, which requires a prisoner to submit an informal concern form describing the 
problem, followed by the filing of a formal grievance, and appealing any adverse 
decision. (Dkt. 3 7-7, Affidavit of Chester Penn.) 
The prisoner begins this process by routing the concern form to the staff member 
most capable of addressing the problem. (Penn Aff., ,r 6.) If the issue is not resolved, the 
prisoner must then complete a grievance form and file the grievance within 30 days of the 
incide1:1t. (Id. at ,r 7.) The grievance form must contain specific information regarding the 
nature.of the complaint, including the dates, places, names of personnel involved, and 
how the offender has been adversely affected. (Id.) The "grievance coordinator" at the 
,. 
prison will route a properly completed grievance to the appropriate staff member, who 
must respond within 10 days. (Id.) 
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After the staff member responds, the coordinator forwards the grievance to the 
"reviewing authority," usually the deputy warden, who reviews the prisoner's complaint 
I 
and the staff member's response and issues a decision. (Id. at ,r 8.) If the prisoner is 
dissatisfied with the reviewing authority's decision, he may then appeal to the "appellate 
authority," which is usually the facility head. (Id.) Once the appellate authority has issued 
its decision, the grievance is then routed back to the inmate, thus concluding the 
administrative review process. (Id.) 
3. Discussion 
Reinke has the burden to plead and prove that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. In attempting to carry that burden, he 
has submitted an affidavit from Chester Penn, the grievance coordinator at ICC. Penn has 
searched the prison's administrative records and asserts that while Plaintiff filed concern 
forms touching on the issue of trust account deductions in 2003 through 2006, he did not 
complete the administrative review process by filing grievance forms and appealing any 
' 
adverse decision. (Penn Aff., at ,r 10.) 
Penn indicates that Plaintiff did file grievances addressing this subject on 
December 28, 2009, and January 14, 2010, and that Plaintiff appealed on January 22, 
2010, but Defendant contends that these grievances were untimely (filed six years after 
the initial garnishment of Plaintiffs inmate account), were not specific, and failed to 
name him personally. Because of these deficiencies, according to Reinke, Plaintiff has not 
exhausted his remedies properly before coming to federal court. 
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While the Court agrees that Plaintiff did not complete the prison's established 
administrative review process before 2010, he clearly raised the relevant issue in his 
December 29, 2009, grievance: 
Inmate accounts have [been] deducting funds from my account for 
restitution since 2003 illegally by failing to serve notice of garnishment on 
me to satisfy my right to due process as gaurrented [sic] under the state and 
federal constitution. Direct levy action by the IDOC in itself does not 
exclude their responsibility to give me adequate and timely notice of the 
above actions so that I could of raised a challenge to the deduction of my 
funds within the 14 days after being served or commencement of action. 
(Dkt. 3-2, p. 9; Dkt. 11-1; Dkt. 37-10, Def.'s Ex. K.) As a remedy, Plaintiff suggested that 
unless IDOC could produce "valid documents," it "needs to reimburse [him] for all funds 
deducted between 2003 and 2009." (Id.) His appeal was denied. (Id.) 
In this grievance, Plaintiff is complaining about the allegedly unconstitutional 
withholding of money from his monthly balance in his account beginning in 2003 and 
continuing until 2009, based on a lack of"notice," which essentially tracks the claim that 
he has now raised in this proceeding. Contrary to Reinke's argument, this grievance is 
timely under prison rules at least as to the most recent instances of the withholding, and, 
at any rate, prison administrators did not invoke untimeliness as a procedural ground on 
which to dismiss the grievance. 
Nor is Plaintiffs failure to name Brent Reinke personally in a grievance fatal to 
proper exhaustion. Exhaustion under the PLRA "is not per se inadequate simply because 
0 -
an individual later sued was not named in the grievance," though the necessary level of 
detail in a properly completed grievance is governed by a prison's administrative rules. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8 
000116
f 
Case 1:10-cv-00Q __ 3LW Document 41 Filed 09/22/1 >age 9 of 17 
See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. Reinke notes correctly that IDOC written policy directs that a 
grievance must "contain specific information such as dates, places, and names" (Dkt. 37-
8, Ex. A, p. 5), but when the identity of the individual responsible for enforcing a prison 
policy that is adversely affecting a prisoner is unknown to him - as appears to be the case 
here - it is still possible to provide "specific information" in a grievance without 
necessarily providing a name. Plaintiffs grievances were otherwise reasonably specific as 
to the actions that he was challenging and the range of dates over which those actions had 
occurred, and there is no indication that administrators were confused about the nature of 
his problem. To the contrary, they reviewed his complaints and found no violations that 
they believed needed to be corrected. 
The exhaustion requirement is not intended to be a mechanism for giving formal 
notice to all potential defendants that they might be sued, but is instead designed to alert 
prison administrators to an alleged problem that might be fixed before a lawsuit is filed. 
Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. If an inmate has (1) set forth the "nature of the complaint" on the 
grievance form with enough specificity to give notice to prison supervisors of a problem 
and (2) has completed the grievance appeal process, he has "availed himself of the 
administrative process the state gave him." Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th 
Cir. 2005). Plaintiff did what was required by Jones, to alert the prison to a problem, and 
he did what was required by Butler, to use the materials provided by the state to complete 
-
all of the levels of the prison grievance system. 
The Court concludes that Reinke has not carried his burden to show that Plaintiff 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9 
000117
I 
Case 1:10-cv-0008 LW Document 41 Filed 09/22/11 age 10 of 17 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.1 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Standard of Law 
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or 
defense, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R Civ. P. 56(l)(a). One of the principal purposes of 
the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... " 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural 
shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or 
defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant 
unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. 
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 
that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See 
id. at 248. 
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party shows that each 
1 It appears that the warden did not issue a final response in Plaintiffs appeal until after Plaintiff 
filed his Civil Rights Complaint, but Reinke does not argue that Plaintiffs failure to complete all three 
steps before filing suit provides a basis for dismissal. In any case, Plaintiff contends that the prison's 
delay in returning responses to him was the cause of any delay, Dkt. 7-1, p. 4, and the Court agrees with 
him that a prison cannot claim that the failure to complete a procedural step is a reason for dismissal when 
the prison did not process a grievance at that step in a timely manner according to its own policies. See 
Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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issue of material fact is not or cannot be disputed. To show the material facts are not in 
dispute, a party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, or show that the 
materials cited do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party 
is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(l)(A)&(B); see T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 
626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). The Court must consider "the 
cited materials," but it may also consider "other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(1 )( c)(3). 
The Court does not determine the credibility of affiants or weigh the evidence set 
forth by the non-moving party. All inferences which can be drawn from the evidence 
must be drawn in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T. W. Elec. Serv., 809 
F.2d at 630-31 (internal citation omitted). 
Rule 56(e) authorizes the Court to grant summary judgment for the moving party 
"if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show 
that the movant is entitled to it." The existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 
non-moving party's position is insufficient. Rather, "there must be evidence on which the 
jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. at 252. 
2. All Claims tliat Accrued After February 16, 2008, are Timely 
: Reinke contends that to the extent that Plaintiffs due process claim is based on the 
failure to give him notice and an opportunity to be heard before the first deduction from 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11 
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his trust account in September 30, 2003, his Complaint is untimely and must be 
dismissed. Alternatively, he argues that only those garnishments that occurred within two 
years of the filing of the Complaint on February 16, 2010, must be dismissed. The Court 
agrees with the alternative argument. 
In a civil rights case brought under§ 1983, the statue oflimitations is determined 
-
by the law of the state in which the action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 
(2007) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-250 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 
261, 279-80 (1985)). Section 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for 
p~rsonal injury actions because such claims have been found analogous to actions for 
injuries to personal rights. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 277 (later overruled only as to claims 
brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). In Idaho, the limitations period for 
claims alleging personal injury is two years. Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). 
In this case, Plaintiff cannot proceed with any claim that arose before February 16, 
2008 (two years before he filed his Complaint). This would include any claims of 
constitutional violations related to the original restitution order, the initial garnishment of 
Plaintiffs trust account in 2003, and garnishments that occurred up to February 16, 2008. 
Howe~er, the Court liberally construes Plaintiffs Complaint as alleging that each 
deduction by IDOC violates his right to due process of law. Reinke concedes that eight 
- garnishments occurred after February 16, 2008, and claims based on those deductions are 
timely. 
0 
3. Plaintiff was not Deprived of Due Process of ~aw 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12 
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Although Plaintiffs Complaint survives Reinke's exhaustion and statute of 
limitations defenses, the Court nonetheless concludes that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that Reinke is entitled to judgment in his favor. On the undisputed 
material facts presented here, Plaintiff has not been deprived of due process of law. 
It is well established that a prisoner retains a property right in his prison trust 
account. Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). Before a state or one of its 
departments can take money from a prisoner's trust account, it must have provided him 
with due process oflaw. Due process is a flexible concept, however, and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976). To determine the process that is due, a court must balance three factors: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of additional or 
substitute procedures; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. Id. at 334-35. 
As to the first Mathews factor, while Plaintiff has a private interest in his trust 
account that is being affected by IDOC's actions, that interest is not as compelling as a 
non-incarcerated person's interest in controlling his or her own bank account. A 
- __ - - ~~-' -" pri;oner's management of a trust account can be limited by ~umerous reasori~ble· 
restrictions. See, e.g.; Foster v. Hughes, 979 F.2d 130, 132-33 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that prisoners have no right to place their money in interest bearing accounts). More 
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generally, a prisoner's constitutional rights are subject to regulations that bear a 
reasonable relationship to the legitimate penological needs of the prison. Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
Next, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Plaintiffs money was minimized by 
the specific procedures used in this case. This is not a case in which a prisoner's funds 
were seized without any advance notice or an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff was 
instead given actual notice that the State was seeking restitution in 2002, as authorized by 
Idaho Code§ 19-5304, and he had an opportunity to be heard at the restitution hearing. 
Plaintiff cannot claim that he was surprised that he would owe money to the victims to 
compensate them for their losses, and he knew that he owed them precisely $32,391.44 
after Judge Bail entered her order. He has also been aware that IDOC is deducting funds 
from his account on a regular basis since at least September 2003. He received additional 
process in state court by way of his Motion to Cease and Desist Restitution and Terminate 
Restitution Withholding, which was denied in the state district court. (Dkt. 37-6, 
Defendant's Exhibit D.) 
Prison officials have followed established statutory and administrative rules in 
deducting the funds from Plaintiffs account, further minimizing the risk of an arbitrary 
deprivation. In particular, IDOC has relied on Idaho Code § 11-108 as authority to 
- support its actions. That statutory provision, labeled "execution of civil judgments against 
prisoners," exempts IDOC from the formal procedural requirements for executing 
judgments against prisoners that would otherwise be applicable to non-prisoners. Idaho 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 14 
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Code § 11-108(1 ). It further authorizes IDOC to use a direct levy against inmate trust 
account~ to satisfy certain judgments, and it prevents prisoners from claiming exemptions. 
Idaho Code§ 11-108(2),(3). IDOC has instituted a written policy that requires an 
automatic deduction of 50% for any restitution order that is received, or a 25% deduction 
if the prisoner is already subject to a child support order, and the employee in charge of 
enforcing these rules has no discretion in the matter. Cf Quickv. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 
1523 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a potentially meritorious due process claim when prison 
officials deducted money for restitution after a prison disciplinary infraction without 
statutory authority). The probable value or benefit of additional safeguards - such as 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before each deduction - would not be great because 
prison officials are already aware of Plaintiffs financial situation, his funds and personal 
property are not exempt from execution by statute, and all of his basic needs are provided 
for regardless of his ability to pay.2 
Finally, the government has a compelling interest in seeing that crime victims 
receive restitution in an orderly and efficient manner. Requiring additional procedural 
safeguards before the prison could deduct money from Plaintiffs account for this purpo~e 
would not decrease the already low risk of error, and the current simplified process avoids 
2 Plaintiff has made passing references to a diminished standard of living in prison because of 
deductions from his trust account, but a less comfortable life in prison is not the same thing as being 
deprived of basic human needs. If the prison refused to provide Plaintiff with the necessities of life 
because of his inability to pay for them, this would be a potential Eighth Amendment violation, which is 
independent of the due process argument made here, and the Court expresses no opinion on such a claim. 
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the administrative and fiscal burdens that would accompany a more cumbersome process. 
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has been provided with the 
process to which he was due under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 
4. Reinke has Qualified Immunity 
Reinke also claims that regardless whether an arguable constitutional violation 
occurred in this case, he is entitled to qualified immunity. This defense protects 
government officials from liability for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194,202 (2001). 
For the reasons already expressed, the Court concludes that the conduct of prison 
officials, including Reinke, did not clearly violate Plaintiffs due process rights. 
Accordingly, Reinke is also immune from liability for damages under the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. 
ORDER 
3 In his Motion for Permission For Leave of the Court to Proceed with Presenting Exhibits (Dkt. 
33) and in his "Rebuttal" (Dkt. 38), Plaintiff suggests that IDOC's policy is being selectively enforced 
against him, in violation of his right to equal protection of the law. He requests permission to submit 
affidavits of prisoners, without disclosing their identities, whom he claims are not subject to automatic 
deduction from their trust accounts despite having outstanding restitutions orders. 
Plaintiffs request will be denied. First, he has not raised an equal protection claim in his 
Complaint, nor has he sought leave to amend. He has also failed to direct the Court to any authority under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or case law that would permit the submission of anonymous 
affidavits. Most importantly, regardless whether some prisoners could come forward to say that their 
accounts are not garnished, there is no additional evidence from which one could find that the prison is 
intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff as opposed to failing to garnish other accounts simply due to 
negligence, mistake, or a lack of notice of a restitution order. 
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IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Permission for Leave of the Court to Proceed with 
Presenting Exhibits with Statement in Support Thereof (Dkt. 33) is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Reinke's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37) is 
GRANTED 
DATED: September 22, 2011 
o.~w~ 
Ho~ Lynn Winmill 
Chief U. S. District Judge 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Case No. 1:10-cv-00081-BLW 
JUDGMENT 
BRENT REINKE, Director of IDOC, 
Defendant. 
Based on the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed herewith, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADruDGED, AND DECREED that this cause of action is 
DISMISSED with prejudice. 
JUDGMENT-I 
DATED: September 22, 2011 
1).~~~ 
Ho 4ieB. Lynn Winmill 
ChiefU. S. District Judge 
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CHRISTOPHER RICH, ET AL, ) 
Defendant ) 
' --------------
Case No. CV-OC-2015-2086~ 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
CDMES NOW, Kenneth M. Workman, plaintiff in the above entitled matter, brings 
forth this motion for the court to reconsider its order denying the plaintiff's motion 
to disqualify judge and states the following in support: 
FAcrs CONCERNING THIS ISSUE 
The court has denied plaintiffs motion to disqualify judge based on I.R.C.P. 
40 ( d) ( 1 ) ( b) • The courts reasoning based on this rule can not stand as it is in complete 
contrast to the record and the facts before this court as plaintiff will point out. 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(b) states, 
"A motion for disqualification without cause must be filed no later than 
seven (7) days after service of a written notice or order setting theJ 
action for status conference, pretrial conference, trial or 
for hearing on the first contested motion, or no later than 
twenty one (21) days after service or receipt of complaint, surrmons 
order or other pleading indicating or specifying who the presiding judge 
to the action will be, whichever occurs first; and such motion must be 
filed before the corrmencement of a status conference, a pretrial con-
ference, a contested proceeding or trial before the judge sought to be 
disqualified". 
Further this court references I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(h) 
None of the above had been placed into affect in this case and as such have no 
MOI'ION 'IO RECDNSIDER Pg. 1. 
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bearing or legal value to this case and are non-applicable. The facts show conclusively 
in this case that plaintiff specifically contacted the Court Clerks office requesting 
the name of the presiding judge for purpose of recusal. The courts office did not 
respond in kind to well over a month on January 14, 2016 with this infonnation. At 
this time and up until February 6, 2016 this case set donnant waiting for the plaintiff 
to send the Affidavits of Service to the Court so that the case could then proceed. 
This court knows as a matter of civil law, that nothing can be done in a civil com-
plaint until the court receives verification through the Affidavit of Service that 
the defendants or parties have been legally served. The record j i1 shows that the motion 
to disqualify accompanied the Affidavits of Service, which were both mailed to the 
court at the same time on February 6, 2016. Therefore this court had not initiated 
any legal action in this case until after the Affidavits of Service had been received. 
This court is simply wrong with its reasoning to deny plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff 
motion to disqualify was timely before this court and the criteria, as suggested in 
the court citing I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(b) is not supported by the existing record and 
for all practical purposes is moot exhibiting extreme prejudice against the plaintiff. 
If this court fails to recuse itself in this case it will cause this matter to 
go before an Administrative Judge for review as well as a complaint lodged with the 
judicial council. Further plaintiff feels that the court of appeals would disprove 
of this courts abuse of discretion in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff request for this court to vacate its order 
and to dismiss himself from this case. 
Dated this~-Mday of February, 2016 
MOI'ION 'ID RECONSIDER Pg. 2 
k':Ma~-m. l;/2~ 
'i:enneth M. Workman 
Plaintiff 
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CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _____________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
ORDER GRANTING IDOC'S 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO FILE MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR ANSWER 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by a Motion to Extend Time to File 
Motion to Dismiss or Answer filed by Defendant Idaho Department of Correction 
pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It appearing that good cause is shown, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant 
IDOC shall file a motion to dismiss or swer on or before February 22, 2016. 
DATED this :)_~dayof.L-, ___ ,2016. n ~ 
~~' 
Magistrate Judge 
ORDER GRANTING IDOC'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE MOTION 
TO DISMISS OR ANSWER--1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. MAR 6}12\i~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of _____ , 2016, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Karin Magnelli 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Corrections 
1299 N. Orchard Street, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706-2266 
Christopher D. Rich 
12flJ.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: __ 
D Statehouse Mail 
li:Zru.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 208-327-7485 
OU.S.Mail 
Ada County Clerk of the District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
~and Delivery 
,,,~
1~9hi1fi~4,Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
......... ,< l1i;"'I a:v:t½ilght'<:ttlail Boise, Idaho 83702 
~ CJ:~--Ji7 ?v-v5e ~~ ~ 
.. ~.:-.1.2.l•-••... "'</ ., 
l ~ .<EJ Facsimile:" , 
§ Cj l ~ '\\\~flrns't....-l-l=i·t":e=:,.R::-,D;:;:-.-;:R::;:,IC='H" 
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ORDER GRANTING IDOC'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE MOTION 
TO DISMISS OR ANSWER--2 
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) Case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
) 
) 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, ET AL., ) 
Defendants. 
) ORDER FOR RESPONSE 
) TO DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
) 
The Idaho Department of Correction and Christopher Rich have filed motions to dismiss. 
The plaintiff is hereby ordered to file responses to these motions, within thirty (30) days 
of the date of this order. 1 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS~y of February 2016. 
~ 
Magistrate Judge 
1The court will advise the parties ifit finds a hearing is necessary in relation to these motions. See I.R.C.P. 6(e)(2); · 
7(b)(3)(d). 
To the extent that a motion to dismiss is supported by other materials such as affidavits, the court may consider it to 
be a motion for summary judgment. See Hauschulz v. Idaho Department of Correction, 143 Idaho 462, 466, 147 
P.3d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[B]ecause matters outside the pleadings were presented, the motion to dismiss was 
converted into a motion for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c)."). 
Order for Response 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to 
each of the parties ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
Date: MAR O 1 2016 --------
Order for Response 2 
000133
.. ... 
Kenneth M. Workman# 61342 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho e3707 
NO·----=;:---:-;-f-1--_.._,,_ 
AM. _____ FIL.r-;E.~ +61 
MAR O 1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DARLENE BOYINK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 








CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of ) 
THE Fourth District Court. ) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTIONS ) 
Defendants ) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-1520864 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO~DEFENDANT 
CHRISTOPHER RICH'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
(l)MES NOW, Kenneth M. Workman, plaintiff acting prose in the above entitled 
matter, brings forth this response in objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss 
and states the following in support: 
BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff's case before this court raises one factual claim. The claim that the 
named defendants have been illegally removing funds from his Inmate Account for the 
purposes of a restitution debt that has long expired and is therefore unenforceable 
for collection. The named defendant was given numerous notice and chances to correct 
the illegal activity, but refused to do so. The defendant has now come forward with 
its current motion to dismiss based on their allegation that the plaintiff has failed 
to state a claim. The defendants motion and argument is misguided and their misinter-
pretatia:i of the law in this matter is self-serving. The argument they have presented 
in their motion is in complete contrast to the prevailing laws in the State of Idaho 
that govern the plaintiff's issue in this case. Their motion should be considered 
moot and is addressed as follows. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 'ID IDTION 'ID DISMISS Pg. 1 
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1. PLAINTIFF'S APRIL 28, 2003 ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND CIVIL JUDG-
MENT IS EXPIRED, UNENFORCEABLE AND NOT SUBJECT TO RENEWAL AND THE 
COURT THEREFORE SHOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A. Applicable Legal Standard for Renewal of Judgment. 
Idaho Code Section 1 0-1111 ( 1 ) sets forth that " [ u] nless the judgment has been 
satif ied, at any time prior to the expiration of the lien created .!2¥. Section 10-111 0, 
Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court which entered the judgment, other a 
judgment for child support, may, upon motion, renew such judgment. The renewed judgment 
may be recorded in the same manner as the original judgment, and the lien established 
thereby shall continue for five (5) years from the date of judgment". (Emphasis added 
on the five years which was the applicable law to this case at the time.) 
"By its own terms I. C. 1 0-1111 provides for the renewal of judgments, not just 
judgment liens". Smith V. Smith 131 Idaho 800-802 (ct. App. 1998) Idaho Code does 
not allow for sua sp::mte renewal. Grazer v. Jones 154 Idaho 58, 59 ( 2013) 
Idaho Code 10-1110 sets forth in pertinent parts that," The lien resulting from 
recording of a judgment other than for child support continues five (5) years from 
the date· of judgment, unless the judgment is previously satisfied, or unless the en-
forcement of the judgment be stayed upon appeal as provided by law". Id. 
Likewise I. C. Section 11-1 05 sets forth that, " [ i] n all cases other than the 
recovery of money the judgment may be enforced or carried into execution after the 
lapse of five (5) years from the date of entry, by leave of the court, upon motion, 
or by judgment for that purpose founded upon supplemental pleading". (emphasis added) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled there is only "one exception to this five year limit: 
" In all. other cases other than for the recovery of money the judgment may be enforced 
or carried into execution after the lapse of five (5) years". Girazer v. Jones 154 
Idaho at 69-70. 
" In short, a civil judgment (as recorded in this case) whether or not a lien 
is actually recorded will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a 
party before that expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by 
the court". Bach v. Dawson 152 Idaho 237-39 (ct. App. 2012) citing Smith V. Smith 
131 Idaho at 802 ( Section 1 0-1111 provides for renewal of judgment, not just judgment 
liens) 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 'IO roTION 'IO DISMISS Pg. 2 
000135
"We (Idaho Court of Appeals) view I.C. 10-1111 to be in the nature of a statute 
of limitations; it sets the limit for a'judgment creditor to take action to renew 
the judgment". Smith v. Smith 131 Idaho at 802 11 Under Idaho's renewal statute, for 
non child support judgments, the motion to renew l«JST be made within five years of 
the date of judgment". Grazer v, Jones 154 Idaho at 65. 
2. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS LACKS MERIT AND FAILS TO GIVE 
MEANING AND EFFECT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
CONCERNING RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT. 
The
1
defendant's ,;~~1that the plaintiff's issue must be dismissed because 
it fails to distinguish between a civil judgment and a criminal order. Defendants 
gci>,,into a lengthy explanation of the criteria f@rIC. 19-5302, but avoid addressing l 
the specific issue raised in this case. That issue is whether restitution orders as 
civil judgments are subject to termination if the victims fail to renew the judgment. 
Idaho Legislators have made it abundantly clear as to the ~tates position on the re-
newal of judgment on restitution orders. Plaintiff would like this court to take 
judicial notice of House Bill No. 62 of the 2015 First Regular Legislative Session. 
Enactments were made specifically to Idaho Code 10-1110 and Idaho Code 10-1111. The 
Legislators changed I.C. 10-1111 (Renewal of Judgment) by extending the five (5) year 
limitation to twenty (20) years. The legislators opined that, "Crime victims nay not 
realize that the lien arising fran a judgment (restitution) nn.ISt be renewed every 
5 years". _: This Bill would enable victims of crime to fully recognize their own 
constitutional right to restitution for harm caused them~ extending the 5 year limit-
itation to 20 years". 
Plaintiff has provided an excerpt from House Bill No. 62 (See Attached Exhibit 
A) to wit:, a copy of the Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note No. RS23375, where the 
Idaho Legislators clearly confinn that a restitution order must be renewed in order 
to keep it enforceable. Plaintiff asserts that this is clear and convincing evidence 
that show the defendants are in fact culpable in this matter and that their argument 
is moot. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 'ID M:>TION 'ID DISMISS Pg. 3 
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The defendant have cited State v. McCool 139 Idaho 804, 806,(2004). This case is not 
supportive of their position and points out that restitution is a civil judgment. 
The courts holdings in this case state: 
"Idaho Code 19-5302, 5304 and 5305 provide that the court in a criminal 
case can enter what is, in essence, a civil judgment for restitution 
r :· .:__-~•,against the defendant". I.C. 19-5304(2) provides, "an order of restitu-
tion shall be a written order in addition to any other sentence the 
court may impose". 
I.C. 19-5305 further provides that," after ordering restitution the 
order may be recorded as a civil judgment and the victim may execute 
as provided for by civil judgments". 
The record does reflect in this case that the restitution order issued on April 
28, 2003, plainly shows that it is an order for restitution and civil judgment. 
Whether or not it was actually recorded as a civil judgment (which in this case it 
was~) the findings would still be conclusive that the plaintiff's restitution is a 
civil judgment and subject to renewal to keep it active. 
The higher courts have previously held that an order for restitution is separate 
and apart from a criminal sentence. citing State v. Ganez 152 Idaho 253, 258, (2012) 
Where ari order for restitution provided in I.C. 19-5304(2) becomes in essence a civil 
judgment for the amount of such restitution. State v. McCool Idaho 804, 806 (2004) 
In this case the defendant is simply incorrect in their assertions. As the evi-
dence presented shows conclusively that a restitution order does encompass the need 
for a crime victim to file for renewal of judgment to keep the order active, then the 
defendant has failed to provide convincing proof to the contrary. The defendant's 
argument is therefore moot and must be dismissed outright for lack of merit. 
In recognizing, as supported by Idaho Law, that the victim in plaintiff's case 
had the right and the opportunity to renew judgment, but failed, to do so. Then as a 
matter of law, plaintiff must prevail on his claim, as the facts and record clearly 
show that no motion to renew judgment was filed in his case, which rendered the 
restitution order in question here expired and unenforceable as of April, 2008. 
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Defendants argue that the majority of the plaintiffs injunctive relief request 
may be subject to the statute of limitations. Plaintiff is aware of the provisions 
established in I.C.5-508 concerning the three (3) year limitation for action for re-
covery of property. In the instant case, plaintiff contends that equitable tolling 
is warranted for the statute of limitations allowing relief going back to 2009. 
Plaintiff's Offender Banking Statement transaction dates show transactions by 
deduction for restitution (writ of execution) starting from July 1, 2009 to October 
30, 2015. In 2009 seven (7) deductions for restitution are shown. On June 6, 2010 
one (1) deduction i.s shown. And again one (1) deduction on July 31, 2012. Between 
June 6, 2010 and July 31, 2012 over two (2) years had elapsed without any funds being 
deducted. Plaintiff assumed that the defendants had finally realized that the resti-
tution had expired for failure to renew and plaintiff was no longer being subjected 
to collections for it. On June 29, 2015, once again the defendants began deducting 
funds from his Inmate Account for restitution as believed due to the 2015 legislation 
mandating restitution deductions for all state prisoners. Plaintiff argues that for 
whatever reason his restitution deductions stopped as of June of 2012. Because the 
deductions had ceased plaintiff assumed the matter was finalized and he chose to fore-
go filing litigation as the matter had seemed resolved. Plaintiff further decided 
to digest the money previously taken from 2008 and move on. Once the defendants began 
again to deduct funds from his account as of June, 2015, plaintiff was left with no 
• • I 
choice but to file this current litigation against them. All deductions stopped as 
of July 31, 2012 and did not corrrnence again until June 29, 2015, a period of over 
three (3) years. It is based on this Three year period without any deductions taken 
that has led plaintiff to believe this matter ~as closed. Equitable tolling Should 
apply back as far as 2009. Had plaintiff known that the defendants would again be 
deducting funds from his account in the future, the civil action now in progress would 
have been filed in 2012 to protect his rights. I,C. 5-508 sets a three (3) year 
limitation. Had plaintiff filed in 2012 the three year limitation would encompass 
damages from 2009. Plaintiff has shown that circumstances beyond his control 
is a sufficient reason to warrant equitable tolling for any statute of limitations 
in this case. "[E]quity aids the diligent and not the negligent". Grazer at 68, 69 
F/N: If ~ plaintiff will pror.ida a certified ~ statarent in sq;:µxt of tie al:I:M=. 
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4. THE COURT SHOUID FIND THAT DEFENDANT MOI'ION TO DISMISS IS FRIVOLOUS 
In Grazer, the appelle asked the Idaho Supreme Court to award him attorney fees, 
"on the grounds that Grazer's arguments on appeal are frivolous". 154 Idaho at 71. 
The Supreme Court agreed, finding that, "none of Grazers arguments are persuasive, 
and many of them are unsupported by authority, are utterly implausible, or are clearly 
contrary to prior decisions rendered by the court". 
The same circumstances exists in this case. The defendant in this case, rather 
than concede that the plaintiff was right with his assertions, has allowed this case 
to go forward causing undue stress on the plaintiff as well as wasting this courts 
time and the states money. Had the defendant look to the realism of this matter by 
simply reviewing the legislative intent for renewal of restitution judgment as plain~ 
tiff has done, then this case could of been resolved outside the confines of the court 
saving Idaho Tax Payers substantial money. 
Plaintiff, is aware that, acting prose he is not entitled to be awarded attorney 
fees and is not asking for that. He is however asking for a specific finding and con-
clusion that the defendant's motion to dismiss has not been brought in good faith 
and is frivolous. Plaintiff asserts that the infonnation he has brought before this 
court is clear and convincing evidence, of which the defendant had access to as well. 
Their failure to concede to the strength of the plaintiffs issue here by bringing 
a frivolous motion and argument warrants this court's intervention to hold them 
accountable for this frivolous undertaking. 
q:)NCLUS ION -----
Plaintiff has provided this court-witli-clear and convincing evidence that the 
Restitution Orders in the State of Idaho must be renewed to keep them an active 
order. Plaintiff has therefore presented a genuine issue of material fact and as a 
matter of law mandates this court provide the relief he is seeking. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests for this honorable court to issue 
an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and its order granting the relief 
plaintiff seeks in this civil complaint. 
Dated this(). s"'aay of February, 2016 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO MOTION TO DISMISS Pg. 6 
~,d:b1). t,J~.,,,., 
eth M. Workman 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theL.efcnY of February, 2016, I provided 
a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss to ISCI Paralegal for process via the U.S. mail to: 
Ada County Prosecutors Office 
C/O Kale D. Gans 
200 West Front Street Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
~mdd m. u.J,dw,,_, 
Kenneth M. Workman 
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EXHIBIT A 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS23375 
Idaho Code provides that when a defendant is found guilty of any crime resulting in economic loss 
to a victim, the court shall order the defendant to make restitution unless it finds that such an order 
would be inappropriate or undesirable. This order may later be recorded as a judgment and the 
victim may execute on the judgment in the same manner as any other civil judgment. However, 
crime victims are generally not represented by an attorney, and they may not realize that the lien 
arising from a judgment must be renewed every five years, or that the judgment must be executed 
upon within five years, unless the court grants a motion to extend that time. This bill would enable 
victims of crime to fully recognize their constitutional right to restitution for the harm that has been 
done to them by extending the five year limitation to twenty years for victims who are seeking to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICI~ilf"a~,J; o. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ArfAPUTY 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) ORDER DENYING 
) MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
) 
The plaintiffs motion to disqualify the undersigned has previously been denied, since 
it was not filed in compliance with the Idaho Rules. See I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B) ("A motion for 
disqualification without cause must be filed not later than seven (7) days after service of a 
written notice or order setting the action for status conference, pretrial conference, trial or for 
hearing on the first contested motion, or not later than twenty-one (21) days after service or 
receipt of a complaint, summons, order or other pleading indicating or specifying who the 
presiding judge to the action will be, whichever occurs first; and such motion must be filed 
before the commencement of a status conference, a pretrial conference, a contested 
proceeding or trial before the judge sought to be disqualified.") ( emphasis added). 
The plaintiff has now filed a "motion to reconsider the c~mrt's order denying 
plaintiffs motion to disqualify judge," asserting that his motion was in compliance with the 
rules. 
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On December 15, 2015, the court filed an order requiring partial payment of fees and 
notice of intent to dismiss. This order specified that the undersigned was the presiding judge 
in this action. The plaintiffs motion to disqualify, which was filed on February 5, 2015, was 
not filed until well after the expiration of the twenty-one day period, which was triggered by 
this order. 1 
The plaintiff also failed to mail a copy of his motion to the undersigned at his resident 
chambers, as the rule requires. I.R.C.P. 40( d)(l )(H) ("A party moving to disqualify a judge or 
magistrate under this Rule 40( d)(l) shall mail a copy of the motion for disqualification to the 
presiding judge or magistrate at the judge's resident chambers."). 
The plaintiffs motion to reconsider is, therefore, denied. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS /~y of March 2016. 
Magistrate Judge 
1The plaintiff paid the partial filing fee on December 31, 2015, in direct response to this order, and his motion to 
disqualify was not even filed within twenty-one days of this. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 
77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
Date: -~\IIAR~_l_5_20_16 __ 
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JAN M. 1;3ENNETTS 
AQA CQUNTY PRO~ECUTINQ ATTORNEY 
RAY J. CHACK;O 
])eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 5862 
NO 
AM::.:.:::.:.FiiF~ILE'i=r.tr=::3:--,,::1,-h--: 
MAR 2 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the Fourth 
District Court, IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS, UNKNOWN AND 
UNNAMED INDIVIDUAL OF THE 




) Case No. CV OC 15 20864 
) 
) :PEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER 
) RICH'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
) TO DISMISS PURSUANT 







On February 16, 2016, defendant Christopher Rich moved for dismissal pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b). On February 22, 2016, co-defendant Idaho Department of Correction similarly 
moved for dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), joining defendant Rich's argument, and in 
addition, sought dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c). Three days later, plaintiff Kenneth 
DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICH'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)-PAGE 1 
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Workman responded to defendant Rich's motion. Plaintiff's response was filed March 1, 2016, 
and ha~· prompted this reply by defendant Ri<;h. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Restitution Order Did Not Expire. 
Plaintiff continues to confuse his ongoing criminal Order of Restitution, which does not 
expire, with laws pertaining to civil judgments. He also confuses filings in a court docket with 
civil judgments recorded in a county's property records. Plaintiff interchanges terminology such 
as liens, judgments, and orders without drawing any meaningful distinctions 1;,etween them. 
Regardless of whether his Order of Restitution was recorded as a civil judgment, Plaintiff cites to 
no authority that said Order of Restitution somehow expired. While Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) 
provides a procedure whereby "an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the 
victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments," Idaho Code § 19-5305(2) creates a 
separate mechanism by which defendant Rich, as the clerk of the court, "may take action to 
collect on the order of restitution on behalf of the victim ... us[ing] the procedures set forth in 
section 19-4708 ... " Plaintiff does not distinguish between these differing methods of recovery. 
The policy to fully compensate crime victims for their economic loss has long been 
recognized by the courts. State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Idaho App. 
2014) (citations omitted). This is reinforced by Idaho Code § 19-4708(2)(c), which includes 
"restitution" under the definition of "Debts owed to courts." Moreover, given that defendant 
Rich, as the clerk of the court, is statutorily authorized to collect restitution payments on behalf 
of victims (such as the garnished funds received from co-defendant Idaho Department of 
Correction in this case), it is unclear how defendant Rich's performance of what amounts to a 
court function could lead to liability. Implementing an Order of Restitution would appear to be a 
DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICH'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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continu~tion of a court function that, if not absolutely immune from liability, would at the very 
least be protected by qualified immunity. See e.g. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 156-57, 937 
P.2d 1222, 1230-31 (1997) (extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to a guardian acting as 
part of the judicial process); see also, Rincover v. Dep 't of Fin., 128 Idaho ·653, 656-57, 917 P.2d 
1293, 1296-97 (1996). 
In light of the above, defendant Rich should be granted dismissal from this action. 
B. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply. 
Even if Plaintiff had provided a cognizable legal basis for proceeding against defendant 
Rich, Plaintiffs claims would be limited by the statute of limitations. Here, Plaintiff argues that 
his Order of Restitution expired in 2008, yet also alleges that his inmate account was garnished 
many times afterwards up through July 31, 2012, before it started again in 2015, Plaintiffs Reply 
to Defendant Rich's Motion to Dismiss, p.5. As a result, he was clearly on notice that funds 
were being deducted after the date, April 2008, that his order of restitution allegedly expired and 
upon which his current cause of action is based. Thus, there is no basis for equitable tolling 
since Plaintiff could have raised his current claims against defendant Rich (or the prior clerk) at 
that time. See Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295, 298, 221 P.3d 521, 524 (App. 2009) (applying 
equitable tolling would not have rendered plaintiffs claim timely). 1 Quite simply, Plaintiffs 
own inactions cannot form a basis for equitable tolling. See Amboh v. State, 149, Idaho 650, 
653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (App. 2010) (equitable tolling not allowed where post-conviction 
petitioner's lack of diligence contribute_d to the untimeliness of his petition). 
1 To the extent Plaintiff may argue that he did raise such issues through U.S. District Court Case 
No. 1:10-cv-00081-BLW, defendant Rich would then note that the res judicata defenses raised by 
co-defendant Idaho Department of Correction would similarly apply to him. See Memorandum in 
Support of Idaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss at 4 - 13. Additionally, the defenses 
regarding notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act as discussed by Idaho Department of Correction would 
also be applicable, though better suited for an I.R.C.P 56(c) motion. Id. at 13-15. 
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.. . 
PATED this 25 th day of March 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.i_'aa.y of March 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b) to the following persons by the following method: 
Kenneth M. Worlanan #61342 
ISCI, P.O. BOX 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Office of the Attorney General 
Karin Magnelli, Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendant IDOC 
1299 North Orchard St., Ste. 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Hand Delivery r U.S.Mail 
Certified Mail --
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail --
Certified Mail 
-;c-,Eax: (208) 327-7485 
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REC E IV.ED 
MAR 31 2016 
Ada County Clerk 
NO.~ f FILED 
A.M- lo- P.M----
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Plaintiff, prose 
MAR 3 1 7016 
CHRISTOPHEl'I O. RICH, Clerk 
ey grAOF{ LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNEI'H M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk' 
of the Fourth District Court, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECI'IONS, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS 














) ________________ ) 
case No. 0/-0C-15-20864 
NOTICE OF CLARIFICATION AND WITIIDRAWAL 
OF 14th AMENDMEN.l' CLAIM 
mMES NOW Plaintiff Kenneth "Mike" Workman, prose, and hereby files his 
Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim. 
By way of this NOTICE, Plaintiff hereby clarifies that he is not raising 
a federal 14th Amendment due process claim in this action. Further, Plaintiff 
also hereby withdraws the following phrase from the Complaint: 






• • • JI 
"Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
monies placed in his inmate account. The taking of any funds for 
Restitution by the Idaho Department of Corrections is governed by the 14th 
Amendment of the State of Idaho and the U.S. Constitution." 
Id., at pg. 4. 
Plaintiff files this OOI'ICE in order to clarify that the scope of the 
Complaint is brought under the constitution and laws of the State of Idaho and 
is based solely on state law, not federal law. 
DATED this ~?fh day of Mardi, 201 ~- 1 
~~~~!O;r) 
Plaintiff, prose 
CERl'IF'lcATE OF SERVICE 
(Prisbner, Mailbox Rule Invoked) 
I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim on the following 
named persons at their last known address, via the ISCI Prison Legal Mail System 
and the u.s Mail, 1st class postage prepaid, on M<;lI'ch ~ft· , 2016:.r 
Karin Magnelli, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard st., Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Kale D. Gans, ISB #9013 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
~,lho1,1)~ 
eth M. Workman 




Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Plaintiff, prose 
A.M \ IJ - FILED P.M-----
MAR a 1 1016 
CHRISTOl'H!J!1 D. RICH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRicr COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRicr 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNEI'H M. ¾ORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of 
of the Fourth District Court, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENI' OF CORRECTIONS, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUAIS 














) ________________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15~20864 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANI' 
IIX)C'S IDI'ION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW Plaintiff K~eth "Mike" Workman, prose, and hereby submits 
this Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IIX)C's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's 
response is supported by the Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in Support 
of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IIX)C's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, 
"Workman Deel.") filed contemporaneously herewith., and the record, pleadings and 
files herein. 
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I. INI'RODUCI'ION 
On February 22, 2016, Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") 
filed their Motion to Dismiss. In their Memorandum in Support of Idaho 
Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, "IDOC's Memorandum"), 
IDOC argues, in error, that Plaintiff's claims in this case rest upon "his 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 2. This is 
incorrect. As set forth in his Complaint, Plaintiff's action is "brought under 
the constitution and laws of the state of Idaho." Complaint, pg.1, § A. 
Plaintiff's action is a "declaratory judgment claim" ( id. ) brought pursuant 
to I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq., alleging that the judgment for restitution entered 
on April 28, 2003 was not renewed within five (5) years and therefore, under 
well-settled Idaho law, expired on April 28, 2008 and is now expired, 
unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer owing. Complaint, pgs. 3-5, 
generally. 
IDOC also argues, in error, that Plaintiff "has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted and his claim is barred by res judicata and 
the statute of limitations." IDOC's Memorandum, pg. 2. As set forth below, 
Plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted 
and his claims are not barred by either res judicata nor the statute of 
limitations. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HIS'IDRY 
Plaintiff Workman is in the custody of the IDOC and is currently housed 
at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). Complaint, p. 2; Workman 
Deel., ,r2.; Affidavit of Shirley Audens in Support of Idaho Department of 
Correction's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Audens Aff."), ,r6. A civil 
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order and judgment for payment of restitution in the amount of $32,391.44 was 
entered against Workman, pursuant to I.C. ~ 19-5304, in Ada County case number 
H0101303 on April 28, 2003. Complaint, p. 4; Workman Deel., fl3, Exhibit A; 
Aud.ens Aff., fl6, Exhibit A. To date, no motion for renewal of judgment has 
been filed or served on Workman pursuant to I.e.§§ 10-1110 and/or 10-1111. 
Complaint, pgs. 2-3; Workman Deel., fl4. 
Even though no motion for renewal of judgment was filed and served within 
the applicable five (5) year time limit, at times since April 28, 2008 (when 
the five (5) year renewal period expired) Defendant ICOC has made cccmtiriuifig. 
deductions from Plaintiff's inmate account for payments toward the now expired 
restitution order. Complaint, pg. 3; Workman Deel., fl5; Audens Aff., fl6. 
On March 1, 2015, I.e.~ 20-209H went into effect, providing for payments 
towards restitution "still owing." Since June 29, 2015, Defendant ICOC has 
made at least fifteen (15) deductions from Plaintiff's inmate account as payments 
towards the restitution order. Complaint, pgs. 2-3; Workman Deel., f[6; Audens 
Aff., fl6. 
III. APPLICABLE LEX;AL STANDARDS 
A Court may grant a 12 (b) ( 6) motion to dismiss when it appears beyond doubt 
that there is no .. · set of facts that will support the claim for relief. Yoakum 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416 (1996); Ortham v. 
Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). The non-moving party 
is entitled to have all inferences in the record viewed in his/her favor. Id. 
To the extent that the Court considers matters outside the scope of the pleadings, 
the Court may consider a 12 ( b) ( 6) motion as one for surrmary judgment. See 
I.R.C.P. 12(b); I.R.C.P. 56(c); Merrifield v. Arave, 128 Idaho 306, 307, 912 
P.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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When reviewing a motion for surrmary judgment, the "Court must liberally 
construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party and determine whether there 
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Quinlan v. Idaho Corrm'n for Pardons 
and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003). Such judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the action. I.R.C.P. 
56(c). 
IV. ARGUMENI' 
1. 'fflE .MAGISTRATE OOURl' LACKS JURISDICI'ION OF THIS MA'ITER. 
As set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, this is a declaratory judgment claim. 
Id. , pg. 1 • Plaintiff's Complaint specifically invoked the jurisdiction of 
the district court, not the magistrate court, pursuant to I.C. § 1-705. Id., 
pg. 2, § C. Jurisdiction. Under Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ ·: "-
10-1201 et seq., "Courts of record within their respective jurisdiction shall 
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed." I.e.§ 12-1201. 
The jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division is set forth and limited by 
I.C. §§ 1-2201 et seq. and Rule 82 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Not only has the Magistrate Division, including attorney magistrates, not 
been given jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions, but it's jurisdiction 
is specifically limited to civil actions "where the amount of damages or value 
of the property claimed does not exceed $10,000." See Rule 82(c)(2)(A); see' 
also I.C;. § 1-2208 (1) (a) (limiting magistrate jurisdiction to matters where 
value "does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000)."). 
The restitution order at issue in this civil case is $32,391.44 plus 
applicable interest. Complaint, pg. 4; Workman Deel., f[3, Exhibit A; Audens 
Aff., fl6, Exhibit A. The magistrate court lacks jurisdiction of this matter. 
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2. THE RESTI'IUI'ION ORDER IS EXPIRED, UNENFORCEABLE, UNCDLLECl'ABLE AND NO LONGER 
OWING BEX::'AUSE IT WAS ID!' RENEWED WITHIN FIVE ( 5) YEARS OF ITS ENl'RY. 
Idaho Ccrle Section 10-1111 ( 1 ) sets forth that " [ u]nless the judgment has 
been satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of the lien created by 
Section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court which entered 
the judgment, other than a judgment for child support, may, upon motion, renew 
such judgment. The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same manner as the 
original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for five 
(5) years from the date of judgment." (emphasis added). 
"By its own tenns, § 1 O-l:1'J;1 provides for the renewal of judgments, not 
just judgment liens." Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667, _ 
(ct. App. 1998). "Idaho Code section 10-1111(1) does not allow for sua sponte 
renewal." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 59, 294 P.3d 184, ( 2013). 
Idaho Code Section 10-1110 sets forth, in pertinent parts, that "[a] 
transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state 
••• may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, ••• and from 
the time of such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes 
a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt 
from execution, owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time 
prior to the expiration of the lien[.]" Id.', '1The lien~:tesul1E±ng from:recording 
of a judgment other than for support of a child continues five (5) years from 
the date of the judgment, unless the judgment be previously satisfied, or unless 
the enforcement of the judgment be stayed upon an appeal as provided by law." 
Id. 
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Likewise, Idaho Code Section 10-105 sets forth that "[i]n all cases other 
than for the recovery of money the judgment may be enforced or carried into 
execution after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry, by leave 
of the court, upon motion, or by judgment for that purpose, founded upon 
supplemental pleadings." (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled 
there is only "one exception to this five-year limit: "In all cases other than 
for recovery of money the judgment may be enforced or carried into execution 
after the lapse of five (5) years."" Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho at 69-70, citing 
I.e.§ 10-105 (emphasis in original). 
"In short, a civil judgment - whether or not a lien is actually recorded -
will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court." 
Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237, 239, 268 P.3d 1189, __ (Ct.App. 2012) (citing 
Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669 (section 10-1111 provides 
for renewal of judgments, not just judgment liens)). 
"We view I.C. § 10-1111 to be in the nature of a statute of limitation; 
it sets the time limit for a judgment creditor to take action to renew the 
judgment." Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at __ • "Under Idaho's 
renewal statute, for non-child support judgments, the motion to renew must be 
made within five years of the date of the judgment [ • ] " Grazer v. Jones, 154 
Idaho at 65, 294 P.3d at_, citing I.e.~ 10-1111(1). 
To date, no motion for renewal of judgment has been filed and served as 
to the restitution order at issue in this case. Workman Deel., ,r4. Therefore, 
as of April 28, 2008, the restitution order became expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing • 
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3. ~'S CLAIM IS WI' BARRED BY 'fflE OOCTRINE OF RES JUDICA'.m. 
The doctrine of res judicata serves three purposes: 
(1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against 
the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice 
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and 
(3) it advances the private interests in repose from the harassment of 
repetitive claims. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007), citing 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 
105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983). "Res Judicata is 
comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion 
(collateral estoppel)." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190, 207 
P.3d 162, 166 (2009), citing Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805. 
Different tests are applied to detennine whether claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion applies. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d 617. 
Claim preclusion prevents subsequent litigation between the same parties 
based upon the same claim or a claim related to the previous cause of action. 
Stoddard, 147 Idaho at 190, 207 P.3d at 166, citing Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho 
at 123, 157 P.3d at 617. To establish claim preclusion, three requirements 
must be met: (1) the subsequent action involves the same parties; (2) the 
subsequent action is based on the same claim; and (3) there was a final judgment 
in the prior action. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
Issue preclusion prevents relitigating an identical issue in a subsequent 
action. Stoddard, 147 Idaho at 191, 207 P.3d at 157, citing Rodriguez v. Dep't. 
of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). To establish issue 
preclusion: 
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(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full 
and fair opJ;X>rtunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; 
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was 
actually decided in prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on 
the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the 
issue was asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401, 404 (2001). 
As discussed below, Workman's Complaint is not barred by res judicata under 
either claim preclusion (true res judicata) nor issue preclusion (collateral 
estoppel) theories. 
A. Workman's Prior Action in U. s. District Court 
On February 16, 2010, Workman filed a Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint 
in the United states District Court for the District of Idaho, case No. 
1:10-cv--;00081-BLW ("U.S. District Court Complaint"). Workman Deel., ,i:1; 
Affidavit of Karin Magnelli in SupJ;X>rt of Defendant Idaho Department of 
Correction's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Magnelli Aff."), ,r2, Exhibit B. 
He asserted that the deductions from his inmate account to pay the restitution 
order violated his due process rights because he was never afforded a hearing 
or received a Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment. Workman Deel., ,r7; 
Magnelli Aff., ,r2, Exhibit B, pg. 2 at ,r2. 
In the U.S. District Court's Initial Review Order filed July 20, 2010, 
the Court dismissed IDOC as a Defendant in the matter because "[t]he Idaho 
Department of Correction, as an ann of the state of Idaho, is not a "person" 
that can be sued directly for damages under§ 1983," but allowed Workman "to 
proceed against Defendant[] Brent Reinke[.]" Workman Deel., ,rs, Exhibit B, 
pg. 3. 
The U.S. District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on 
September 22, 2011, granting surrmary judgment in favor of Defendant Reinke. 
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Workman Deel., ,I9; Magnelli Aff., ,r2, Exhibit C. A judgment was also entered 
on September 22, 2011, dismissing Workman's U.S. District Court Complaint with 
prejudice. Workman Deel., ,r1 0; Magnelli Aff., ,r2, Exhibit D. 
B. Workman's Action is Not Barred by Claim Preclusion 
Notwithstanding Defendant IDOC's arguments to the contrary, the Complaint 
currently before this Court is not barred by claim preclusion as it does not 
involve the same parties and claim that was litigated by Workman in his 2010 
U.S. District Court Complaint. 
i. This action does not involve the same parties. 
The U.S. District Court specifically dismissed IDOC from Workman's 2010 
federal§ 1983 civil rights complaint because IDOC, "as an arm of the state 
of Idaho, is not a "person" that can be sued directly for damages under§ 1983." 
Workman Deel., ,rs, Exhibit B, pg. 3; see also Arnzen v. state, 123 Idaho 899, 
903, 854 P.2d 842 (1993) ("Thus, it is clear that in Idaho, the State, for 
purposes of 42 u.s.c. § 1983, is not a "person.""). Therefore, IDOC was not 
a party to the U.S. District Court proceedings. 
ii. The claim in the Complaint is not the same claim raised in the 
2010 U.S. District Court Complaint. 
IDOC argues that "Workman has asserted the same claim in the current 
Complaint as he asserted in his 2010 [U.S.] District Court Complaint. IDOC's 
Memorandum, pg. 7. IDOC is incorrect. 
First, IDOC is incorrect because, while Workman did raise a federal due 
process claim in the 2010 U.S. District Court proceedings, he is not raising 
a federal due process claim in this action. 1 As set forth in his Complaint, 
1 In order to clarify the scope of the current Complaint, Plaintiff files 
contemporaneously herewith his "Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal 
of 14th Amenament Claim." 
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Workman's action is "brought under the constitution and laws of the State of 
the State of Idaho." Complaint, pg. 1, § A. Plaintiff's action is solely a 
state law "declaratory judgment claim" (id.) brought pursuant to I.C. § 10-1201 
et seq., alleging that the judgment for restitution entered on April 28, 2003 
was not renewed within five (5) years and therefore, under well-settled Idaho 
law, expired on April 28, 2008 and is now expired, unerlforceable, uncollectable 
and no longer owing. Complaint, pgs. 3-5, generally. This is not the same 
claim that was litigated in the 2010 U.S. District Court proceedings. 
Second, IDOC is incorrect because the state law claims being brought before 
this Court in the instant action is not a matter "which could have been raised 
and litigated in the first action." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126, 157 
P.3d at 620, citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A., v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 
437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993). The U.S. District Court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over Workman's present claims, which are based solely on 
state law. 
As set forth in Workman's federal civil rights complaint, the U.S. District 
Court's jurisdiction was limited to "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 
u.s.c. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4) and 2201 and 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Workman Deel., 
fl?; Magnelli Aff., fl2, Exhibit B, pg. 2, § B. Jurisdiction, fl1. None of these 
federal statutes provide the U.S. District Court jurisdiction to hear state 
law claims. See Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 127-129 (specially concurring 
opinion,,noting that the federal bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction 
to resolve Ticor's unjust enrichment claim, but that Ticor had failed to raise 
this issue on appeal.). 
Further, Plaintiff's claims against IDOC and the Clerk of the Court are 
barred in federal court for the additional reason that, as state entities, they 
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are irrrrnune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Emendrnent. See Hans 
v. I.ouisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 u.s. 89, 100 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't. of state 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (recognizing that only a "person" may be sued 
pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 and holding that a state is not considered a 
"person" under that statute). 
Therefore, Workman's claim is not barred by claim preclusion because this 
action does not involve the same parties and the claim in the instant Complaint 
is not the same claim raised in the 2010 U.S. District Court Complaint. The 
final judgment in the U.S. District Court is not a judgment that bars Workman's 
instant claim. 
c. Workman's Action is Not Barred by Issue Preclusion 
Contrary to the arguments of Il)(X:, the issue before the Court in the current 
Complaint is not "whether Il)(X: can relyy upon an order of restitution to deduct 
funds from an inmate's account to satisfy a judgment of restitution." See Il)(X:'s 
Memorandum, pg. 10. Rather, the issue is whether, due to the failure to timely 
move for renewal of judgment, the restitution order is expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing. 
Under well-settled Idaho law, the burden of timely renewal of a money 
judgment lies squarely upon the creditor. In the case of a restitution order 
(as in this case), that burden lies upon the Clerk of the District Court and/or 
the victim owed the restitution. See I.e.~ 19-5305(1) (restitution order may 
be recorded and executed upon as a civil judgment); State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 
167, 172, 345 P.2d 226 (Ct. App. 2014) (enforcement of restitution order "is 
specifically entrusted to the victim or the clerk of the district court."). 
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly established that the burden 
to timely renew a money judgment lies squarely upon the creditor. In Grazer 
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v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.2d 184 (2013), creditor Grazer "had never attempted 
to renew the judgment[.]" Id., at 62. The Grazer Court held that "[t]he 
judgment lien expired five years after the entry of judgment, and none of 
Grazer's excuses for allowing his lien to expire are persuasive, primarily 
because.he never attempted to renew the lien or obtain a new lien." Id., at 64. 
"Under Idaho's renewal statute, for non-child support judgment?, the motion 
to renew must be made within five years from the date" of the judgment. Id., 
at 65. "It is undisputed that Grazer never attempted to renew his lien. 
Nevertheless, Grazer asks this Court to disregard the fact that his lien has 
expired. We shall not do so." Id., at 68. 
The same applies to Workman's case. It is undisputed that neither the clerk 
of the court nor the victim has timely moved to renew the civil restitution 
judgment against Workman prior to the expiration of the five-year time limit. 
Complaint, pgs. 2-4; Workman Deel., i[4. The respective Defendants' arguments 
to the contrary are not only losing arguments, but frivolous arguments. In 
Grazer, the Idaho Supreme Court awarded the appellee attorney fees "on the 
grounds that Grazer's arguments on appeal are frivolous." 154 Idaho at 71. 
Just as in that case, none of Defendants' arguments here "are persuasive, and 
many of·them are unsupported by any authority, are utterly implausible, or are 
clearly contrary to prior decisions rendered by" the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. , ---
Indeed, a number of years after Workman's restitution order expired on 
April 28, 2008, the Idaho Legislature, recognizing that these orders must be 
timely renewed, passed into law 2015 House Bill 62. In passing this bill, the 
legislature specifically acknowledged that, even where restitution orders are 
at issue, that "the lien, arising from a judgment, must be renewed every five 
years" and chose to "extend[] the five year limitation to twenty years[.]" 
See Statement of Purpose RS23375. The bill amended I.C. ~ 10-1110, in pertinent 
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part, by adding the following provision: "A. lien arising from an order for 
restitution to a crime victim where the order of restitution has been recorded 
as a judgment pursuant to section 19-5305, Idaho Code, continues until twenty 
(20) years from the date of the judgment, unless the judgment be previously 
satisfied, or unless the judgment is stayed or set aside." See I.C. § 10-1110 
(2015). The amendment specifically "provided that the act should take effect 
on and after July 1, 2015, and shall apply only to judgments issued on and after 
July 1, 2015, by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id., statutory Notes, 
Effective Dates. 
Thus, Idaho's Legislature, which makes the law, and Idaho's Supreme Court, 
which interprets the law, have both determined that the failure to timely move 
for renewal of judgment makes Workman's restitution order expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing as of April 28, 2008. Defendants ask this 
Court to ignore this critical fact. But this Court must follow the law, must 
follow the direction of the Idaho Supreme Court, and "shall not do so." Grazer, 
154 Idaho at 68. 
i. Workman did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue of the expiration of the non-renewed judgment in the 
2010 U.S. District Court proceedings. 
As set forth above in Section 3.B in regards to claim preclusion, the 
federal U.S. District Court did not have jurisdiction over this state law issue, 
state entities could not be named as parties in the federal§ 1983 proceeding, 
and the Defendants in the instant case enjoyed Eleventh Amendment irnnunity in 
the prior federal case. Thus, Workman did not have a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue of whether, due to failure to timely move for renewal 
of judgment, the restitution order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable 
and no longer owing in the U.S. District Court proceedings. 
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ii. The issue decided in the 2010 U.S. District Court proceedings 
is not identical the the issue in the current Complaint. 
In the 2010 U.S. District Court Complaint, the issue was whether the 
deductions from Workman's inmate account as payments towards the restitution 
order violated his due process rights because was never afforded a hearing or 
received a Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment. Workman Deel., fl?; 
Magnelli_Aff., fl2, Exhibit B, pg. 2 at fl2; IlX)C Memorandum, pg. 5 ("He argued 
that the deductions violated his due process rights because he was never ~fforded 
a hearing or received a Writ of Execution or Notice of Garnishment."). 
This, is not identical to the issue in the current Complaint, which is 
whether,· due to the failure to timely move for renewal of judgment, the 
restitution order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer owing. 
iii. The issue of the expiration of the non-renewed judgment was not 
decided in the 2010 U.S. District Court proceedings. 
The U.S. District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on 
September 22, 2011, plainly states that the issue 'being decided sterrmed from 
Workman's allegations "that he has not 'been presented with notice or had an 
opportunity to object 'before the funds are taken out of his account, as required 
by state.law." Workman Deel., fl9; Magnelli Aff., n2, Exhibit c (Memorandum 
Decision and Order), at 3-4. The U.S. District Court conclude[d] that Plaintiff 
was not deprived of due process of law[.]" Id., at 5. The U.S. District Court 
then set out an entire section discussing its decision that Plaintiff was not 
deprived of due process of law, none of which addressed or had anything to do 
with the issue of whether, due to the failure to timely move for renewal of 
judgment, the restitution order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and 
no longer owing. Id., pgs. 12-16 at ~3. Thus, Workman's current issue is not 
the issue that was decided previously by the U.S. District Court. 
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iv. There was no prior judgment on the rneri ts of the expired non-
renewed judgment in the U.S. District Court proceedings. 
As _discussed above, the issue of whether, due to the failure to timely 
move for renewal of judgment, the restitution order is expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing was not presented nor decided on the merits 
in the U.S. District Court. That Court's Memorandum Decision and Order did 
not decide the merits of this issue, and the Court's judgment was specifically 
'' [b] ased on the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed herewith [ • ] '' Workman 
DecL, J[J[9-10; Magnelli Aff., J[2, Exhibit c and Exhibit D. Thus, there was 
no prior judgment on the merits of the non-renewed judgment issue. 
I 
Therefore, Workman's claim is not barred by issue preclusion because heJdid 
not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the present issue in the earlier 
case, the issue decided in the prior case was not identical to the issue 
presented in this action, the issue was not actually decided in the prior 
litigation, and there was no final judgment on the merits of this issue in the 
prior litigation. Workman's present claim is not barred by collateral estoppel. 
4. l«:lRKMAN'S CDMPLAINT IS NCJl' BARRED BY THE STA'IUI'E OF LIMITATIONS. 
IDClC! argues that "pursuant to Idaho Code~ 6-905, Workman's Complaint is 
untimely." IDC>C!'s Memorandum, pg. 13. IDClC! is incorrect. By its own terms, 
I.C. § 6-905 applies to "claims against the state under the provisions of this 
act[;]" that is, the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"), I.C. §§ 6-901 et seq. 
But Workman's Complaint and his claims are not brought under the ITCA. Rather, 
they are brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq. 
Therefore, I.e.§ 6-905 does not apply to Workman's Complaint. 
Further, Workman's claims are not stated as an ITCA claim because the 
damages alleged by Workman in this case are economic losses, which are generally 
unrecoverable in negligence actions. See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Assoc., 
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126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). Econanic losses unrelated 
to pro:perty damage or personal injury are not generally the proper subject of 
a negligence action. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 
P.3d 996, 1000 (2q05). Though exceptions to this general rule do exist, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has construed these exceptions narrowly and has stated that 
there is "an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends 
its protections to a party's economic interest." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-
08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. Since Workman has neither stated an ITCA claim in 
his Complaint nor asserted an exception to the economic loss rule, I.e.§ 6-905 
simply does not apply to this case. 
However, notwithstanding that I.C. § 6-905 does not apply to this case, 
Workman did in fact comply with I.e.§ 6-905 by filing a notice of claim with 
the Secretary of State and will provide it to the Court and Defendants, by way 
of a supplemental affidavit, when he receives it from the Secretary of State. 
Workman Deel. , ,i:11 • 
IIXlC also argues that "Workman would have had to file his complaint no 
later than July 6, 2011, and therefore, his Complaint on December 30, 2015, 
is untimely." IIX>C's Memorandum, pg. 14. This also is incorrect. 
IDOC is asking this Court to ignore the fact that the underlying restitution 
order is expired and has been for almost -eight years. But this Court is bound 
by the direction of the Idaho Supreme Court and "shall not do so." Grazer, 
154 Idaho at 68. 
The question then becomes, how far back in time is Workman entitled by 
the law to recover for money deducted from his inmate account after the 
restitution order expired on April 28, 2008? Plainly, Workman believes the 
correct answer to this question is "all of it," and rightfully so. Since April 
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2008 Workman has had money taken from him that simply was no longer owing due 
to the creditors' failure to timely renew. 
To the extent that the Court detennines that a statute of limitations 
applies, then Workman is entitled to recover the moneys deducted as far back 
as is allowed by the applicable statute. 
As an initial matter, however, the two-year statute of limitations asserted 
by IDOC, I.e.§ 6-911, is incorrect because that is the statute of limitations 
for tort claims brought under the ITCA. Indeed, even Defendant Court Clerk 
Christopher Rich, a creditor actually authorized by law to enforce active 
restitution orders, argues for the three-year statute of limitations under I.e. 
§ 5-218. See Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) and supporting 
Memorandum (at pgs. 6-7) filed on February 16, 2016 by Defendant Rich. Defendant 
also concedes that Workman is entitled to recover the deductions "that occurred 
from December, 2012 to the present." Id., pg. 7. 
Every time after April 28, 2008 that deductions were made from Workman's 
inmate account for payments toward the expired restitution order, a "wrongful 
act" was corrmitted for which a legal remedy in damages is available. However, 
because each of these wrongful acts were done in furtherance of a continuous, 
unfinished effort to collect a much larger restitution total, these acts were 
continuous torts and the statute of limitation does not apply until the wrongful 
conduct actually ceases. 
The Idaho Supreme court has adopted the "continuous tort" doctrine. In 
Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981), the Court held that when 
"the act complained of is in the nature of a continuing tort" that "it is a 
better policy to focus upon the act complained of, rather than the damages" 
in detennining the applicability of the statute of limitations. Id., 102 Idaho 
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at 400, 630 P.2d at 688. Under the continuous tort doctrine, wrongful acts 
"should be analyzed for the purposes of time limitations according to whether 
it is simply one complete act with ensuing damages, or whether it consists of 
continuous activities." CUrtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 602, 850 P.2d 749, 
754 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the definition of "continuing 
tort" as: 
"[O]ne inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct 
that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause 
of action. A continuous tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations 
is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects 
from an original violation[.]" 
Id., 123 Idaho at 603, 860 P.2d at 755, citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, 
§ 177, at 231 (1987). The Court has also determined "what does not constitute 
a continuing tort. Wrongful acts which are separate and wholly dissimilar are 
separate causes of action and the statute of limitations begins to run from 
the time of the cormnission of each wrongful act." Id., citing Fox v. Higgins, 
149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1967). 
In this case, since April 28, 2008, Defendants have been engaged in a series 
of continuous, similar wrongful acts, that is, making deductions from Workman's 
inmate account as payment upon a restitution order that is expired. These were 
not "separate and wholly dissimilar" wrongful acts. Rather, they were all part 
of the repeated, continuous, wrongful act of collecting moneys that were no 
longer owed due to the underlying judgment being expired. The conduct has still 
not even ceased. Thus, the statute of limitations does not apply and Workman 
is entitled to recover all moneys wrongfully taken since April 28, 2008. 
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5. \'DRKMAN' S ORDER FOR RESTITUTION IS EXPIRED. 
Defendant IDOC has joined in "Defendant Rich's argument that an order o[f] 
restitution does not expire and Workman misinterpretation of the statute allowing 
a victim to file the order as a civil judgment." IDOC's Memorandum, pg. 15, 
citing Defendant Rich's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b). 
Both Defendants IDOC and Rich are incorrect. The Idaho Supreme Court 
clearly established in Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho at 65, that "[u]nder Idaho's 
renewal statute, for non-child support judgments, the rrotion to renew must be 
made within five years of the date of the judgment[.]" A couple of years later 
Idaho's Legislature, recognizing that this also applied to restitution order~, 
chose to amend the law as to restitutionorder5;, extending the renewal period 
for restitution orders from the prior five (5) years to twenty (20) years for 
all restitution orders entered on and after July 1, 2015. 
Defendants IDOC and Rich ··ask this Court to disregard the fact that· 
Workman's restitution order expired almost · :'eiglft years ago on April 28, 2008. 
They ask ~is Court to ignore the rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court that require 
creditors to timely renew their judgments. And they ask this Court to "presume 
that the legislature perfonned an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision" 
when it amended the renewal period from five (5) to twenty (20) years for 
restitution orders in 2015. Roberts v. Board of Trustees, Pocatello School 
District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000). The Court 
instead should follow the direction 6f the Idaho Supreme.Court th?tt·it "shall 
not do so" and rule that, due to the failure to timely rrove for renewal the 
judgment is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer owing. 
Pursuant to the authority granted the Court under I.R.C.P. 56(c) that, 
on any party's rrotion for surrmary judgment, that "[s]uch judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the action," the Court 
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.. 
should enter surrmary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Workman and against 
Defendants in this matter. 
V. Attorney Fees 
IDOC also ask the Court to award attorney fees "pursuant to Idaho Code 
6-918A, or alternatively, Idaho Code§ 12-121." IDOC's Memorandum, pg. 15. 
The Court should deny IDOC's request for attorney fees. 
Attorney fees are only authorized under I.C. § 6-918A with "a showing, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the party against whom or which such 
award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the corn:nencement, conduct, maintenance 
or defense of the action." No such showing has been made against Plaintiff 
Workman. Indeed, it is Defendant IDOC that has been guilty of bad faith in 
their "defense of the action." Id. 
Likewise, attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 may only be awarded to the 
prevailing party "when the court is left with the abiding belief that the [case] 
has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
Gibson v. Bennett, )41 Idaho 270, 277, 108 P.2d 417 (2005). Defendant IDOC 
should not be the prevailing party in this action; Workman should prevail instead. 
Further, Workman's case is supported by good faith argument and is not frivolous. 
Indeed, it is IDOC's position that has already been deemed to be frivolous and 
contrary to prior rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court. Grazer, 154 Idaho at 71. 
Therefore, the Court should not award attorney fees against Workman and 
instead make specific findings that Defendants' defense of this action was done 
in bad faith and frivolously. 
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IV. CDNCLUSION 
As set forth above, Workman has stated a Declaratory Judgment Claim that is 
I 
out side the scope of a Magistrate Courts judicial authority to entertain. The 
Magistrate judge assigned to this case lacks standing and jurisdiction to preside 
over this matter. Workman has further stated a cognizable claim against Defendant 
IIXX! upon which relief may be granted and his claims are not barred by res j udicata 
nor the statute of limitations. IIXX:'.'s motion to dismiss should be denied by the 
court. Instead the court should rule that the restitution order expired on April 
28, 2008 and enter surrmary judgment in favor of Workman and against the Defendants 
in this case. 
Sul:mitted thisG/~ day of March, 2016 
~:.·1tib 
Plaintiff Prose 
CERl'IE'ICATE OF MAILit«; 
· ( Prisoner Mailbox Rule Invoked) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~f#i day of March, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IIXX!'s motion to dismiss 
on the following named persons, via the ISCI Prison Legal Mail system and the U.S. 
Mail to: 
Karen Magnelli, # ISB 6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Corrections 
1299 North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Lale D. Gans, ISB #9013 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Division 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
~xtim.W~ 
.~enneth M. Workman 





Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF 1IDAHO,'·m-AND-·FOR,.,THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNEI'H M. viORKMAN, 
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v. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk 
of the Fourth District Court, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECI'IONS, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS 














) ________________ ) 
case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
DEX::LARATION OF KENNETH "MIKE" l'K>RKMAN 
IN SUPPORI' OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
'ID DEFENDANT IOOC'S rorION 'ID DISMISS 
I, Kenneth Mike Workman, being competent to make this declaration and having 
personal kno~ledge of the matters herein, hereby declare under penalty of perjury 
pursuant to I.e.§ 9-1406(1) as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and make this 
declaration based upon personal knowledge. 
DECLARATION OF KENNETH "MIKE" WORKMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT IDOC'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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2. · I am in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction ( "IDOC") 
and currently housed at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI") in 
Unit 9. 
3. On April 28, 2003, an "Order For Restitution And Civil Judgment" was 
entered against me in the case of State v. Workman, Ada County case No. H0101303, 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304, in the amount of $32,391.44. A true and correct 
copy of this order and civil judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
' . 
4. To date, no motion for renewal of judgment has been served upon me 
in regards to the April 28, 2003 Order For Restitution And Civil Judgment 
pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-1110 and/or 10-1111. To my knowledge, no such motion 
for renewal of judgment has ever been filed with the Court either. 
5. Even though no motion for renewal of judgment was filed and served 
within the applicable five (5) year time limit, at times since April 28, 2008 
(when the five (5) year renewal period expired) Defendant IDOC has made 
continuing deductions from my inmate trust account for payments toward the now 
expired restitution order. 
6. Since June 29, 2015, Defendant IDOC has made at least fifteen (15) 
deductions from my inmate trust account as payments toward the restitution order. 
7. On February 16, 2010, I filed a Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint 
in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, case No. ': ~ 1 " -
1:10-cv-00081-BLW. A true and correct copy of this complaint appears to be 
attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Karin Magnelli In Support of Defendant 
Idaho Department of Correction's Motion To Dismiss (hereinafter, "Magnelli Aff.") 
filed in this matter on February 22, 2016. 
DECLARATION OF KENNETH "MIKE" WORKMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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8. On July 20, 2010, an Initial Review Order was entered by the U.S. 
District Court in Case No. 1:10-cv-00081-BLW. A true and correct copy of this 
Initial Review Order is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
9. On September 22, 2011, the U.S. District Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision and Order, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Reinke. 
A true and correct copy of this Memorandum Decision and Order appears to be 
attached as Exhibit C to the .Magnelli Aff. filed on February 22, 2016. 
10. On September 22, 2011, the U.S. District Court also issued a Judgment. 
A true and correct copy of this Judgment appears to be attached as Exhibit D 
to the .Magnelli Aff. filed on February 22, 2016. 
11. Prior to filing this action, I filed a notice of tort claim with the 
Idaho Secretary of State. I sent the original to the Secretary of State but 
did not get a copy made at the time of mailing. To the best of my recollection 
I mailed the original in about August or September of 2015. On March 17, 2016, 
I wrote to the Secretary of State requesting a copy of my notice of tort claim. 
A verbatim copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C. When the copy 
arrives to me from the Secretary of State, I will provide a copy of it to the 
Court and Defendants by way of a supplemental declaration. 
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the state of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 9-P~ day of Mqrcli, 2016 •. ·: 
,Jf.~Am. &,)~ 
I{ eth M. Workman 
DECLARATION OF KENNETH "MIKE" WORKMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT IDOC'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
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CERfll"ICA'l'E OF SERVICE 
(Prisoner Mailbox Rule Invoked) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in Support of Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant IIXJC's Motion to Dismiss on the following named persons at their last 
known address, via the ISCI Prison µ:gal Mail System and the U.S. Mail, 1st 
class postage prepaid, on M?rch~ 2016: · 
Karin Magnelli, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Deparbnent of Correction 
1299 North Orchard st., Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Kale D. Gans, ISB #9013 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
yiih.~ eth M. Workman 
DECLARATION OF KENNETH "MIKE" WORKMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT IDOC'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 
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A.M. • DP.M. 
J ---
: EXHIBIT A APR 2 8 2003 
8~. DAV~ir~~ 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 We$t Front Street Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephon~: (208) 287-7700 
..... 
IN THE PISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY. OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. H0101303 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
.A_l\lD CIVIL JUDGMENT 












i·,_ ·,.., \ . . Defendant. 1J!I., ______________ ) 
WHEREAS, on the 5th day of August, 2002, a Judgment ofConviction was entered 
against defendant KENNETH M. WORKMAN; and therefore pursuant to Idaho Code §19-
. . ~ 
..,.· "! 
:5304 and based on evidence presen_ted to this Court, _r'./7/t .. 
·I 
. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the ·defendant, KENNETH M. WOR.Kiv!AN, 
. . 
shall make restitution to ~e victim(s) in the following amounts of: 
,., 
ORDER FOR RES'J;'ITUIION AND CIVIL JUDGMENT (WORKMAN) , Page 1 u . i "" . "' I"" 





Diane King _ , 
a. Approximate amount of recent surgery , 
b. Out of pocket medical through 01/IO/Q3 
SUBTOTAL 
Anthony Barton 
a. Out of pocket medical through 11/02 · 
b. Cobra reimbursement · . 
c. 2003 deductible and out of po*et medical expenses for 












Interest on said restitution ·amount ~hall be computed at _---L..7_· ____ % per 
annum. 
FURTHER, this Order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the defendant, 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN. 
IT_IS SO ORDE~D . . 
DATED, this lJ dayof.......,..,t..F+.~---,f,i--ff---r.T:H 
. \ I - . 
. . • .. i . ' ft ' ~
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION AND CIVIL JUDG1'fN'\ \ ~RKMAN) , Page 2 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO EXHIBIT B 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ADA COUNTY, DEBORAH BAIL, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION (IDOC), 
CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA, BRENT REINKE, director 
of IDOC, WARDEN PHILLIP 
VALDEZ, and UNKNOWN AND 
UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 1: 1 0-CV-00081-BLW 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
Plaintiff, an Idaho state prisoner, has lodged a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint 
with the Court under 42 U .S.C. § 1983, which has been conditionally filed by the Clerk 
pending the Court's initial review. Plaintiff also seeks permission to proceed in forma 
pauperis. 
The Court is required to screen prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking 
relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to 
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 191 S(e) and 1915A. 
The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 1 
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malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of 
rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by 
conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 
1420 (9th Cir. 1991 ). 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS 
After Plaintiff was convicted of felony crimes in state district court, District Judge 
Deborah Bail ordered Plaintiff to pay $32,391.44 in restitution to his victims. This order 
also serves a civil judgment. Plaintiff contends that, beginning in September 2003, Idaho 
prison officials began deducting 25% of the funds in his inmate trust account on a 
monthly basis to satisfy the restitution order, until he was transferred to a prison in 
Oklahoma in 2007, where the monthly deductions stopped. When he returned to Idaho, 
prison officials again deducted funds from his trust account. According to Plaintiff, he 
has never been presented with notice of a garnishment, or had an opportunity to object, as 
required by state law. 
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that his property has been taken from 
him without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He has 
named the following Defendants: (1) Ada County; (2) Deborah Bail; (3) Idaho 
Department of Correction (IDOC); ( 4) Correctional Corporation of America; (5) Brent 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 2 
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Reinke, director ofIDOC; (6) Warden Phillip Valdez; and (7) "Unnamed and unknown 
individuals of the State of Idaho and the Correctional Corporation who have failed to sign 
' 
their names to the documents relating to this action." (Complaint, pp. 1-2.) 
REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff contends that IDOC and ICC officials deducted money from his inmate 
trust account first providing notice to him or an opportunity to be heard. It is clear that an 
inmate has a property right in an account containing his funds that the prison maintains as 
trustee. See, e.g., Quickv. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court 
therefore concludes that Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed against Defendants Brent 
Reinke, Phillip Valdez, and others responsible for deducting funds who are presently 
unknown to Plaintiff, though the Complaint may still be subject to dismissal on a ground 
not yet apparent to the Court at this initial screening stage. 
Conversely, the Court finds that Judge Deborah Bail is absolutely immune from 
Plaintiffs claim against her for monetary damages based on her decision to impose 
restitution, because she made that decision as part of her judicial function. Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). The Idaho Department of Correction, as an arm of 
the state of Idaho, is not a "person" that can be sued directly for damages under § 1983. 
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989); Hale v. Arizona, 993 
F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane). While a county may be a proper defendant 
in a § 1983 action, Plaintiff has not alleged that Ada County, as a governmental entity, 
has a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. 
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See Monell v. Dep 't of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). 
This also holds true against the Correctional Corporation of America, the corporate entity 
that contracts with the Idaho Department of Corrections to operate ICC. 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
For any litigant to file a civil complaint in federal court, that litigant must either 
pay the filing fee in full at the time of filing or seek in form a pauperis status, which 
allows the litigant to pay the filing fee over time. In either case, the litigant must pay the 
full filing fee for having filed the complaint, regardless of whether that person's case is 
eventually dismissed or is unsuccessful. Based upon Plaintiffs statements of his current 
financial condition, the Court finds it appropriate to grant his Motion to Proceed in Forma 
Pauperis, which allows him to pay the filing fee over time according to the schedule set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l). 
Because the Court does not know the current balance of Plaintiffs account, it will 
waive payment of an initial partial filing fee. Plaintiff shall be required to make monthly 
payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to his institutional 
account. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall forward payments from his account 
to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds ten dollars, until 
the filing fees are paid in full. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket No. 1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is obligated to pay 
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the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action, but he will not be assessed an initial 
partial filing fee at this time. A separate order directing prison officials to deduct monies 
from Plaintiffs prison trust account will issue. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion ~or the Appointment of 
Counsel (Docket No. 4) is DENIED without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (Docket 
No. 7) and [Second] Motion for Leave to Amend (Docket No. 11) are GRANTED insofar 
as Plaintiff is supplementing his Complaint with information related to his attempts to 
exhaust his administrative remedies. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that claims against the following Defendants are 
DISMISSED from this action without prejudice: Deborah Bail, Ada County, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and Correctional Corporation of America. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining Defendants shall be allowed to 
waive service of summons by executing, or having counsel execute, the Waiver of 
Service of Summons as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and returning it to the Court 
within thirty (30) days. If Defendants choose to return the Waiver of Service of 
Summons, the answer or pre-answer motion shall be due in accordance with Rule 
12( a)( 1 )(_A)(ii). 
Accordingly the Clerk of Court shall forward a copy of the Complaint (Docket No. 
3 ), and a copy of this Order, and a Waiver of Service of Summons to the following 
counsel: 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 5 
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1. Paul Panther, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Idaho 
Department of Corrections, 1299 North Orchard, Ste. 110, Boise, Idaho 
83706 on behalf of Defendant Reinke and IDOC John/Jane Does. 
2. Kirtlan Naylor, Naylor & Hales, P.C. 950 W. Bannock, Ste·. 610, Boise, ID, 
83702, also on behalf of Phillip Valdez and ICC John/Jane Does. 
3. Steve Groom, Deputy General Counsel, Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA), 10 Burton Hills Boulevard, Nashville, TN 37215. 
Should any entity determine that the individuals for whom it was served are not, in 
fact, its employees or former employees, or that its attorney will not be appearing for 
particular former employees, it should notify the Court via the CM/ECF system, with a 
copy to Plaintiff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall not engage in any discovery 
until an answer has been filed. Within thirty (30) days after an answer has been filed, the 
parties shall provide each other with the following voluntary disclosures: all relevant 
information pertaining to the claims and defenses in this case, including the names of 
individuals likely to have discoverable information, along with the subject of the 
information, as well as any relevant documents in their possession, in a redacted form if 
necessary for security or privilege purposes; and, if necessary, they shall provide a 
security/privilege log sufficiently describing any undisclosed relevant documents which 
are alleged to be subject to nondisclosure. Any party may request that the Court conduct 
an in camera review of withheld documents or information. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, instead of filing an answer, Defendants file a 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, disclosures and discovery 
shall be automatically stayed with the exception that Defendants shall submit with any 
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a copy of all 
grievance-related forms and correspondence, including a copy of original handwritten 
forms submitted by Plaintiff that either fall within the relevant time period or that 
otherwise relate to the subject matter of a claim. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery requests and responses shall not be 
filed with the Clerk of Court, but shall be exchanged between parties, only, as provided 
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions to compel discovery shall not be 
filed unless the parties have first attempted to work out their disagreements between 
themselves. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may have more than three pending 
motions before the Court at one time, and no party may file a motion on the same subject 
matter if he or she has another motion on the same subject matter currently pending 
before the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall notify the Court immediately if 
his or her address changes. Failure to do so may be cause for dismissal of this case 
without further notice. 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 7 
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.. 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER - 8 
DATED: July 20, 2010 
Z'J-~W~ 
Ho~ Lynn Winmill 
Chief U. S. District Judge 
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Idaho Secretary of State 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0080 
Re: Copy of Tort Claim 
Dear Secretary of State, 
Kenneth M. Workman 61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
March 17, 2016 
EXHIBIT C: 
In about August or September of 2015, I filed a Tort Claim with you regarding 
the collection of an expired restitution order. Unfortunately, I did not take 
a copy for my own records when I mailed it to you. 
I am writing to request that you provide me a copy of my Tort Claim. If there 
is a charge for this service please let me know what it is and I will send prompt 
payment. 




Kenneth M. Workman 
[verbatim copy of original] 
000186A 
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Plaintiff, prose 
N0·------;~:---,-"4-~L._-
A.M ___ F-t<IL~:.~ 156 = 
APR 1 5 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN FOR THE CXXJNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. ¼ORKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk 
of the Fourth District Court, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECI'IONS, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS 














) _______________ ) 
CAse No. CC-OC-2015-20864 
SUPPLEMENI'AL DEcr.ARATION OF KmNEI'II 
"MIKE" VDRKMAN IN SUPPORl' OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE 'IO DEFmDANT IDOC' s IDI'ION 
'IO DISMISS 
I, Kenneth Mike Workman, being competent to make this declaration and having 
personal knowledge of the matters herein, hereby declare under penalty of perjury 
pursuant to I.e.§ 9-1406(1) as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and make this 
declaration based upon personal knowledge. 
SCJPPLEMENl'AL DEX:!LARATION OF KEl'lNEl'H "MIKE" l\ORKMAN IN SUPPORI' OF 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 'IO DEFENDANI' IDOC's IDI'ION 'IO DISMISS - 1 
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2. As I stated in the Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in Support 
of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss which I signed 
on March 28th, 2016 and is filed in the Court, prior to filing this action I 
filed a notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary of State. See id., at 
~11. Attached hereto as Exhibit A.is a true and correct copy of the notice 
of tort claim that I filed with the Secretary of State on September 1, 2015. 
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the state of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this.....!£_ day of April, 2016. 
~m.u~ 
eth M. Workman 
CER'l'IF'ICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in Support of Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss on the following named persons 
at their last known address, via the ISCI Prison Legal Mail System and the U.S. 
Mail, 1st class postage prepaid, on April ...12._, 2016: 
Karin Magnelli, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard st., Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Kale D. Gans, ISB #9013 
Deputy Attorney Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
SUPPLEMFNrnL DEX:!1:ARATION OF KENNRrll "MIKE" IDRKMAN IN SUPPORT OF 
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Secretary of State 
P.O. Box 83720 







LAW ENCE DENNEY 
Secretary of State 
r.'fll~ 
20·15 SEP - l AH 8: 48 
SECRETARY OF STAiE 
STATE OF !DAHO 
In compliance with Title 6, Idaho ode, the undersi ncd hereb resents a clai against the 
State of Idaho tor damages arising out of an occurrence which happened as fol lows: 
Date and Time: July 7, 201 5 to present time 
Place or Location: Idaho state Cbrrectional Inst , 
Cause of Damages: (Describe the details and circumstances of the accident or occurrence) 
Starting j n ,JnJ y of 2Q1 5 funds bas and i s b=d ng i 11 egaJ J y mrroved from my 
Inmate Acco:mt: for a 2004 court order for restitution, case No. H0101303. 
The order i s 1 4 years oJ d and for the order to remain valid it must be 
renewed every 5 years in accordance with I.C. 10-1110 am 1111. '!here 
has been no renewal of judgment/order for restitutuion which renders the 
<;>Wed amount rm-w1le:::ta::i atrl _un_en_f_o_rcea __ b_l_e_. __________ _ 
Witnesses: (Name, Address and Phone Number) This matter has been personally 
adrninistatively exhausted through the n:xx: grievance process and the Clerk 
of the Fourth District court has been notified to desist in this case. 
The clerk's office has not responded. 
Amount of Claim: $ ? __ (Attach all bills or substantiating information as to the 
amount of the claim) The amount can not be calculated at this point due to 
funds are still being taken. 
Personal Injury: (Please describe the extent of your injury, your attending physician, place of 
treatment, etc.) ___________________ _ 




<: • \ '--= \ ... 
Property Damage: (Describe the property damage) The xroney taken is an illegal act 
tbat evokes a constitutional liberty interest. I'm now being forced to go 
without specific items, hygiene ect. that are a necessity in prison 
DATEDThis_21._dayof August ~,20--12._._ / ;} 
. fY'l w~A1'14,n 
Name of Claimant: workman # 61342 
Street Address: ISCI P.O. Box 14 
City and State: Roi se, Idaho 83707 
RETURN THIS NOTICE OF CLAIM AND ALL SUBSTANTIATING DOCUMENTS,TO 
THE SEd~.ETARY TO STATE AT THE ADDRESS LISTED ABOVE. THE ORIGINAL 
WILL BE RETAINED IN THIS OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RECORD. COPIES WlLL BE 
FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT FOR 
CONSIDERATION AND PROCESSING ACCORDING TO THE STATUTES. QUESTIONS 
REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE CLAIM SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM - 2 
Revised· I ll/14/05 
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Plan ~- ~-c.Xs 
01:4F· 1"?,p.m. 04-22-2016 2 /10 208-327-7485 
%~1ltt% L 
L~WRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI, ISB #5275 
FILED VIAFAX 
UNDER m &(i)(2) L..\ ;i..2- \ b 
DATE··--
NO., ___ -;:::-':':":--:--.---
Lead Deputy Attorney General, Department of Correction AM 
r-11.~0 r), ".2.~--
· ··----P.M~ 
KARIN MAGNELLI, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard St., Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83 706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile (208) 327-7485 
E-mail: mkubinsk@idoc.idaho.gov 
E-mail: kmagnell@idoc.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant !DOC 
APR 2 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clark 
. • By SARAH TAYLOR' 
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CHRISTOPHER RICH, Court Clerk of ) 
the Fourth District Court, IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED ) 
INDIVIDUALS OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ____________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
On March 31, 2016, Plaintiff Kenneth Workman filed Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiffs Response"). IDOC hereby submits the 
following Reply to Plaintiff's Response and asks that this Court grant judgment in favor 
of !DOC based on Workman's failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted and 
his claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS-I 
ORIGINAL 
000191
208-327-7485 01 :4~· i;o p.m. 04-22-2016 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
1. WORKMAN'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
JUDICATA 
Workman argues his claim is not barred by the doctrine ofresjudicata. Workman 
argues claim preclusion does not apply because his Civil Complaint does not involve the 
same parties or the same claim from his 2010 U.S. District Court proceedings. Plaintiff's 
Response, p. 9. Workman argues IDOC was not a party to the U.S. District Court case 
based on the dismissal of IDOC by the U.S. District Court, which left only former IDOC 
director, Brent Reinke as a defendant. Workman fails to address the long standing 
practice that parties named in their official capacity are representatives of the State, and 
therefore both complaints are against the State rather than those specific ~dividuals. 
Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 903, 854 P.2d 242, 246 (1993). Defendant IDOC has 
established that for the purposes of establishing claim preclusion under the doctrine of res 
judicata, the parties in both the current Complaint and the 2010 District Court Cqmplaint 
involve the same parties, Workman and the State. 
In order to establish his two cases do not involve the same claim, Workman has 
filed a ''Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim" and states he 
is only pursuing a "state law declaratory judgment claim" and his claim is pursuant to the 
"constitution and laws of the State of Idaho." Plaintiffs Response, pp. 9-10. Workman 
argues he could not have raised the issue of the expiration of the restitution order in his 
U.S. District Court case because the U.S. District Court would not have had jurisdiction 
over the matter. Workman's argument is contrary to the fundamental purposes of res 
judicata, which are: 
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution 
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
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matter were litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it serves the 
public interest in protection the courts against the burdens of 
repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private interest in 
repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (citing Aldape v Atkins, 
105 Idaho 251, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
At the time Workman filed his claim in U.S. District Court, he had the option to 
file in state court or federal court, and he chose federal court. As stated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, "res judicdta bars subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the 
same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made." Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-915, 684 P.2d 314, 317-318 
(Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he rule against splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or 
forms of relief demanded in one suit are different from those demanded in another.")) In 
addition, Idaho's broad application of the ''transactional concept" of what constitutes a 
claim is applicable to this case due to the substantial overlap between the theories 
advanced by Workman in support of his claim. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 
126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007). Workman's decision on how to prosecute his claim does 
not shield him from the doctrine of res judicata. Regardless of the theory proposed by 
Workman, in both cases Workman is seeking a legal means to relieve him of his 
obligation to pay the restitution he was ordered to pay as a result of his criminal conduct. 
Defendant IDOC has established that for the purposes of establishing claim preclusion 
under the doctrine of resjudicata, Workman's current Civil Complaint and the complaint 
in his 2010 U.S. District Court case involved the same claim. 
Workman also argues his claim is not barred by issue preclusion. Plaintiff's 
Response, p. 11. His argument rests solely on his theory the issue in the previous case is 
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not identical to the issue in the present case. According to Workman the issue in the 
previous case involved the violation of his federal due process rights due to the deduction 
of funds from his inmate account to pay restitution owing without proper notice, and the 
issue in this case is the deduction of funds from his inmate account to pay restitution 
owing after the restitution order allegedly expired. Plaintiff's Response, p. 14. However, 
those are legal theories advanced by Workman in support of his claim in both cases that 
Defendant IDOC has violated his due process rights under the federal or state 
constitutions by relying upon an order from the court of restitution to deduct funds from 
an inmate's account. While Workman does not reference article 1, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution in his Civil Complaint, he clearly argues he has been deprived of property 
and that his claim is based in part upon the constitution of the state ofldaho. 
The Idaho· Supreme Court has found that the due process clause in the Idaho 
Constitution is "substantially the same" as the due process clause in the Federal 
Constitution. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577, 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996) (citations 
omitted). Schevers also found that the "atypical and significant hardship" test that is 
applied to Federal due process claims is the same standard to be applied to state due 
p~ocess claims. Id.; see also Martin v. Spalding, 133 Idaho 469, 473, 988 P.2d 695, 699 
(Ct. App. 1998) (applying the "atypical and significant hardship" test recognized in 
Schevers to a property deprivation claim). Workman wants to be relieved of his 
restitution obligation that he was ordered to pay as a result of his criminal conduct. His 
current reliance upon a state constitutional provision that is substantially similar to the 
federal constitutional provision he relied upon in a previous case does not create a new 
issue. Defendant IDOC has established that for the purposes of establishing issue 
preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata, the issue raised by Workman in his current 
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Complaint and is the same issue he raised in his 2010 U.S. District Court case in which 
Workman had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and there was a judgment on 
the merits, 
2. COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Plaintiff argues his Civil Complaint is not subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA") and is not barred by the statute of limitations based on the continuing tort 
theory. Plaintiff's Response, pp. 15, 17. Workman argues he has not filed a tort claim and 
that his claim is brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. However, in his Civil 
Complaint, Workman states he timely filed a notice of tort claim and that he seeks 
injunctive relief, an order the restitution order has expired, money damages and sanctions 
against defendants. Civil Complaint, p. 5. In addition, Workman has provided the Court 
with a copy of his Notice of Tort Claim that was filed on September 1, 2015 with the 
Idaho Secretary of State. See Supplemental Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in 
Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss filed April 15, 
2016. In this Notice of Tort Claim, Workman asserts the restitution order has expired and 
that.the damage he has suffered violates his liberty interest. Id. Workman admits he has 
had funds deducted from his inmate account to pay restitution since April 2008. 
Plaintiff's Response, pp. 16-17. Therefore, this Notice of Tort Claim filed in September 
2015 is untimely as it was not filed within one hundred (180) days "from the date the 
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later'' and the claim 
must be dismissed. See Idaho Code § 6-905; Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 
157, 59 P.3d 959, 962 (2008) citing McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 
747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987) ("The failure to file within the ITCA time limitation acts as a 
bar to any further action.") 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS-5 
6 /10 
000195
208-327-7485 01: 5 p.m. 04-22-2016 
Despite arguing he is not filing a tort claim, Workman relies upon the continuous 
tort theory as a basis for his argument that his claim is not barred by the statute of 
limitations. This claim also fails and his reliance on the court's analysis in Curtis v. Firth 
is misplaced. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993). In Curtis, the court 
was applying the continuing tort theory to the limited context of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress where the wrongful act, emotional distress and damages did not all 
occur at the same time and a claim could not have been filed when the act first occurred. 
Id. In Workman's case, the wrongful act and the damages occurred at the same time on 
the date the first withdrawal was made from his inmate account after he claims the 
restitution order expired. The fact additional withdrawals from his inmate account 
occurred, does not justify this as a continuing tort or the tolling of the statute of 
limitations. As opposed to Curtis, Workman was able to file suit at the time that wrongful 
act occurred, because the wrongful act and resulting damage to Workman occurred at the 
same time. Workman has not been the victim of continued unlawful acts, but rather he is 
suffering from the ill effects of the original garnishment of his inmate account after the 
restitution order allegedly expired, which is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations in 
this case. (Curtis, 123 Idaho at 604, citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§ 177, at 231 
(1987) ("A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitation is occasioned by 
continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.") 
In addition, Workman is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations. Workman was aware of the deductions from his inmate account to satisfy his 
restitution obligations since April 2008, and did not file this claim until December 2015. 
As stated by Defendant Rich, Workman's lack of diligence cannot be a basis for 
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equitable tolling. See Defendant Christopher Rich's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) filed March 25, 2016, p. 3. 
Workman had knowledge of and was aware of the deductions made from his 
inmate account for restitution following the alleged April 25, 2008 expiration date of the 
restitution order. Workman's Complaint must be dismissed as untimely. 
3. WORKMAN'S ORDER FOR RESTITUTION HAD NOT EXPIRED 
Workman argues the order for restitution had in fact expired and as creditors, 
defendants failed to renew the judgment. Plaintiff's Response, p. 19. Contrary to 
Workman's arguments, Defendants Rich and IDOC are not creditors for the purposes of 
Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 or 10-1111. Defendant IDOC previously joined in Defendant 
Rich's argument that an order or restitution does not expire and Workman 
misinterpretation of the statute allowing a victim to file the order as a civil judgment. See 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) and supporting memorandum filed on 
February 16, 2016 by Defendant Rich. Defendant IDOC now joins Defendant' Rich's 
argument in reply, including Defendant Rich's argument of immunity. See Defendant 
Christopher Rich's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b) filed on March 25, 2016. Workman has provided no legal basis to find the 
clerk of the district court is prevented from performing its statutory duty to collect 
restitution and Defendant IDOC cannot assist the clerk of the district court in its duties to 
collect restitution from defendants who have been committed to its custody. 
4. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION 
Workman argues for the first time in his response that the magistrate court does 
not have jurisdiction to hear this matter because the claim exceeds five thousand dollars. 
Plaintiff's Response, p. 4. Workman relies upon the full amount of the restitution order to 
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support his argument, however, he is only entitled to recover any monies that were 
unlawfully deducted from his inmate account as payment towards the restitution order. In 
addition, the Fourth Judicial District has authorized the assignment of all matters in civil 
actions where the claim does not exceed $10,000. See Local Rules of the District Court 
and Magistrate Division of the Fourth Judicial District Rule 13. Workman has not 
provided any evidence his claim exceeds $10,000. 
CONCLUSION 
Workman is unable to present any set of facts that will support his claim for relief. 
The Civil Complaint is barred by res judicata, the statute of limitations, and Workman 
has failed to state a claim against Defendant IDOC for which relief may be granted. The 
Civil Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety and Defendant IDOC is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of April, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: L tlk J{__-
KARIN MAGNEL(gI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Counsel for Defendant IDOC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of April, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Idaho Department of 
Correction's Motion to Dismiss by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
!SCI 
P.O.Box 15 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Kale Gans, Deputy Prosecutor 
Ray J. Chacko, Deputy Prosecutor 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Counsel for Defendant Rich 
OU.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[81 Inmate Mail Service 
OU.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
[81 Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
'Karin Magnelli 0 
Deputy Attorney General 
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) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTIONS TO DISMISS/ 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On December 30, 2015, the plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a "prisoners [sic] civil 
complaint."1 The plaintiffs complaint names "Christopher Rich,2 Court Clerk of the Fourth 
District Court, Idaho Department of Correction, Unknown and Unnamed Individuals of the State 
of Idaho." Prisoners Civil Complaint, at 1. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff asserts "[t]his is a civil action to address the illegal conduct 
of the defendants and a stated declaratory judgment claim ... brought under the constitution and 
laws of the State ofldaho .... " Id. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff states he is "a state prisoner who owed restitution from an 
order handed down by the Fourth District Court in April of 2003. In February of 2014[,] the 
1The plaintiff is proceeding here pro se. In Idaho, "'[p]ro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as 
those represented by an attorney."' Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387,393, 797 P.2d 95, 101 (1990). 
2The complaint states Christopher Rich "is being sued in his official capacity ... The IDOC (Idaho Department of 
Correction] and its unnamed employees involved in this action are named as a primary defendant and are being sued 
in their official capacity .... " Prisoner[']s Civil Complaint, at 2. 
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Idaho Legislators enacted a new law, LC. § 20-209H, to provide for the IDOC to mandate the 
withdrawal of Inmate[']s owed restitution. The law went into effect on March 1, 2015 and has 
now become a statewide practice by the IDOC." Id. at 3. 
The plaintiff contends this statute is not applicable to him "as his court order for 
restitution became unenforceable as of April 2008. This is supported by ... LC. § 10-1110 and 
LC. § 10-1111 ... in order to keep the restitution order or judgment an active, collectable order, 
the parties must file a timely motion to renew judgment within five (5) years from the date of the 
entry and thereafter every five (5) years. The court must further grant this motion to renew to 
make it valid ... The record in this case shows conclusively that no motion to renew judgment 
has ever been filed in the 13 years this case has lingered. Plaintiff has presented his case to the 
IDOC administration of which has been exhausted through the grievance process." Id. 
"As a matter of law, defendants order for restitution became unenforceable as of April 
2008. All funds deducted must be returned after this date and all future attempts to deduct funds 
must cease and desist." Id. 
On February 16, 2016, defendant Christopher Rich, through counsel, filed a "motion to 
dismiss ... pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)." Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b), at 1. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum. 
On February 22, 2016, defendant Idaho Department of Correction also filed a motion to 
dismiss, supported by a memorandum, affidavit and other materials. 3 
On March 1, 2016, the court ordered the plaintiff to respond to the defendants' motions to · 
dismiss. 
3See Hauschulz v. Idaho Department of Correction, 143 Idaho 462, 466, 147 P.3d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006) 
("[B]ecause matters outside the pleadings were presented, the motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c)."). 
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On March 31, 2016, the plaintiff filed a "notice of clarification and withdrawal of 14th 
Amendment claim," wherein he states "Plaintiff hereby clarifies that he is not raising a federal 
14th Amendment due process claim in this action. Further, Plaintiff also hereby withdraws the 
following phrase from the Complaint: 'Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
the monies placed in his inmate account. The taking of any funds for Restitution by the Idaho 
Department of Corrections is governed by the 14th Amendment of the State ofldaho and the U.S. 
Constitution.' ... Plaintiff files this notice in order to clarify that the scope of the Complaint is 
brought under the constitution and laws of the State ofldaho and is based solely on state law, not 
federal law." Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim, at 1-2. 
On March 31, 2016, the plaintiff also filed a response to defendant IDOC's motion to 
dismiss, supported by a declaration and a supplemental declaration by the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
had previously filed a response to Christopher Rich's motion to dismiss, on March I, 2016.4 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court looks only at the 
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. 'The question then is 
whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, would 
entitle him to relief. Every reasonable intendment will be made to sµstain a complaint against a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.' The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." 
Burghart v. Carlin, 151 Idaho 730, 731-32, 264 P.3d 71, 72-73 (Ct. App. 2011). 
4Neither the defendants nor the plaintiff have timely requested oral argument and the court finds oral argument is not 
necessary. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D). 
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B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a summary judgment 
motion, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in the nonmoving party's favor and 
the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Drennon v. Idaho 
State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598,601, 181 P.3d 524, 527 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This burden can be met by 
demonstrating the absence of evidence concerning an element the nonmoving would be required 
to prove at trial. This absence of evidence can be established by an affirmative showing with the 
party's own evidence or by reviewing the nonmoving party's evidence and asserting that proof of 
· a required element is lacking. Id. 
After an absence of evidence has been shown, the burden shifts to the party opposing the 
motion to demonstrate, by depositions, affidavits, or discovery responses, that there is a genuine 
issue for trial or to provide a valid justification for failing to do so. Id. 5 
DECISION 
In his response to the department's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff contends "the 
magistrate court lacks jurisdiction in this matter." Plaintiffs Response to Defendant IDOC's 
Motion to Dismiss, at 4. The court notes that it has jurisdiction in all civil proceedings where the 
amount of money or damages claimed does not exceed $10,000. See LC. § 1-2208; Rule 13 of 
the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division of the Fourth Judicial District. 
5The defendant bears the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense in relation to a summary judgment 
motion. See, e.g., Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770, 215 P.3d 485,490 (2009). 
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There has been no indication that the amount of money or damages claimed here exceeds that 
amount.6 
As previously noted, defendant Rich has filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion, Rich 
essentially asserts that his motion should be granted "because he [the plaintiff] fails to 
distinguish between a civil judgment and a criminal restitution order .... " Memorandum in 
Support of Memorandum of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), at 4. Rich also 
contends "the statute oflimitations bars the majority of the plaintiff's claims." Id. at 6. 
In its motion, the Department of Correction asserts the following: (1) "Workman's claim 
is barred by res judicata;" (2) "[his] complaint is barred by the statute of limitations;" and (3) 
"Workman's order for restitution had not expired." Memorandum in Support of Idaho 
Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 4, 13, 15. 
In sum, in reviewing the defendants' motions the following assertions are made: (1) the 
plaintiff's claim is barred by res judicata; (2) his claim is barred by the statute oflimitations, and 
(3) the court's order ofrestitution has not expired. 
1. Res Judicata 
The department contends that the plaintiff's claim here that his prisoner account has been 
improperly garnished in order to pay for court-ordered restitution is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
"'Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the 
essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence.' Res judicata encompasses both claim 
and issue preclusion ('true' res judicata and collateral estoppel, respectively), but this Court 
6The plaintiff contends "[t]he restitution order at issue in this civil case is $32,391.44 plus applicable interest." 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss, at 4. However, the plaintiff has not asserted that 
$32,391.44 has been garnished from his prisoner account, nor has he asserted, in his complaint, that more than 
$10,000 has been garnished. 
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employs different tests for each. 'A valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes 
all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions of which the cause of 
action arose."' C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 561-62, 181 P.3d 485, 487-88 (2008). 
"In addition, in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the 
former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and 
received but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." 
145 Idaho at 562, 181 P.3d at 488. 
"The three fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: 'First it preserves the 
acceptability of judicial resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results.' Second, it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.'" Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 
Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
A. Claim Preclusion 
"The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of 
action which were actually made or which might have been made ... 'The rule against splitting a 
claim applies even though the remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit are different 
from those demanded in another."' Id. 
"For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same 
parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment." Ticor Title Co. v. Stan/on, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 
157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). "In order for claim preclusion to apply, both proceedings must involve 
the same parties or their privies. To be privies, a person not a party to the former action must 
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'derive his interest from one who was a party to it, that is he (must be) be in privity with a party 
to that judgment.'" Id. 
Even assuming that the same claim and final judgment elements of claim preclusion have 
been met, it is not clear that the same parties' element has been. In his federal district court 
' 
complaint, the plaintiff listed "County of Ada, Deborah Bail, Idaho Dept. of Corrections, Brent 
D. Reinke, Correctional Corporations of America, Unknown and Unnamed Individuals of the 
State of Idaho, those individuals are being sued in their official and individual capacity." Civil 
Rights Complaint, at 1. (IDOC's Exhibit B). However, the plaintiff only ended up proceeding 
against Brent Reinke, Director of IDOC. See Memorandum Decision and Order, at 4 ("The Court 
conducted an initial review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 1915A, and allowed 
Plaintiff to go forward with his claims against IDOC Director Brent Reinke, Warden Phillip 
Valdez, and 'others responsible for deducting funds who are presently unknown to Plaintiff.' ... 
All other named Defendants were dismissed . . . Plaintiff later chose to dismiss Valdez and all 
other unknown employees at the Idaho Correctional Center and to proceed only against Director 
Reinke."). 
The plaintiff was apparently allowed to proceed against Defendant Reinke in his 
individual capacity, 7 as an action against him in his official capacity would have or should have 
been barred by the Eleventh Amendment or, at least, the department has not demonstrated that 
the suit against Reinke was allowed to proceed in his official capacity, as well. See Pena v. 
Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is thus clear that the eleventh amendment will bar 
7Additional support for this view is found in the federal district court's finding that "Reinke is also immune from 
liability for damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity." Memorandum Decision and Order, at 16. See, e.g., 
Richardson v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 2015 WL 1478434, *1 (D. Id.) ("The defense of qualified 
immunity completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual 
capacities unless their conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known."') (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). 
' 
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Pena from bringing his claims in federal court against the state officials in their official 
capacities. It will not, however, bar claims against the state officials in their personal [individual] 
capacities."). See also Hall v. Idaho Department of Fish and Game, 2012 WL 380278, *1 (D. 
Id.) ("Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 
the Department and Bogar and Soumas in their official capacities. The Court agrees ... The 
claims against Bogar and Soumas in their individual capacities shall remain.") ( citing Will v. 
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). 
In contrast, in the case at bar, the plaintiff states the defendants include "Idaho 
Department of Corrections (IDOC) ... a state governmental department ... The IDOC and its 
unnamed employees involved in this action are named as a primary defendant and are being sued 
in their official capacity8 •... " Prisoners Civil Complaint, at 2. 
"Res judicata does not apply where the parties in the two suits are sued in different 
capacities. 'A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not 
thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in 
which he appears in another capacity."' Strong v. Director of Idaho Department of Correction, 
2006 WL 47358, *3 (D. Id.) (citing Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2000)). "Similarly, 
under Idaho law, in order for a party to be in privity with a party to a prior suit, the party in the 
later suit must 'derive its interest from the one who was a party to (the prior suit)."' Id. (citing 
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31,855 P.2d 868,872 (1993)). 
8"0fficial-capacity suits, in contrast, 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of 
which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an 
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit 
against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 
105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). 
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It has not been shown that Brent Reinke, the (former) IDOC Director, who appears to 
have been allowed to stay in the plaintiffs federal district court action in his individual capacity, 
is the same party or a party in privity with the Idaho Department of Correction, and its unnamed 
employees sued in their official capacities, in this action, for purposes of claim preclusion. 
On this record, therefore, claim preclusion has not been shown. See Gubler v. Brydon, 
125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984 (1994) ("[T]he issue of privity is a question of fact, 
which courts cannot usually resolve summarily."). 
B. Issue Preclusion 
"Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue 
determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue 
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the 
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation." Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
Issue preclusion does not apply here, since the issue presented here is not identical to the 
issue decided in the plaintiffs federal district court lawsuit. 
In federal district court, the plaintiff "alleges that he has not been presented with notice or 
had an opportunity to object before the funds are taken out of his account, as required by state 
law . . . Based on this, Plaintiff claims that his property has been taken· from him without due 
process oflaw in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Memorandum Decision and Order, at 
3-4 (IDOC's Exhibit B). 
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In contrast, in his complaint before this court, the plaintiff essentially asserts "[t]he law 
which is applicable to this case states, in order for a victim or concerned party of whom the 
restitution is owed, in order to keep the restitution order of judgment an active, collectable order, 
the parties must file a timely motion to renew judgment within five (5) years from the date of 
entry and thereafter every five (5) years. The court must further grant this motion to renew to 
make it valid. The record in this case conclusively shows that no motion to renew judgment has 
ever been filed in the 13 years since this case has lingered." Prisoners Civil Complaint, at 3. 
In sum, the court finds that the department has not shown, on this record, that res judicata 
acts as a bar to the plaintiffs present complaint.9 
2. Statute of Limitations 
The department10 asserts "Idaho Code § 6-905 requires all claims against the state or an 
employee be presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred (180) days 
'from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.' If 
a resolution has not been reached, a claim against a governmental entity must be filed within two 
(2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. See Idaho 
Code § 6-911 ... Pursuant to these statutes and based upon Workman's allegations in his 
Complaint that the restitution order became unenforceable on April 25, 2008, Workman would 
have been required to file a notice of claim within six months of April 25, 2008, or October 22, 
2008, for any deductions occurring after the expiration of the order. Arguably, Workman would 
not have discovered the claim until the first deduction that was made after April 25, 2008 which 
9The court also notes the plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his "14th Amendment Claim." See Notice of 
Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim. 
1°Defendant Rich did not assert any Idaho Tort Claims Act defense in his motion to dismiss and only briefly 
references the department's assertion of it in a footnote in his reply memorandum. See Defendant Christopher Rich's 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), at 3, n. 1. 
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was on July 6, 2009. [citing Audens Affidavit ,r 6]. Therefore, Workman would have had to file a 
notice of claim on or before January 2, 2010. Regardless of whether proper notice of claim was 
filed with the secretary of state on or before January 2, 2010 pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905, 
Workman's complaint is untimely." Memorandum in Support of Idaho Department of 
Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 3. 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act "only applies to tort claims ... claim[s] arising in tort." 
Farner v. Idaho Falls School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 337,341, 17 P.3d 281,285 (2000). A 
review of the complaint does not reveal that the plaintiff is plainly asserting any tort claims 
against the department, nor has the department specified 11 what these tort claims are. 12 
The plaintiff contends the Idaho Tort Claims Act is not applicable "because his claims are 
not brought under the ITCA." Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss, at 
15. The plaintiff states, as is set forth in his complaint, that "his claims are ... brought under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act .... " Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss, at 
15. See also Prisoners Civil Complaint, at 1 (This is a civil action to address the illegal conduct 
of the defendants and a stated declaratory judgment claim."). 13 
11"Failure to comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA is an affirmative defense." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 
893,372, 104 P.3d 367,898 (2004). See also Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581,586, 726 P.2d 693,698 (1986) ("It is. 
. . the general rule that 'where the defense to an action is of an affirmative nature, the defendant becomes the 
proponent, and has the burden to bear .... "'). 
12Nor does it appear that the plaintiff is asserting any claim fitting the traditional and commonly understood legal 
definition of a tort. See Durtsch v. Joint School District No. 93, 110 Idaho 466, 486, 716 P.2d 1238, 1258 (1986) 
(Bakes, J., dissenting) ( citing, in reference to a discussion of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Jimenez-Nieves v. U.S., 682 
F.2d 1, 6 (1 st Cir. 1982) ("Plaintiff's claim fits 'the traditional and commonly understood legal definition of the tort . 
. .. "). See also Noak v. Idaho Department of Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 309-10, 271 P.3d 703, 707-08 (2012) 
(''Noak's other claims against IDOC all sound in tort and are therefore to be considered under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act (ITCA)."). 
13While the plaintiff is also seeking money damages, "[a] party to a declaratory judgment action may properly seek 
damages _or other monetary relief to which he may be entitled." Agricultural Services, Inc. v. City of Gooding, 120 
Idaho 627,628,818 P.2d 331,332 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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In sum, the court finds that is has not been shown that the claims asserted here, 
specifically said to be brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, are tort claims required 
to comply with the relevant provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
The court does agree with the defendants that the relevant statute of limitations bars the 
plaintiffs improper garnishment claims that are dated beyond that period preceding the filing of 
his complaint and that the plaintiffs equitable tolling assertion is without merit. 14 See, e.g., LC. § 
5-224. See also Brennan v. State, 2014 WL 1878753, * {Id. Ct. App.) ("'American courts 
generally have applied equitable tolling only in rare and exceptional circumstances beyond the 
petitioner's control that prevented him from filing a timely petition ... Idaho appellate courts 
have not permitted equitable tolling where the ... petitioner's own lack of diligence caused or 
contributed to the untimeliness of the petition."') (citing Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112,115,218 
P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009); Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (Ct. 
App. 2010)). 
Since it appears that the applicable statute of limitations15 does not bar all of the 
plaintiffs assertions of instances of improper garnishment, 16 the court will consider the merits of 
the plaintiffs contentions. 
14As are his other meritless arguments made in an effort to evade the statute of limitations, such as his "continuing 
tort" theory, which he makes after previously asserting he is not raising any tort claims. See Heinze v. Bauer, 145 
Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2007) ("Judicial estoppel 'precludes a party from taking one position, and then 
seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position."'). The court realizes the same could be said of his 
having filed a notice of a tort claim but, given the indefiniteness concerning what tort claims he is said to be 
asserting, the court will not find this controlling, for purposes of judicial estoppel, but an apparent effort to "cover 
his bases." 
15The defendants contend the applicable statute of limitations is I.C. § 5-218(3), based on the plaintiffs "alleged 
conversion" assertions. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b), at 7. 
However, as previously noted, it is not clear that the plaintiff is asserting any tort claims here. In addition, money or 
cash cannot be the subject of conversion. See Kerr v. Bank of America, N.A., 2011 WL 11047661, *8 (Id. Ct. App.) 
("[W]here the property in the conversion claim is money, the claim cannot be sustained unless the money can be 
described as a specific chattel.") (citing Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc., 96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 
P.2d 1106, 1108 (1974)). 
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3. Continued Validity of Restitution Order 
The department has provided a copy of the district court's April 28, 2003 "order for 
restitution and civil judgment." IDOC's Exhibit A. This order provides "whereas, on the 5th day 
of August, 2002, a Judgment of Conviction was entered against Kenneth M. Workman; and 
therefore pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-5304 and based on evidence presented to this Court, it is 
hereby ordered, that the defendant, Kenneth M. Workman, shall make restitution to the victim(s) 
in the following amounts of: Diarie King ... $12,516.99 ... Anthony Barton ... $19,874.45 ... 
total: $32,391.44 ... Interest on said restitution shall be computed at 7.29% per annum. Further, 
this Order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the defendant, Kenneth M. Workman." Order 
for Restitution and Civil Judgment (Workman), at 1-2. 
As previously noted, the plaintiff asserts "since no motion for renewal of judgment was 
filed and granted within five (5) years of April 28, 2003, the judgment expired ... on April 28, 
2008. Once the judgment expires the debt is no longer collectible." Prisoners Civil Complaint, at 
4. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear and 
unambiguous, we are constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the statute nor 
take away by judicial construction. Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of 
the literal words of the statute. Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the 
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. We must give the words their plain, usual 
and ordinary meaning, and there is no occasion for construction where the language of a statute 
is unambiguous. We furthermore must give every word, clause and sentence effect, if possible." 
16See, e.g., Affidavit of Shirley Audens in Support ofldaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 3 ("Of 
those 33 deductions for restitution, ten (10) were made between September 30, 2003 and May 10, 2005, seven (7) 
between July 6, 2009 and June 16, 2010, one (1) on July 31, 2012, and fifteen (15) were made between June 29, 
2015 and February 9, 2016."). 
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Poison Creek Publishing, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 
1254, 1257 (2000). 17 "[T]he court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz v. Priest River 
Glass Company, 125 Idaho 333,336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). 
LC. § 19-5304(4) states where, as here, "a separate written order of restitution is issued, 
an order of restitution shall be for an amount certain and shall be due and owing at the time of 
sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is determined, whichever is later. An order for 
restitution may provide for interest from the date of the economic loss or injury." The statute 
says nothing about the expiration of the order of restitution, only that it "shall be due and owing 
at the time of sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is determined, whichever is 
later." 
LC. § 19-5305 ("Collection of Judgments.") provides: 
(1) After forty-two (42) days from the entry of the order of restitution or at the 
conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of restitution, whichever occurs 
later, an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim 
may execute as provided by law for civil judgments. 18 
(2) The clerk of the district court may take action on the order of restitution on the 
order of restitution on behalf of the victim and, with the approval of the 
administrative district judge, may use the procedures set forth in section 19-
4 708, Idaho Code, for the collection of the restitution. 
LC. § 19-4708 is entitled "Collection of Debts Owed to Courts - Contracts for 
Collection" and it also specifically states that its purpose is to allow for collection of debts owed 
17"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's intent in passing the 
statute. 'It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction."' Wheeler v. Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,263,207 P.3d 988,994 (2009). 
18This statutory language would be unnecessary if, as the plaintiff appears to contend, all orders of restitution were 
civil judgments. 
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to courts and it specifically states that "debts owed to courts" includes "restitution." LC. § 19-
4708(2)(c). 
Finally, LC. § 20-209H19 ("Duty to Establish Inmate Accounts - Payment of 
Restitution.") states: 
The state board of correction shall establish an account in the name of each 
inmate confined in a correctional facility. All moneys in the inmate's possession 
upon admission, all moneys earned from institutional employment and all moneys 
received by the inmate from any other source, other than money that is 
contraband, shall be deposited in the inmate's account. If the court ordered an 
inmate to make restitution under section 19-5304, Idaho Code, and the restitution 
is still owing, then twenty percent (20%) of each deposit in the inmate's account 
shall be paid to the state board of correction who shall, within five (5) days after 
the end of the month, pay such moneys to the clerk of the court in which the 
restitution order was entered for payment to the victim. The provisions of this 
section shall apply to any inmate confined in a correctional facility on or after the 
effective date of this section.20 
The court finds, reading these statutory provisions together, the legislature provided two 
different avenues for crime victims to receive restitution from the perpetrators of the crime: (1) 
by a court order of restitution (pursuant to LC. § 19-5304), and (2) by a civil judgment (pursuant 
to LC. § 19-5305(1)) that can be executed on or result in a lien being placed on the perpetrator's 
real property.21 
19The department notes "[t]he only change with the implementation ofldaho Code § 20-209H is to require a certain 
percentage, 20%, be deducted from an inmate's account and it reinforces Idaho Code§ 11-108(3) that funds in 
inmate accounts are not considered exempt property. Idaho Code § 20-209H does not provide any new authority to 
IDOC." Memorandum in Support ofldaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 14. See also Affidavit 
of Shirley Audens in Support ofldaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 2 ("Prior to March 1, 2015, 
I would garnish up to 50% of a prisoner's inmate trust account and send the funds to the district court to distribute 
the named vic~im. After the implementation ofldaho Code§ 20-209H, effective March 1, 2015, I now garnish 20% 
of every deposit made into a prisoner's inmate trust account for distribution to the named victim by the district 
court."). 
20The court has reviewed the sections of the Idaho Code cited by the plaintiff, relating to the renewability of civil 
judgments, but finds they are not applicable to the situation here, which involves a court order of restitution being 
utilized as a basis for garnishing a portion of his prisoner account, not the execution of a civil judgment. 
21This also appears to have been Judge Bail's intent in fashioning the order as she did and in captioning it as an 
"order for restitution and civil judgment." 
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The court has reviewed the cases cited by the plaintiff, including Grazer v. Jones, 154 
Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013) and State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 87 P.3d 291 (2004), but 
neither of these cases, nor the others he cites, specifically hold that a court order of restitution is 
extinguished and loses enforceability and authority, when the order is also recorded as a 
judgment for purposes of constituting a civil judgment or that an order of restitution is always 
and solely a civil judgment. 
4. Attorney Fees 
The Idaho Department of Correction has requested "reasonable attorney fees be awarded 
pursuant to Idaho Code 6-918A, or alternatively Idaho Code § 12-121." Memorandum in 
Support ofldaho Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss, at 15. The department's request 
is not supported by any argument specifying why it should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to 
either of these statutes, in the context of this proceeding. Cunningham v. Waford, 131 Idaho 841, 
844, 965 P.2d 201,204 (Ct. App. 1998) ("As the party moving for [attorney] fees, the bus drivers 
bore the burden to show that the standards for such an award had been met."). 
LC. § 6-918A is not applicable here as it has not been shown that the plaintiff is asserting 
tort claims against the department. 
"'An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the 
prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding 
belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation."' Shea v. Kevic Corporation, 156 Idaho 540,552,328 P.3d 520,532 (2014). 
"[A] suit is not frivolous or groundless merely because the [party] loses ... we have held 
~ 
that attorney fees should be awarded under LC. § 12-121 only if the position advocated by the 
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nonprevailing is plainly fallacious and, therefore, not fairly debatable." Associate Northwest, Inc. 
v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The court declines to award attorney fees to the department, pursuant to LC. § 12-121, as 
the department has neither argued, nor is it otherwise apparent, that this action was brought or 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. In other words, the action was not 
plainly fallacious. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, to the extent noted above, the defendants' motions to dismiss/summary 
judgment are hereby granted. 
SOORDEREDANDDATE THIS ·tta"fayofMa 
David Manweiler 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to 
each of the parties of record in this case in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 
ISCI UNIT 9 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
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MAY 2 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR~f~~~SON 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is awarded to the defendants. 
~ 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the above JUDGMENT as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. 




PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
Date: 




) .. ' 
Kenneth M. Workman 61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83702 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
JUN 1 3 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
8y ROSE WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE muNI'Y OF ADA 
KENNETH M. IDRKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 
case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
OOI'ICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant Kenneth M. Workman, prose, hereby submits his OOI'ICE 
OF APPEAL, pursuant to Rule 83(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
'ID: Defendants-Appellees CHRISTOPHER RICH and the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
AND THE DEFENDANI'S-APPELLEES ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT: 
OOI'ICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant KENNETH M. IDRKMAN appeals against the above 
named Appellees from the Magistrate's Division to the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada. 
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2. The Appellant appeals from the Judgment entered by the Magistrate 
Court on May 25, 2016. 
3. This appeal is taken upon both matters of law and matters of fact. 
4. As there were no hearings in the Magistrate Court, to the best of 
Appellant's knowledge and belief, testimony and proceedings from the Magistrate 
Court proceedings were not recorded or reported. 
5. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal 
shall not·prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. That the Magistrate Court erred in concluding that it had 
jurisdiction over the matter in the Magistrate Court; and 
b. That the Magistrate Court erred in granting the Appellees' Motions 
To Dismiss and Motions For Surnnary Judgment. 
DATED this _9_ day of June, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
:/fi:,,rW'6{m. tAJ~ e eth M. Workman 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
KENNEl'H M. viDRKMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled action and that all 
statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
In addition, that the party is an inmate and timely files this notice of 
appeal within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk 
mrICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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... ,' 
on the judgment, under the "Prisoner Mailoox Rule," by depositing same in the 
ISCI Prison Legal Mail System and the U.S. Mail, 1st class postage prepaid, 
on the 9th day of June, 2016, addressed to: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
~,th rn. 1;,J~ eth M. Workman 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 'IO before me on this _J_ day of June, 2016. 
Residing at: 77: 
Cormtlssion Expires:o/zphzo 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOI'ICE OF APPEAL on the following named persons at their last known address, 
via the ISCI Prison Legal Mail System and the U.S. Mail, 1st class postage 
prepaid, on this 9th day of June, 2016: 
Karen Magnelli, ISB # 6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Corrections 
1299 North Orchard St. Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
00.l'ICE OF APPEAL - 4 
Kale D. Gans ISB # 9013 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Front St. Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
~,,,;#nu~ 
eth M. Workman 
000223
) 
Kenneth M. Workman# 61342 
Full Name of Party Filing Document 
ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
City, State and Zip Code 
Telephone 
NO·----~:::---r-,..,,..~-
AM'----F...J.1~.M 4 50 
JUN 1 3 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Sy ROSE WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _A_D_A _____ _ 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
IB] Petitioner D Respondent asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) Appeal from di sroi ssaJ af civi J case . I 
believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for. 
2. [I I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. D I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011 
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in. my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages if more space is 
needed for any response.) 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: Kenneth M. Workman Other name(s) I have used: __ N--'-._A ____ _ 
Address: ISCI P.O. Box 14 Boise, Idaho 83707 
How long at that address? 3 years Phone: _ ___._.N=A=---------
Year and place of birth: 5/6/53 Morton, Washington 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am Kl single D married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: __ N_/A ________________________ _ 
My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: __ _ 
NA 
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ 60. 00 per D week 89 month after deductions 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: periodic gift money from family 
My spouse's income: $ NIA per D week D month. 
ASSETS: 







List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Value 
Cash _________________________ _ 
Notes and Receivables --------------------
Ve hi c I es -------------------------
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts ___________ _ 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit __________ _ 
Trust Funds _______________________ _ 
Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s _______________ _ 
Cash Value Insurance ---------------------
Motorcycles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles ______________ _ 
Furniture/Appliances ____________________ _ 
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles _________________ _ 
Description (provide description for each item) 
TVs/Stereos/Computers/Electronics. _______________ _ 
Tools/Equipment. _____________________ _ 
Sporting Goods/Guns ____________________ _ 
Horses/Livestock/Tack ___________________ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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Rent/House Payment _____________________ _ 
Vehicle Payment(s) ____________________ _ 
Credit Cards (List last four digits of each account number.) 
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Expense Monthly Payment 
Auto Insurance________________________ ---=-o __ 
Life Insurance________________________ __o __ 
Medical Insurance_______________________ _ __ o__ 
Medical Expense_______________________ ____.._o __ 
Other none 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
From whom? N/A How much can you borrow? $ __ 0 _____ _ -----------
When did you file your last income tax return? _N--'-/_A ___ Amount of refund: $_N~/=A __ _ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.) 
Name 
N/A 
Kenneth M. Workman 
Typed/printed 
STATE OF IDAHO 






SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this f day of )IM~ U/l 4-
Years Known 
No yPutilic for Idaho 
Residing at F ~ 
Commission expires Vt ti/ 
I 
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·1 ~ ··.i.;;~1~;.-v,:,:;~~:,,,. 
~ ,i:/f:1~lfi.~t{·~f~~t' ~ . 
~ = .. = ... ~., .. e=.======================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
· Dcit:]i.·).~bt~r Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
;: ~li%~~~~.i~.,¼.~~;;;~~;~=;;~ ;;; =~~;-~~~~;~ ----~ -~~~ --- ---~; ~ ;;-- ---~; ~ ~~ ---
01/a6'~2'CftsTh:I0707398-581 099-COMM SPL 66. 60DB O. 94 
.: 04i/tihfci,ts'tiifrQo'708225-013 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 80. 94 
0{ls~~'f.~il~~ijt:to'i08303-546 099-COMM SPL O. 71DB 80. 23 
:: 01t2ii{?:;Q).;~;;-~:;t,cno9269-452 099-COMM SPL 74. 27DB 5. 96 
,: 04i/~T7..~::ogt{i',}IrIQ709942-480 099-COMM SPL 4. 66DB 1. 30 
·:·05.7-,.0~3/fQ".0·1J.Sl;;;r,ro710593-011 223-IMF PAYROL APR PAY 72. 00 73. 3 0 
: ·oE}v.{oi1Jf.5':iflst:tfI0710714-469 099-COMM SPL 1. OODB 72. 30 
~ 0.s¢·ol~1ff0~~:l~RJQ0,~10790-004 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 152. 30 
· 05,./4,Q:6]y.;f0111s;i'fr:cf711243-018 072-METER MAIL 228975 2.87DB 149.43 
:: otf.{tJ!1~'.~~:~]!~\f711734-012 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 229. 43 
·' Q~/-])J?ft~-W'$ '._1~0711843-591 099-COMM SPL 115. 69DB 113. 74 
.I O~;_(}:fPJ.!:t~i9iJ%tfl!I~i71:f2693-508 099-COMM SPL 41. OlDB 72. 7.3 
. 09/.148Y.:i2·Q.J.51:llI0712693-509 099-COMM SPL 19. 88DB 52. 8.5 
: os/:is:)2:Cfi?s"fII0713453-467 099-COMM SPL 30. 86DB 21. 99 
• i. ' 1--... -~ ., ' • ~ , •• 
·. ©~fQ'.~ti~~:W5 II0714032-459 099-COMM SPL 12 .19DB 9. 80 
. '0'~1.£9,:.fi~?i'f-5 II0714070-004 223-IMF PAYROL MAY PAY 74.40 84.20 
06-r;O-·):.if~.015 II0714169-005 100-CR INM CMM 4. 24 88. 44 
O~/~~f,"~:Ql,;5 ,;·II0715234-558 099-COMM SPL 65. 88DB 22. 56 
. 06/lllai,3/20J.S•.!HQ0715670-007 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 102. 56 
. O~/.t~JJq"i_~_f°;fs~d716042-557 099-COMM SPL 57. 23DB 45. 3·3 
00A*;WK~·o:;i.i%f;:~lq:0716760-506 099-COMM sPL 30 .12DB 15. 21 
: o~/~~:.t~~·t,~;:,r1W717343-476 099-COMM SPL 14. 64DB O. 57 
06'/29,/2'.01S.t·II0717355-026 223-IMF PAYROL JUN PAY 72. 00 72. 57 
oGJ-i'9.~t'id:fsY--:r.iQo717357-003 063-coURT oRDR cR-FE10-13 14. 40DB 58. 1 7 
6:'l~Jif~:t~{o±;g·,~'f°'I0718254-506 099-COMM SPL 55. 90DB 2. 27 
: O~/i0~1,!i:Q:t:.$.~lj~Q9~19091-012 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 82. 27 
, 0~/~'.3:Z.:2~Ctl5,i~H!;)J'(}719092-003 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 16. OODB 66. 27 
O~L?,0:~i:9~~}~~0.719935-456 099-COMM SPL 51. 08DB 15 .19 
. 0~/20."½'2B1~5. II0720548-437 099-COMM SPL 14. 95DB O. 24 
'.08il,0;ii;):ii:c,.f5\iI:tQt2:1399-020 223-IMF PAYROL JUL PAY 74.40 74.6:4 
0~/0:att2'.o.i'_s'tiHQ0721401-005 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 14. 88DB 59. i'6 
oaV:1!0)20:i:s1t'II0722436-573 099-COMM SPL 39. 44DB 20. 32 1 .,, , •', - I(. .... 
O~ffilil,iOi~ HQ0722678-012 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 100.00 120.32 
· 018~/.~1):2."if15 HQ0722679-002 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 20. OODB 100. 32 
~ ._"I ~ '. .,:, • t~---
. 0~/4~%¼.'~ll5 II0723332-490 099-COMM SPL 69. 63DB 30. 69 
· os'./2!~i12P'l5 ·II0724132-461 099-COMM SPL 25. 45DB 5. 24 
OS1/3:f;/zoi's;-f\t[0724912-470 099-COMM SPL 5 .19DB O. 05 
Oi/0'.,3:j'zd:fs i~·l:lir:0-:72543 0- 016 223 - IMF PAYROL AUG pJl.11,ereby certify that t~J9f®:lS are true and E}O.fr. 4·5 
o t .i~~i:ivt:~1\{l.~U · 1- rect copies of official records or reports or entries 
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o a 1 ~N'f~u.ti5-'i h? ·I ...;J.,!~~:__-J---::::,,-----
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. Ac<;i!oun.t--~ CHK 
lf,j I ),)~J,•J. ..t,/u.,_.: :·'·• 
Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
Status: ACTIVE 
cr:t;ir.'iJ~J(J':f'.~·-;\ 1 · .' O!t/ctf~~ff~iim- ,Dates: 04/ 01/2015-06/ 09 /2016 
t,t,~ r;11i~t~\:t11;<,,i-it~i-~~:..1-,.:r: ,., 
'..r .. ( , . .t:~-'i:?~.J ... r,·.V;..t~-ar,~.,~.,., , 
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!'df--1 ~}l·,~?hf-,;i;: :,.-i. ,0. 34 2167. 7 8 216 8. 3 6 0. 92 ..,~t),,,,_'i.,_, .'{,_.,,~..., ----· 
,r-~,--.~·: .. , . .'.u::,;,:: 1 ~ .• =================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
bati'~~~';;ii~}!tt~,\-Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
~-q,!·".;, .. i ~- l"~:~t!-u <-iv;,1ti..1"•• "½"~·...: '1• • 
-- 8j~~li.·~i1tf~-a2;25432-002 ~~; =;;~;;-;~;---- ;;=;;~~=~; ---~~ ~ ;;~~ ---~~ ~ ~;- --
. o.s;t;oa1Qnct:gt"'r~o.726021-567 099-coMM sPL 43. 20DB 16. 37 
: 82·;~~;l_~~+li.Itg·1,16783-450 099-COMM SPL 6. 94DB 9, 1,3 
. 8§}-&1~W3~:~R'JiilOV27564-452 099-COMM SPL 8. 77DB O. 96 
: 1Q~',t?)J·,4,GlJ.'~{:,II0727928-045 100-CR INM CMM 2 .12 2. 78 · R~,~~it~Jtis 'II0728395-414 099-COMM SPL 2, OODB O. 78 
e.R}'.,9.9°~3,815 II0729258-008 223-IMF PAYROL SEP PAY 72. 00 72. 78 
'W2~:9.W1.~·915 HQ0729260-004 063-COURT ORDR CR-FEl0-13 14.40DB 58.38 
. et.f{~.,~¥1!@.~_:5.!_fI0730318-579 099-COMM SPL 43, 86DB 14. 52 
. ~8f,~~-f.~R.},!L~f\I0731010-467 099-COMM SPL 14. 49DB O. 03 
J.Hfg_if,~,R~~:J:~g.Q,732059-002 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 150, 00 150. 03 
10;{2.;:7,,:{e20,lfr .. ·HQ0732060-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 30. OODB 120. 03 
\;J ( \ .c~-J,.,,}·,,~(.·., ~,,,.,,fl,f,,'-1,t i~, ~ 
eQJ·!f.~'{t..9J_l:f~~,!}.}:?32406-011 072-METER MAIL 239665 1. 64DB 118. 39 
[0~29720X5BnI0732412-009 070-PHOTO COPY 241075 0,50DB 117.89 
\.I \~,i -I, f 1,- ,,;;'4...-:~j,:J'. ~ , 1 
' 1Jic02/;-2-0'l,q-'-Il0732717-478 099-COMM SPL 82 .16DB 35. 73 
• .,., ;./'t' t.': ·r ~''$..-.'\•.:-':..~.-~ <~·.., .. ( 
~i£'Frn·r~:t!B~illi!0732717-479 099-COMM SPL 21. 57DB 14 .16 
. ffii!J}@j,/~Q-1'§/Wf59J.33201-015 223-IMF PAYROL OCT PAY 74.40 88.56 
~1/~';lf~.fft~:::;tl~9?~3203-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14. 88DB 73. 68 
~4!/Q~'lt2Jih.e.HPR.733938-557 099-COMM SPL 12. 05DB 61. 63 
@~tW.,f¾t2Jif.?-r~g734282-017 072-METER MAIL 241602 2.30DB 59.33 
. W~f~_~,t_?,A;I,p.,;L4q,-1~_,4758-467 099-COMM SPL 18,45DB 40.88 
l!f~k',;i;j:r~/;l~:~HQ0,73.4897-007 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 120. ~8 
~;Jlt~tlt~,Ol~~HQ0734898-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 16,00DB 104.88 
M~t~-q~~9Js .II0735408-004 070-PHOTO COPY 241603 2. 70DB 102 .18 
. iffi'l~~~~Ol5 II0735459-455 099-COMM SPL 24.76DB 77.42 
•\• ........ :., .. ,r~ ,., r ,':r \-r 
il.'D?¼;~2t(f20-15 II0735459-456 099-COMM SPL 70. 39DB 7. 03 
. fi¥:fu,t-cj2.015 .:;.II0736262-025 223-IMF PAYROL NOV PAY 72. 00 79, 03 
i..r.t".,'Y Jt,1'".i•l 1 t"', ~-,,,. • t -~ 
JJ~gQ,:fl;f2JUS:··;fIQ0736264-005 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14, 40DB 64. 63 
i~r~·~J~,_g,J}~L~~J!,737043-009 072-METER MAIL 241630 2. 08DB 62. 55 
llai.{Q7c•2015.·:·i!E&0.737272-558 099-COMM SPL 39. 97DB 22. 58 - f ......... ,,,,.,, ~,;, ... \~·:~-,., ..... ~., .. ·:r:. -
12/~J/2-0iSfl~I0~37992-002 070-PHOTO COPY 241631 0.50DB 22.08 
. 1)i;dl.il,i-?,2ai's:s:rl.to738093-507 099-COMM SPL 21. 58DB O. 50 
i~f~4;{-%°~'.~§~'. :(I0738186-002 071-MED CO-PAY 787043 5. OODB 4. 50DB 
l:-2:jl,~:0/.·2-0;!';5~HQ0739016-009 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 100. 00 95. 50 i-r ,J ' *.t""i~ .!, """'' ",; ; .._,_-.~ , .. 
f2p2,fil1/,2.015-;:H~0-'.739017-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 20. OODB 75. 50 
, J, > ~ < • ..,. .... •, ... ,•."Ml>,.~- l .. , ·'" ~ •J. 
12tBili'/12015.-·iITID073914 7-015 072-METER MAIL 241646 1, 64DB 73. 86 
:t2\/2l4lt<zoif:ii<li.<b39600-003 061-CK INMATE 241645 25. OODB 48. 86 
:11it2i~)xzHiI'"r'to:?39799-49o 099-coMM sPL 40 13PnB 8. 73 
ctfi',(,ii4j2q£:5,_:.I:Icfo.Jo5 6 0 - 0 04 2 23 - IMF PAYROL DECI h:tlfiWCertify that these repijqSJre rue and C?r· 8 3 . ];3 
~tfti,t;9"/ffr~:){ ~ rect copies of official records or reports ?r entnes J 
· ~fl.J}~i,·4~HJ·· ~ thereinoftbe a DepartmentofCorrect1on. 
- ru '!i~~ii'~.aotf·· /,. 
er. 'I. ,-'."11,'~ 3(. f Dated: U!- '4, 
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4!f'11~ l1t1· f.-.\:fi 17 , J' .• 
l1~1H:\~.n~Qt,;'>., '!. '. 
:f lot \~t>;'iF' ·-'ii .... 
... :~:1,.f[:.1l~~i,.~~-;'!--,i. )l:0.1-..-' • 
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i~&~idta;t~j¥Jit========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ---------- 06/09/2016 = 
"' fl /' l '.:J! ~ t ~VI ·r F:'ll : :,'t 11'_~ .. , .... ,i:~-.~1 ~~..i ... ~ t' ,_. -,,, 
\ -~ ,; ii'/£. 1,· .'~~;,ts· ·; . : · . 
~.;·:.,/"/j ~~· . ./, .. lJ.j.J.. i. ·,· ~ ' 
i ;; ·'t.ii •i:- i-!.~5 'i; i(;.;).i: 
',.r;:1.,.._,r,~ .•• ~t°{~:?4 ·~~:-·~ t C ·' 
fl6~~Nb~/U;'§.'·3~-2-1 ,:;· Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
'"l -~ f 1,!'\'.· /'. ~')' ti "I, C t:q •.,1 ~• 
:At:coant1t:t.CHK':--''•;. Status: ACTIVE 
Ji:1\J ~-?.it ·1 ~f'tlil ! W-ifi-' · 
~!%Jf¥i~}f~iti\t>ates: 04/0l/2015-06/09/2016 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-17 
~1 ,'£ i ,~.~ f t~ ~{JI, ,;I', , .•• r ~ ·,;r.xi1 
~! '.!i.'1 : ... ·':.'-'-~t I'; i';,'-'I: •.l;,, • : •.• ,, 
~'~~J{. 1P.1ff,if.t-;ra·13egirlning Total Total Current l:;U ~1JJ;rn:u:!Balance Charges Payments Balance 
~~4~~t~R}:==~-=~==========::::~:8TRANSACTI0;~ 6 ~~=:===========~~=:============= 
t .. .a&"l: ,~ ~~•~/;:O. I I . ~~;~ff;-~i.~K Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
-,1 .n= ... ~l"-t1. -~v .. ~ ~ 
-:i·r~e-:t~~tati; 11Qo740562-003 ;~; =;;~~;-;~~~- --- ;~;;= ;~=~; ---~~ ~ ~~~~ ---~~ ~ ;~ ---
't "'"f .r 11 'hr _t"",.t,'Y. f' ~ -<·.,. .. ,\ 1'' 
01f!Of.l:io/,210:l:.6''·\C:I-0740687-341 099-COMM SPL 3. 76DB 64. 49 
oizoaflffi6:j':£0741453-007 072-METER MAIL 244989 2.08DB 62.41 
~i%.wwt~13·~-~:~ft~741610-626 099-COMM SPL 54. 84DB 7. 57 
·OT.X:1'.2,l2()'.J:i6 !'HQ0741808-001 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 87. 57 
~:*ii~f,l~lf,.;~90741810-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 16. OODB 71. 57 
~i-t.1.'~:?½'~04-f::·~J}q742446-004 070-PHOTO COPY 244988 1. 60DB 69. 97 
'.q;~~rt~'y;~~~-f3j~~9,,7, 4 2 513 - 5 0 3 0 9 9 - COMM SPL 3 8 . 13DB 31 . 8 4 
~-~~~~?-y'.t~;~i~:~-1)5~.Q!143145-454 099-COMM SPL 25. 82DB 6. 02 
~l~'f-~t~.Pl§ :TlQ.,743207-020 071-MED CO-PAY 811127 8. OODB 1. 98DB 
Rt~~]'0-fj~·9: .I~Q-1i4 095-014 223-IMF PAYROL JAN PAY 74. 40 72. 42 
·02,Z.'02~;;rn1'6· HQ074A097-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14. 88DB 57. 54 
8~t9~{~P,-}§'~II67~4387-028 072-METER MAIL 244539 0.22DB 57.32 
9?,/.Q§lR9+?1:lII0744967-557 099-COMM SPL 57.lODB 0.22 
9~1/J?~;1/,~nj:6 HQ0745144-007 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80. 00 80. 22 
. t>g/q~#~:~i6 HQ0745145-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 16. OODB 64. 22 
·o,~¥ili-2t:H:l16 II0745612-003 070-PHOTO COPY 244990 0. 70DB 63. 52 
~f0i~Jf~16'II0745689-517 099-COMM SPL 4.08DB 59.44 
. 62fDS%~OiEf II0745689-518 099-COMM SPL 36. 24DB 23. 20 
Q~½~~~)18_i~:·t~0746599-426 099-COMM SPL 7. 20DB 16. 00 
. 02/,96Zr2'o1:'1r-:tro74 721 7- 005 072-METER MAIL 251971 0. 44DB 15. 56 
· ·02%'2:9{:28:ili~1bf:ti:f747364-396 099-COMM SPL 14. 73DB O. 83 
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A.M ____ F,....r:LE.M l6g. 
JUN 2 0 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA By R~~~SON 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
) FOR FEE W AIYER 
) ON APPEAL 
) 
Presently pending before the court is the plaintiffs motion for a fee waiver in his 
appeal of this magistrate division's case to the district court. 
It appears that the plaintiff is indigent and without funds to pay the $81.00 fee for 
filing such an appeal. See I.C. § 31-3220A. 
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the plaintiffs motion for fee waiver on appeal is 
hereby granted. 
Order Granting Motion for Fee Waiver on Appeal 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 




PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
Date: --------
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N0·----~~7'TTT°t~r>r---
A.M ____ F,_,.,LE .• ~fa.w, 
JUN 2 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, STATE OF IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein; and it further appearing that no transcript has 
been requested in this appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That the Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) days of the 
date of this Order. 
2) That the Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) days 
after service of Appellant's brief. 
3) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one (21) 
days after service of Respondent's brief. 
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4) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briefs are filed, and 
that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice for oral 
argument, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and the 
record. 
Dated this 20th day of June, 2016. 
~ 
Sr. District Judge 
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.. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of June 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
KENNETH M WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 - ISCI - UNIT 9, 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE ID 83702 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Mary Karin Magnelli 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
1299 N Orchard, Ste 110 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0018 
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NO'-----==-----:-~ 
A.M ____ FI_.LE .~ j, C-:-_3_r' 
JUL O 6 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




STATE OF IDAHO DEPART OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. CV-OC-15-20864 
AMENDED ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein; and it further appearing that no transcript has 
been requested in this appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That the Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) days of the 
date of this Order. 
2) That the Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) days 
after service of Appellant's brief. 
3) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one (21) 
days after service of Respondent's brief. 
4) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briefs are filed, and 
that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice for oral 
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argument, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and the 
record. 
Dated this 6th day of July, 2016. 
Sr. District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of July, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
IDOC #61342 ISCI UNIT 9 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE ID 83707 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
CIVIL DIVISION 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Mary Karin Magnelli 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
1299 N Orchard, Ste 110 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0018 
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,. N0·----~~~1-~-' FiLED':2 A.M. ____ ..,..,.M;; .. /'l) 
AUG 1 8 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
~ ROSE WRIGHT 
IN 'l'HE oISmicr CDURr OF 'l'HE FOURrH JUDICIAL DIS'IRicr oePurv 
OF THE STATE OF ID.AID, IN AND FOR THE OOUN.l'Y OF ADA 
KENNEl'H M. OORKMAN, ) 
) 




CHRIS'IDPHER RICH, Court Clerk ) 
of the Fourth District Court; ) 




UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS ) 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _______________ ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLl\NI' 
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada 
KENNEI'H M. OORKMAN 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Plaintiff/Appellant, prose 
HONORABLE DAVID MANWEILER 
Magistrate Judge 
Kale D. Gans 
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Main Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney For Defendant/Respondent 
Christopher Rich 
Karen Magnelli 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Deparbnent of Correction 
1299 N. Orchard, Suite 110 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0018 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent IDOC 
·-, ,, 
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I. S'I'ATEl-1ENl' OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This case is based u!X)n Appellant Kenneth M. 
Workman's ("Workman") Prisoners Civil Complaint ("Complaint") for declaratory 
judgment, which sought a declaration that the restitution order entered against 
him on April 28, 2003 expired five (5) years later on April 28, 2008. Workman 
apeals the magistrate court's dismissal and granting of Slll1iilarY judgment in favor 
of the Defendants. 
' 
B. '!be Course of the Proceedings. Workman's Complaint was filed in the 
Fourth District Court on December 30, 2015. The case was subsequently assigned 
to Magistrate Judge George G. Hicks of the Magistrate Division. 
Workman moved to disqualify Judge Hicks without cause on February 5, 2016. 
This motion was denied on February 22, 2016. Workman moved for reconsideration, 
which was denied on March 15, 2016. 
On February 16, 2016, Defendant Christopher Rich ("Rich"), through counsel, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). This motion was 
sup!X)rted by a memorandum. 
On February 22, 2016, Defendant Idaho Department of Correction ("IIX>C") also 
filed a motion to dismiss, which was sup!X)rted by a memorandum, the Affidavit of 
Shirley Audens in Sup!X)rt of Idaho Department of-Correction's Motion to Dismiss 
(hereinafter, "Audens Aff.") and other materials. 
On March 1 , 201 6, the Magistrate Court ordered Workman to res!X)nd to the 
Defendants' motions to dismiss. 
On March 1, 2016, Workman filed Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant Christopher 
Rich's Motion to Dismiss. 
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On March 31, 2016, Workman filed his "Notice of Clarifi~tion and Withdrawal 
of 14th Amendment Claim." On the same date, he also filed Plaintiff's Response 
to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss. Workman's response was supported by the 
Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in Support of Plaintiff's Response to 
. ' 
Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Workman Deel.") filed on 
March 31, 2016 and.the Supplemental Declaration of Kenneth "Mike" Workman in 
Suport of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss, which was 
dated April 12, 2016. 
On May 18, 2016, Magistrate Judge. David Manweiler 1 issued his Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Surrmary Judgment, granting 
the Defendants' motions to disrniss/surrmary· judgment. The Magistrate Court denied 
Workman's contention that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter (Id., at 4-5), 
denied }?efendant IDOC's contention that Workman's Complaint was barred by res 
j udicata ( Id. , at 5-1 O) , denied Defendant Rich's and Defendant IDOC' s contentions 
that Workman's Complaint was barred by the statute of limitations (Id., at 10-12), 
"consider[ed] the merits of plaintiff's contentions" (Id., at 12) and denied 
2 Defendant IDOC's request for an award of attorney fees. Id., at 16-17. 
1 Workman was not previously notified of this change in the assignment of the 
presiding Magistrate Judge. · 
2 Defendants Rich and IDOC did not file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal 
on the Magistrate court's rulings against them regarding their res judicata and 
statute of limitations defenses and Defendant IDOC's request for attorney fees. 
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The magistrate Court detennined that the renewal statutes cited by Workman 
(i.e., I.e.§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111) were inapplicable (Id., at 15, n.20) and 
concluded that none of the authorities cited by Workman "specifically hold that a 
court order for restitution is extinguished and loses enforceability and 
authority, when the order is also recorded as a judgment for purposes of 
constituting a civil judgment or that an order of restitution is always and 
solely a civil judgment." Id., at 16. On this basis, the Magistrate Court 
concluded that the Defendants' "motions to dismiss/surnnary judgment are hereby 
granted~" Id., at 1'/. 
The Magistrate Court filed its Judgment on May 25, 2016. Workman timely 
filed his Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2016. 
c. statanent of the Facts. Plaintiff Workman is in the custody of the IDOC 
and is currently housed at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). 
Complaint, at 2; Workman Deel., n 2; Audens Aff. , n 6. An Order For Restitution 
and Civil Judgment for payment of restitution in the amount of $32, 391.44, with , 
7.29% interest per annum, was entered against Workman, pursuant to I.C. §19-5304, 
in Ada County case Number H0101303 on April 28, 2003. Complaint, at 4; Workman 
Deel., f[ 3, Exhibit A; Audens Aff., f[ 6, Exhibit A. To date, no motion for 
re:iewal of judgment has been filed or served on Workman pursuant to I.C. §§ 
10-1110 and/or 10-1111. Complaint, at 2-3; Workman Deel., f[ 4. 
Even though no motion for renewal of judgment was filed and served within 
the applicable five (5) year time limit, at times since April 28, 2008 (when the 
five (5) year renewal period expired) DefendantIDOC has made continuing 
deductions from Plaintiff's inmate account for payments toward the now expired 
restitution order. Complaint, at 3; Workman Deel. , f[ 5; Audens Aff. , f[ 6. 
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,-.. 
On March 1, 201 ~' I.C. § 20-209H went into effect, providing for payments 
towards restitution "still owing." Since June 29, 2015, Defendant IDOC has made 
I ' 
at least fifteen (15) deductions from Plaintiff's inmate account as payments 
towards the restitution order. Complaint, at 2-3; Workman Deel., ,r 6; Audens 
Aff., fl 6. 
II. ISSUES PRESENl'EO ON APPEAL 
ISSUE I. 
Did the Magistrate Court err in concluding that it had jurisdiction over 
this matter? 
ISSUE II. 
Did.the Magistrate Court err by failing to conclude that the restitution 
order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer still owing because 
it was not renewed within five (5) years of its entry? 
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIE.W 
A. Standards of Review for Declaratory Judgrtelt Claims. Idaho's Unifonn 
Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq., provides that "Courts of 
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relatioTI?, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed." I.C. § 10-1201. "Any person ••• whose rights, status 3 or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute • • • may have detennined any question of 
construction of validity arising under the ••• statute ••• and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations there under." I.C. § 
10-1202. The "act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to , , 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and 
other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered." I.e. 
§ 10-1212. 
"A party to a declaratory judgment action may properly seek damages or 
other monetary relief to which he may be entitled." Agricultural Services, Inc. 
v. City of Gooding, 120 Idaho 627, 628, 818 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1991). 
B. Standards of Review for tJbtions for Dismissal. "On a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court looks only at the. pleadings, and all 
inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. 'The question then is 
whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support'of his claim 
which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Every reasonable intendment will 
be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.' The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Burghart 
v. Carlin, 151 Idaho 730, 731-32, 264 P.3d 71, 72-73 (Ct. App. 2011). 
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When matters outside the pleadings are presented and considered by the 
court, a motion to dismiss is to be converted into a motion for surrmary judgment 
' ' 
I 
under I.R.C.P. 56(c). Hauschulz v. State, Deparbnent of Correction, 143 Idaho 
I . 
462, 466, 147 P.3d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006). 
. . I . 
A court may grant a 12 (b) ( 6) motion to dismiss when it appears beyond doubt 
that there is no set of facJs that will support the claim for relief. Yoakum v. 
I 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416 (1996); ortham v. Idaho 
I 
Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). The non-moving party is 
I 
entitled to have all inferences in the record viewed in his/her favor. Id. To 
the extent that the Court considers matters outside of the scope of the pleadings, 
the Court may consider a 12(b) (6) motion as one for surrmary judgment. 
. . 
C. Stamards of Review for t-k>tions for Sunmary Judgnent. Rule 56 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for surrmary judgment. "The · 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 65(c). 
When reviewing a motion for sumnary judgment, the "Court must liberally 
construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party and determine whether there 
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Quinlan v. Idaho Cornn' n for Pardons 
and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003)!. 
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The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. This burden can be met by demonstrating the absence concerning an · I. 
element the nonmoving party would be required to prove at trial. This absence of 
evidence can be established by an affinnative showing with the party's own 
evidence or by reviewing the nonmoving party's evidence and asserting that proof 
of a required element is lacking. Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional 
Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 601, 181 P.3d 524, 527 (Ct. App. 2008)~ 
After an absence of evidence has been shown, the burden then shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to demonstrate, by deposition, affidavits, or discovery 
responses, that there is a genuine issue for trial or to provide a valid 
justification for failing to do so. Id. 
The defendant bears the burden of supporting a claimed affinnative defense 
in relation to a surnnary judgment motion. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770, 
215 P.3d 485, 490 (2009). 




The Magistrate Court erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over this 
matter. ' 
As set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, this is a declaratory judgment claim. 
Id., at 1. Plaintiff's Complaint specifically invoked the jurisdiction of the 
district.court, not the magistrate court, pursuant to I.C. § 1-705. Id., at 2, 
§ C. Jurisdiction. Under Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ 10-1201 et 
l 
seq., "Courts of record within ~heir respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, ·status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief 
is or could re claimed." I.e.§ 10-1201. 
The jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division is set forth and limited by 
I.C. §§ 1-2201 ,et seq.; 8Rule 1.2 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 13 
of the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division of the Fourth 
Judicial District; and Rule 5(c)(1) of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules. 3 
Not only has the Magistrate Division, including attorney magistrates, not 
been given jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions, but its jurisdiction 
is specifically limited to actions "where the amount of damages or value of the 
property: claimed does not exceed $10,000." See Rule 5(c)(1), I.C.A.R.; see also 
I.C. § 10-2208(1) (a) (limiting magistrate·11 jurisdiction to matters where the value 
"does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000)."). 
3 Former Rule 82 of th~ Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing magistrates 
was completely recodified., and placed in "reserved" status effective July 1, 2016. 
Thus, the underlying record on appeal refers to Rule 82 on this issue, but 
Workman's appeal briefing will refer to the current rules. 
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In the magistrate court's Memorandum Decision and Order, it noted "that it 
has jurisdiction in all civil proceedings where the amount of money or damages 
claimed does not exceed $10,000." Id., at 4, citing I.C. § 1-2208; Rule 13 of 
the Local Rules of the District Cc:l.lrt and Magistrate Division of the Fourth 
Judicial District. In a footnote, the magistrate court said that "[t]he plaintiff 
contends "the restitution order at issue in this civil case is $32,391.44 plus 
applicab;Le interest," ••• [h]owever, the plaintiff has not asserted that $32,391.44 
has been garnished from his prisoner account, nor has he asserted, in his . ,,. 'j 1·;_ 
complaint, that more than $10,000 has been garnished." Id., at 5, n.6. The 
magistrate court tllen concluded that "[t]here is no indication that the amount of 
money or damages claimed here exceeds that amount." Id., at s. 
This is error. The magistrate court has incorrectly equated the amount of 
money that has been collected to date on a total amount of money or damages 
claimed as the basis to grant itself jurisdiction in a matter that exceeds the 
scope of the jurisdiction of the magistrate division. 
But.workman's Complaint is clear that the amount of money or damages claimed 
in this case is not merely the amount that has been collected to date. Rather, 
Workman's Complaint sets forth that "Ut]he order for restitution and civil 
judgment in the amount of $32,391.44 was ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 in 
plaintiffs case No. H0101303 on April-28, 2003 over 13 years ago)! Id., at 4. 
Workman's Complaint further alleges that "[u]nder I.C. § 10-1110 and 10-1111, a 
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money judgment must be renewed within Five (5),t.years of the judgment' to remain 
enforceable[;]" that "[t]he record shows conclusively that there has been no 
motion to renew filed in this case[;]" and that "Ut]he'failure to timely file a 
motion to renew judgment makes the debt uncollectable, expired and unenforceable.'' 
Id. 
Plainly, Workman's Complaint has alleged that "the amount of money or damages 
claimed". includes bqth the moneys already collected after the five (5) year 
expiration date and the total amount of the restitution order itself. 4 
The total .amount of the restitution order - $32,391.44 plus applicable 
interest - exceeds the $10,000 jurisdictional limit of the magistrate court. The 
magistrate court below erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over this 
matter. 
. ' 4 Plaintiff Workman concedes to and does not appeal the magistrate court's 
ruling that "the relevant statute of limitations bars the plaintiff's improper 
garnishment claims that are dated beyond that period preceding the filing of his 
complaint[.]" Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/ 
Surrmary Judgment at 12. Workman acknowledges that he may only recover moneys 
already garnished as far back as is alloweci'-by the applicable and correct statute 
of limitations. However, he notes that the magistrate court rejected the ,: , '. 
respective statutes asserted by both Defendant IOOC (Id., at 10-12) and Defendant 
Rich (Id., at 12, n.15) and that neither Defendant IOOC nor Defendant Rich has 
filed a notice of appeal or cross-appeal. Thus, the applicable and correct 
statute.of:limitations was not determined in the magistrate court below. 
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ISSUE II. 
The Magistrate Court erred by failing to conclude that the restitution order is 
expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer owing because it was not 
renewed within five (5),years of its entry. 
The central question of this case is whether the rule of law that Idaho's 
state appellate courts have repeatedly held applies to all non-child support 
money judgments - the rule ~t the underlying judgment must be timely renewed 
within five (5) years by creditors to remain enforceable - applies with equal 
' 5 ' 
force to restitution orders. As Appellant Workman sets forth below, our Idaho 
Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have already repeatedly held that, once 
a money judgment is entered, the burden to keep the judgment enforceable through 
a;timely motion to renew lies squarely on the creditor and that restitution orders 
are essentially civil judgments and the same rule applies to them as well. 
Where restitution orders are at issue, Idaho law clearly establishes that 
either the clerk of the court that entered the restitution order or the victim 
qualify as the "creditor;" either of whom may timely move for renewal of judgment 
( or not, at their choosing) , but both of whom are responsible for and bear the 
burden of doing so if they want the restitution order to remain enforceable for 
over five (5) years. Indeed, not only have Idaho's appellate courts repeatedly :, 
held that this is the law of the state of Idaho, but Idaho's :Gegislature has also 
5 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, under current law restitution 
orders must be renewed within twenty (20) years, but this change in the law 
occurred after Workman's restitution order had already been expired for about 
eight years :under the fonner five (5) year renewal period that applied to his 
restitution order. 
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explicitly recognized that this is the law of Idaho when it amended the law so l:i-1 
that a twenty (20) year rule now applies to restitution orders entered on or after 
July 1, 2015. 
But when it amended the law to provide this longer renewal period, Idaho's 
Legislature explicitly did so knowing that the prior renewal period that applied 
to restituti~n orders was five (5) years. The Legislature of the state of Idaho, 
which makes the law of the State of Idaho, knows what that law is. It changed 
the law specifically for restitution orders from a five (5) year rule to a twenty 
(20) year rule knowing what that law is. 
But the magistrate court below has ignored Idaho's renewal laws, the Idaho : , 
Supreme'court, the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Legislature, and has 
instead ruled that the requirement to renew judgments simply doesn't apply to 
restitution orders. This is error, and the magistrate court should be reversed. 
and Mr. Workman should receive the relief that the law provides: the legal 
declaration that his un-renewed restitution order is expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer still owing. 
*** 
"Idaho Code§§ 19-5302, 19-5304, and 19-5305 provide that the court in a 
criminal case can enter .what is, in essence, a civil j~t for :restitution 
against the defendant." State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 .'P.3d 291, 293, 
2004 Ida. LEXIS 34, *6 (Idaho 2004). "Section 19-5302 provides: "If a district 
court or magistrate's division orders the defendant to pay restitution, the 
court shall order the defendant'to pay such restitution to the victim or victims 
injured by the defendant's conduct." Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides, "An 
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order of restitution shall be a separate written order in addition to any other 
sentence the court may imi;:x::>se." Idaho Code§ 19-5305 provides: "After forty-two 
days from the entry of the order of restitution or at the conclusion of a hearing 
to reconsider an order of restitution,, whichever is later, an order of ,: 
restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may execute as provided 
by law for civil judgments." Thus, an order of restitution provided in Idaho 
Code §. ··19-5304(2) becanes, in essence, a civil judgoent for the aIIDUI1t of such 
restitution." Id. (emphasis added). 6 
Under the general restitution statute, the trial court "has discretion over 
whether to order restitution and in what amount." State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 
167, 171, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014), citing State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 
35, 37/ 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 
P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). 
However, the district does not have the discretion to dictate when or how 
the restitution order may be enforced after it is entered. That function is 
specifically entrusted to the victim or the clerk of the district court. Id., at 
172, citing I.C. §§ 19-5305(1) (restitution order may be recorded and executed 
ui;:x::>n as a civil judgment); 19-5305(2) ("Theclerk of the district court may take 
6 "This Court has previously held that an order for restitution is separate 
and apart from a criminal sentence." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886, 292 
P.3d 273, 277, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 4, *7 (Idaho 2013), citing State v. Gomez, 153 
Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 95 (2012); State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 
P.3d 291, 293 (2004) (An "order for restitution provided in Idaho Code§ 
19-5304(2) becanes, in essence, a civil judgnent for the anount of such 
restitution." ( emphasis added) ) • · 
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action to collect on the order of restitution ori behalf of the victim and .• 1 •• 
may use the procedures set forth in section 19-4708, Idaho Code, for the 
collection of restitution."); 19-4708 (providing the procedure for collection of 
debts, all of which are.directed to the clerks of the district court under the 
supervision of the Idaho Supreme Court)~" 
Idaho law sets forthr that money judgments, including restitution ord~s that 
are in essence a civil judgment for the amount of restitution, must be timel~ 
renewed. 
Idaho Code Section 10-1111 ( 1 ) sets forth that '·' [u]nless the judgment has 
been satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration·of the lien created by 
Section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court which entered 
the judgment, other than for child support, may, upon motion, renew such 
judgment. 7 The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same manner as the 
original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for five (5) 
years from the date of the judgment." Id. (emphasis added). 
"By its own terms,§ 10-1111 provides for the renewal of judgments, not 
just judgment liens." Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667 (Ct. 
App. 1998). "Idaho Code section 10-1111 (_ 1 ) does not allow for sua sponte 
renewal." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 59, 294 P.3d 194 (2013). 
7 Except where specifically identified otherwise herein, references to 
I.C. §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 and their subsections refer to those versions of 
these statutes that were in effect before the 2015 amendments to them. 
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Idaho Code Section 10-1110 sets forth, in pertinent parts, that "[a) 
transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state 
' 
may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, ••• and from the 
time of such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien 
upon all real property of the judgment debtor in 1:,he county, not exempt from 
execution, owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to 
the expiration of the lien[.)" Id. "The lien resulting from recording of a 
judgment other than for support of a child continues five (5) years from the date 
of the judgment, unless the judgment be previously satisfied, or unless the 
enforcement of the judgment be stayed upon appeal as provided by law." Id. 
"In short, in civil judgment - whether or not a lien is actually recorded -
will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiraton, makes a motion to renew and such motion is grffil:ted by the court." 
Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237, 239, 268 P.3d 1189 (Ct. App. 2012 (citing Smith v. 
Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669 (section 10-1111 provides for renewal of 
judgments, not just judgment liens) ) • 
"We view I.C. § 10-1111 to be in the nature of a statute of limitation;: it 
sets the time limit for a judgrent creditor to take action to renew the judgment." 
Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added). "Under 
Idaho's renewal statute, for non-chiid support judgments, the motion to renew must 
be made within five years of the date of the judgment [ • ] " Grazer v. Jones; 154 
Idaho at 65, 294 P.3d 184, citing I.e.§ 10-1111(1). 
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Thus, under well-settled Idaho law, the burden of timely renewal of a money 
., 
judgment lies squarely upon the creditor. In the case of a restitution order (as 
in this'case) that burden lies upon the clerk of the district court and the 
victim owed the restitution. See I.C. § 19-5305(1) (restitution order may be 
recorded and executed upon as a civil judgment); state v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 
172, 345 P.2d 226 (Ct. App. 2014 (enforcement of restitution "is specifically 
entrusted to the victim or the clerk of the district court."). 
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court recently emphasized that it is clearly 
established that the burden to timely renew lies squarely upon the creditor. In 
I 
Grazer v. Jones, _154 Idaho 58, 294 P. 3d 184, creditor Grazer had engaged in other, 
' 
prolonged and extensive litigation against the debtor, but "had never attempted 
to renew the judgment[.]" Id., at 62. The Grazer Court held that "[t]he 
judgment lien expired five years after entry of judgment, and none of Grazer's 
excuses for allowing his lien to expire a;re persuasive, primarily because he never 
attempted to renew the lien or obtain a new lien." Id., at 64. 
"Under Idaho's renewal statute, for non-child support judgments, the motion 
to renew must be made with~n five years from the date" of the judgment. Id., at 
65. "I~ is undisputed that Grazer never attempted to renew his lien. 1 r sJ· ,r:i·'., l 
Nevertheless, Grazer asks this Court to disregard the fact that his lien has 
expired~ We shall not do so." Id. , at 68 ( emphasis added) • 
In_ light of these specific Idaho statutes and Idaho appellate court 
. . 
decisions, if there was any question remaining (which there isn't) whether the 
five ('5) year renewal rule applied to restitution orders such as Workman's, that 
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question was explicitly put to rest by Idaho's Legislature in the First Regular 
Legislative Session of the 2015 Legislature. In this session, the legislature 
introduced and passed into law 2015 House Bill No. 62, specifically amending 
Idaho C~e Sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 to extend, as to restitution orders in 
particular, the 'fonner five (5) year renewal period to a new twenty (20) year 
renewal period, beginning with all restitution orders entered on or after July 1, 
2015. 
Indeed, the legislature specifically stated in its statement of Purpose 
No. SB23375 that: 
Idaho Code provides that when a defendant is found guilty of any crime 
resulting in economic loss to a victim, the court shall order the defendants 
to make restitution unless it finds that such an order would be 
inappropriate or undesireable. This order may later be recorded as a )11,l1 r1·, 
judgment and the victim nay execute ai the jl.rlglent in the same manner .as 
any other civil judglent. However, crime victims are generally not 
represented by an attorney, and they may not realize that the lien arising 
fran a judgnent must be renewed every five years, or that the judgment 
must be executed upon within five years, unless the court grants a notion 
to extend that tine. This bill would enable victims of crime to fully 
recognize their constitutional right to restitution for the hann that has 
been done to them by extending the five year limitation to twenty years for 
victims who are seeking to recover on a judgment for restitution arising 
from a defendant's conviction. 
See Statement of Purpose No. SB23375, attached hereto as A<Hendum A ( emphasis 
added); see also Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant Christopher Rich's Motion to 
Dismiss filed March 1, 2016, at Exhibit A. 
Thus, it is clearly established under the Idaho law applicable to Workman's· 
restitution order that the clerk of the court or the victim were required to 
renew the restitution order within five (5) years of its entry on April 28, 
2003, that is, by no later than April 28, 2008. They both failed to do so. 
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To date, no motion for renewal of judgment has been filed and served as to 
Workman's restitution order that is at issue in this case. See Complaint, at 
2-4; Workman Deel., ,r 4. Therefore, as of April 28, 2008, Workman's restitution 
order became expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer still owing. 
It is in light of this legal authority and background that the magistrate 
court states, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendcmts' Motions to 
Disrniss/Surrmary Judgment, that I.C. § 19-5304(4) "says nothing about the 
expiration of the order of restitution, only that it "shall be due and owing at 
the time of sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is detennined, 
whichever is later."" Id., at 14. After first finding that Idaho's renewal 
statutes [i.e., I.e.§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111] "are not applicable to the situation 
here, which involves a court order of restitution being utilized as a basis for 
garnishing a portion of his prisoner account, not the execution of a civil 
judgment" (Id., at 15, n.20), the magistrate court found that "the legislature 
provided two different avenues for crime victims to receive restitution from the 
perpetrators of the crime: (1) by a court order of restitution (pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-5304), and (2) by a civil7judgment (pursuant to I.C. § 19-5305(1)) that can 
be executed on or result in a lien being placed on the perpetrator's real 
property." Id., at 15. The magistrate court concluded that the authorities · ,1.··-. 
cited by Plaintiff Workman do not "specifically hold that a court order of 
restitution is extinguished and loses enforceability and authority, when the· 
order is also recorded as a judgment for purposes of constituting a civil 
judgment or that an order of restitution is always and solely a civil judgment." 
Id., at 16. 
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This is error for numerous reasons. First, the magistrate court's statement 
that I.e.§ 19-5304(4) "says nothing about the expiration of the order of 
restitution" is error because Idaho's appellate courts have held that it is I.e. 
§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 that speak of the expiration of civil orders and money · 
judgments (see, e.g., Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 964 P.2d 667; Bach, 152 Idaho·237, 
268 P.3d 1189; Grazer, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184) and have established that 
restitution orders are essentially civil judgments (see, e.g., McCool, 139 Idaho 
804, 87 P.3d 291; Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273; Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 
P.3d 90). Thus, the magistrate court's demand that r.e. § 19-5304 itself must 
specifically speak of expiration for expiration to apply is error because Idaho's 
appellate courts have already held that civil judgments expire in five years , , i 
unless timely renewed·before they expire and that restitution orders are,, 
essentially civil judgments. 
Second, the magistrate court's finding that r.e. §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 
"are not applicable to the situation here, which involves a court order of 
restitution being utilized as a basis for garnishing a portion of his prisoner 
account, not the execution of a civil judgment" is error because garnishments 
from inmate accounts under I.e.§ 20-209H can only be made for restitution that 
"is still owing." See I.e.§ 20-209H. The magistrate court's effort to 
distinguish garnishments from the inmate account from execution of a civil 
judgment is entirely inC9fllP3.tible with the prior rulings of Idaho's appellate 
courts that it is not just the lien, but the judgment itself that expires in 
five (5) years if not timely renewed.first. 
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"In short, in civil judgment - whether or not a lien is actually recorded -
will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court." 
Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237, 239, 268 P.3d 1189 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Smith 
v.· Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669 (section 10-1111 provides for renewal 
of judgments, not just judgment liens)). 
"We view,.I.C. § 10-1111 to be in the nature of. a statute of limitation; ; it 
sets the tine limit for a j'lldgtent creditor- to take action to :renew the judgment." 
Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d 667 (emphasis added). "Under Idaho's 
renewal statute, for non-child support judgments, the motion to renew must be made 
within five years of the date of the judgment[.]" Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho at 
65, 294 P.3d 184, citing I.e.§ 10-1111(1). 
Thus, it was Workman's restitution order itself that expired after five (5) 
years on April 28, 2008, not just the ability to secure a lien or to conduct 
execution of a civil judgment against Workman. Since the restitution order itself 
expired, the restitution itself is no longer "still owing," a prerequisite for 
legal garnishments from the inmate account under I.C. § 20-209H •• 
Third, the magistrate court's finding that "the legislature provided two 
different avenues for crime victims to receive restitution from the perpetrators 
of the crime" is error because it also is entirely inconsistent with the Idaho 
Supreme:eourt's holding that, working together, "Idaho Code§§ 19-5302, 19-5304, 
and 19-5305 provide that the rourt in a criminal case can enter what is, in 
esence, a civil judgment for restitution against the defen~t. 11 McCool~_J~2_ 
Idaho at 806, 97 P.3d at 293 (emphasis added). 
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Fourth, in addition to being entirely at odds with the Idaho statutes and 
case law cited by Workman, the magistrate court's ruling is in error because it 
infers that Idaho's legislature, which makes Idaho's law, has no idea what it's 
doing, does not know what the law is, and that it "perfonned an idle act by 
enacting a meaningless provision" when it amended the renewal pe:r::iod from five 
( 5) years to twenty ( 20) years for restitution orders in 2015. Roberts v. Board 
of Trustees, Pocatello School District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 
'' 
1111 (2000). When it amended the renewal laws, the legislature specifically 
acknowledged that '.'the lien arising from a judgment must be renewed within five 
years, unless the court grants a motion to extend that time." See Statement of 
,~ 
Purpose No. SB23375; see also Back v. Dawson, 152 Idaho at 239, 268 P.3d 1189 
("In short, in civil judgment - whether or not a lien is actually recorded - will 
last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court."), 
citing Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669 ("We view I.C. § 10-1111 
to be in the nature of a statute of limitation; it sets the time limit for a 
judgment. creditor to take action to renew the judgment.") • 
' Idaho's Legislature, which makes the law, and Idaho's appellate courts which 
interpret the law, have both determined that the failure to timely move for 
renewal of.judgment makes Workman's restitution order expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing as of April 28, 2008. The magistrate court 
ignored this critical fact. But this Court must follow the law, ·must follow the 
direction of the Idaho Supreme Court, and "shall not do so." Grazer, 154 Idaho 
at 68. 
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Pursuant to the authority granted the Court under I.R.C.P. 56(c) that, on 
any party's motion for surrmary judgment, that " [ s ]uch judgment, when appropriate, 
may be render~ for or against any party to the action;" the Court should enter 
surnnary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Workman and against Defendants in this 
matter. 
As set forth above, the magistrate court should be reversed and Mr. Workman 
should receive the relief that the law provides; the legal declaration that his 
un-renewed restitution order is expired,. unenforceable, uncollectable and no 7 ·.: 
longer still owing. Workman should prevail in this appeal and thus, should also 
be awarded his costs pursuant to Rule 54, I.C.R.P.; Rule 40, I.A.R.; and all 
' other laws and rules authorizing the award of such costs. 
IV. CDNCLUSION 
As set forth above, the magistrate court 1 lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
this matter. Workman has further stated a cognizable claim against Defendants 
upon which relief may be granted arid, based upon the undisputed facts, he is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This Court should rule that Workman's 
restitution order expired on April 28, 2008 and enter surnnary judgment in favor 
of Workman and against the Defendants in this case. · .• 
The magistrate court erred in granting dismissal and surnnary judgment in 
favor of the Defendants and should be reversed. Workman should be awarded his 
costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P. and Rule 40, I.A.R •• 
Respectfully submitted this 9...±!2. day of August, 2016. 
~Minijj m v w~ 
eth M. Workman 
Appellant, prose 
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EXHIBIT A 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS23375 
Idaho Code provides that when a defendant is found guilty of any crime resulting in economic loss 
to a victim, the court shall order the defendant to make restitution unless it finds that such an order 
would be inappropriate or undesirable. This order may later be recorded as a judgment and the 
victim may execute on the judgment in the same manner as any other civil judgment. However, 
crime victims are generally not represented by an attorney, and they may not realize that the lien 
arising from a judgment must be renewed every five years, or that the judgment must be executed 
upon within five years, unless the court grants a motion to extend that time. This bill would enable 
victims of crime to fully recognize their constitutional right to restitution for the harm that has been 
done to them by extending the five year limitation to twenty years for victims who are seeking to 
recover on a judgment for restitution arising from a defendant's conviction. 
None. 
Contact: 
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(208) 332-1000 
FISCAL NOTE 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This declaratory judgment action can be distilled to a simple question: does Idaho Code 
§ 19-5305 provide a mechanism for collecting court ordered criminal restitution through two (2) 
separate methods? 
Confirming that it does, the Honorable David Manweiler issued a Memorandum Decision 
and Order Re: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary Judgment1 on May 18, 2016, noting 
that: 
(i) Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) allows a victim to record a restitution order as a civil 
judgment to collect restitution, while; 
(ii) Idaho Code § 19-5305(2) additionally allows the Clerk of the district court to 
directly collect on the restitution order on behalf of the victim. 
Given that the civil judgment procedure set forth in Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) was not 
utilized in regards to the collection of restitution owed by Appellant/Plaintiff Kenneth Workman 
("Workman"), his request for declaratory judgment2 regarding the adequacy of judgment 
1 Defendant/Respondent Ada County Clerk Christopher Rich filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
February 16, 2016, while Defendant/Respondent Idaho Department of Correction filed a separate 
Motion to Dismiss on February 22, 2016, which, because it was accompanied by Affidavits, was 
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2 Workman had previously clarified that "the scope of [his] Complaint is brought under the 
constitution and laws of the State of Idaho and is based solely on state law, not federal law." 
Notice of Clarification and Withdrawal of 14th Amendment Claim at 1-2. 
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renewals (which would only be applicable to collection under Idaho Code § 19-5305(1)) was 
dismissed in its entirety.3 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether Respondent Christopher Rich is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Workman continues to argue a position that is unsupported by law, despite the existence 
of a statute that is directly on point and contrary to his contentions. As a direct result of 
Workman's actions, which lack a reasonable basis in fact or law, Respondent Ada County Clerk 
Christopher Rich (the "Clerk") has been forced to retain the services of the Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and has and will continue to incur fees in defense 
thereof and requests that he be granted reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 12-117 and/or 12-121. 
IV. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
The district court shall review an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district 
court on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon 
the same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court. I.R.C.P. 
83(-f)(l ). The appellate court is required to accept the factual findings made by the magistrate 
unless they are clearly erroneous. In Re Estate of Bradley, 107 Idaho 860, 862, 693 P.2d 1062, 
3 In addition to ruling that Idaho Code § 19-5305 is dispositive of the matter, the Court also 
ruled: 
1) Magistrate jurisdiction is proper; 
2) Res judicata is not grounds for dismissal; 
3) This matter is a declaratory action, which does not sound in tort; and 
4) The applicable statute of limitations would limit any recovery prior to the date of the 
Complaint. 




1064 (Idaho App. 1984). Conclusions oflaw and legal issues are subject to free review. Carter 
v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 378, 146 P.3d 639, 644 (2006). Interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law over which a court will exercise free review. Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 689, 
152 P.3d 558, 560 (2007). 
"The grant of a 12(b )( 6) motion will be affirmed where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,398,987 P.2d 300,310 (1999). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code § 19-5305 Sets Forth Two Methods For Collecting on a Criminal 
Restitution Order. 
The policy to fully compensate crime victims for their economic loss has long been 
recognized by the courts. State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P .3d 226, 229 (Idaho App. 
2014) (citations omitted). This is reinforced by Idaho Code § 19-4708(2)(c), which includes 
"restitution" under the definition of "Debts owed to courts." Once an order for criminal 
restitution is made, the next step is to collect on it. Idaho Code§ 19-5305 provides: 
1) After forty-two (42) days.from the entry of the order ofrestitution or at the 
conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of restitution, whichever 
occurs later, an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the 
victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments. 
2) The clerk of the district court may take action to collect on the order of 
restitution on behalf of the victim and, with the approval of the 
administrative district judge, may use the procedures set forth in section 
19-4 708, Idaho Code, for the collection of the restitution. 
Thus, the victim can collect restitution by taking the restitution order and recording it as a 
civil judgment (pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1)). Alternatively, the clerk of the district 
court can collect on the restitution order directly (pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(2)). 
Workman does not distinguish between these differing methods of recovery. Instead, he merges 
3 
000276
them into a single collection process whereby the Clerk would be required to record a restitution 
order as a civil judgment and continually renew it in order to collect on behalf of a victim. 
When interpreting a statute, all parts of a statute shall be given meaning and courts will 
construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or 
insignificant. Moreland at 690, 561 (citation omitted). When construing a statute, courts "must 
give effect to every word, clause and sentence of a statute, and the construction of a statute 
should be adopted which does not deprive provisions of the statute of their meaning." Athay v. 
Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005). 
In this case, Idaho Code § 19-5305(2) would be rendered meaningless and superfluous if, 
as Workman contends, the only way to collect on a restitution order is for the clerk of the court 
to file it as a civil judgment on behalf of the victim. Workman's interpretation fails to provide 
for the separate avenues for obtaining restitution: 1) a procedure allowing victims to personally 
collect through the use of a civil judgment and 2) a procedure allowing the clerk of the court to 
collect on the victim's behalf outside of the civil judgment process.4 Workman's illogical theory 
4 Workman's arguments regarding recent amendments to Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 
and the Legislature's intent to aid crime victims by extending the renewal period for judgments 
would only apply to execution of civil judgments pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-5305(1), which is 
not the collection process utilized with respect to Workman. Moreover, the Magistrate: 
[R]eviewed the cases cited by [Workman], including Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 
58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013) and State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 87 P.3d 291 (2004), 
but neither of these cases, nor the others he cites, specifically hold that a court 
order of restitution is extinguished and loses enforceability and authority, when 
the order is also recorded as a judgment for purposes of constituting a civil 
judgment or that an order of restitution is always and solely a civil judgment. 
Order at 16. The Magistrate also found: 
LC. § 19-5304(4) states where, as here, "a separate written order of restitution is 
issued, an order of restitution shall be for an amount certain and shall be due and 
owing at the time of sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is 
determined, whichever is later. An order for restitution may provide for interest 
from the date of the economic loss or injury." The statute says nothing about 
the expiration of the order of restitution ... 
4 
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fails to give effect to all parts of Idaho Code § 19-5305, negating an entire avenue of recovery. 
As such the Magistrate Court's grant of dismissal in favor of the Clerk was appropriate. 
B. The Magistrate Court had Jurisdiction in This Matter or, in the Alternative, This 
Court Has Free Rein to Decide the Legal Issues. 
After the parties had completed all briefing in regards to the Clerk's Motion to Dismiss,5 
Workman raised an issue of the Magistrate Court's jurisdiction in his March 28, 2016, Response 
to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss. Workman argued that 1) the Magistrate Court does not 
have jurisdiction over declaratory judgments and 2) because his restitution order was for 
$32,391.44 plus interest, it exceeded the Magistrate Court's $10,000 jurisdictional limit.6 In its 
Order of dismissal, the Magistrate Court responded to these arguments by noting it has 
jurisdiction in all civil proceedings where the amount of damages does not exceed $10,000 and 
that Workman never asserted in his Complaint that more than $10,000 has been garnished from 
his prisoner account. Order at 5, n. 6. 
Notwithstanding that Workman's jurisdictional arguments were never raised in objection 
to the Clerk's Motion to Dismiss (and are arguably untimely with respect to the Clerk),7 the fact 
Order at 14 (emphasis added). Lastly, the Magistrate additionally noted that by fashioning the 
restitution order as she did and captioning it as an "order for restitution and civil judgment," it 
appeared to be Judge Bail's intent to allow both methods of collection under Idaho Code 
19-5305 to be utilized. Id. at 15. 
5 The Clerk filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss on March 25, 2016. 
6 Workman had previously attempted to disqualify the Magistrate Judge under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l), 
which was denied for failure to follow the requirements of the Rule. See Order Denying Motion 
to Reconsider, filed March 15, 2016. However, the issue of disqualification of a Magistrate 
Judge is separate from the issue of the Magistrate Court's authority, which is the issue on appeal 
here. See Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 341, 343, 882 P.2d 996, 998 (Idaho App. 1994). 
7 Though questions of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any 
time, "the propriety and sufficiency of an assignment to an attorney magistrate is not a question 
5 
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of the matter is that as a result of this appeal this matter is currently before a district judge who 
freely reviews conclusions of law and legal issues. Carter at 378, 644. Given that this entire 
controversy was dismissed on the basis of failure to state a legal claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), there is nothing that prevents this Court from freely making its own legal rulings as to 
the parties' arguments. 
C. The Clerk is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 or 12-121, the Clerk claims attorney fees incurred in the 
appellate proceeding in this action. Workman has made this appeal frivolously and without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Despite a statute on point and clear direction from the Magistrate 
Court that his civil judgment renewability arguments are without merit, Workman continues to rely 
on the same arguments without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the 
existing law on which the Magistrate Court based its decision. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, the Clerk respectfully requests that the decision of the Magistrate 
Court dismissing Workman's Complaint be upheld and that the Clerk be allowed to recover 
attorney fees on appeal against Workman. 
of subject matter jurisdiction." Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 341, 344, 882 P.2d 996, 999 (Idaho 
App. 1994). Further: 
[N]o order or judgment is void or subject to collateral attack merely because 
rendered pursuant to an improper assignment to a magistrate. Accordingly, 
irregularities in a magistrate's assignment to a particular case or in the scope of 
the assignment are procedural errors which may be waived, not jurisdictional 
deficiencies which can be asserted for the first time on appeal or in a collateral 
attack on the judgment. 
Id. The Wilbanks Court relied on I.R.C.P. 82(c), which appears to have been replaced in part by 
I.R.C.P. 1.3 and similarly notes that "[n]o order or judgment is void or subject to collateral attack 
because it is rendered pursuant to an improper assignment to a magistrate." 
6 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: u?::G--
Ray J. Chacko 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case 
The Appellant ("Workman"), a prose incarcerated inmate, appeals the magistrate court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary Judgment 
("Order") dismissing Workman's Prisoners Civil Complaint ("Complaint"). Workman argued the 
restitution order entered against him was no longer enforceable as it had not been renewed pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111, and any deductions from his inmate account after April 28, 
2008, were made illegally. The magistrate court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively Rule 56(c), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts of the 
case are not in dispute in this appeal. At issue on appeal before the District Court are matters oflaw. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 
Workman is a presently incarcerated within the IDOC by virtue of a judgment of conviction 
and order of commitment in Ada County Case No. H0101303. At the time of his judgment of 
conviction on April 28, 2003, Workman was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $32,391.44, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. The Order for Restitution and Civil Judgment ("Restitution 
Order") stated the order was also a civil judgment against Workman. IDOC began deducting funds 
from Workman's inmate account on September 30, 2003, to be paid towards the Restitution Order. 
These deductions from Workman's inmate account have continued, with the most recent deduction 
being made on February 9, 2016. These funds have been paid to the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Procedural History 
Respondent IDOC does not dispute the procedural history set forth in Section LB. of the 
Brief for the Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), with the exception of the reply memorandums filed 
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by Respondent Rich on March 25, 2016, and Respondent IDOC on April 22, 2016, which were 
omitted from the Appellant's Brief. Appellant's Brief, p. 4. The Court ordered Workman's brief 
to be filed by August 10, 2016. Workman timely filed his brief and Respondent IDOC timely 
files this response. 1 
ISSUES 
Workman has asserted two issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the Magistrate Court err in concluding that it had jurisdiction over this matter? 
2. Did the Magistrate Court err by failing to conclude that the restitution order is expired, 
unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer still owing because it was not renewed within 
five (5) years of its entry? 
Appellant's Brief, p.7. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MAGISTRATE COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER 
A. Introduction 
Workman argues the magistrate court does not have jurisdiction over declaratory 
judgment actions and its jurisdiction is limited to civil actions where the amount of damages 
does not exceed $10,000. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. Workman fails to assert he is entitled to any 
relief based on this alleged error. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review applied when a decision of the magistrate division is appealed to 
the District Court, is set forth in Rule 83(±)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure: 
1 The certificate of service attached to Workman's brief states it was served on August 9, 2016. Respondent IDOC 
did not receive Workman's brief until August 17, 2016, and the court repository shows Workman's brief was filed 
with the court on August 18, 2016. Counsel for Respondent IDOC verified that Workman's brief was submitted to 
the paralegal at the prison for mailing on August 9, 2016. 
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Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, the district court must hear appeals from 
the magistrate court as an appellate proceeding and a transcript must be prepared as 
provided in Rule 83(g). The district court must review the case on the record and 
determine the appeal in the same manner and on the same standards of review as an 
appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and the law of this 
state, and the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
"Where a district court sits as an appellate court for the purpose of reviewing a 
magistrate's judgment, the district court is required to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact. If those findings are so supported, and if 
the conclusions of law demonstrate proper application of legal principles to the facts found, then 
the district court will affirm the magistrate's judgment. The judgment also will be upheld on 
further appeal." Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App.1988) 
citing Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct.App.1983). "The question of a court's 
jurisdiction is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Jones, 141 
Idaho 652, 654, 115 P.3d 743, 745 (2005) quoting State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 
1083, 1084 (2003). Determining the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law 
over which this Court exercises free review." Id., quoting Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 
17 P.3d 247,252 (2000). 
C. Magistrate Court did not Err by Presiding Over This Matter 
The authority of the courts within the state of Idaho is established in the Idaho 
Constitution, which provides, "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a court for the 
trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to the 
Supreme Court as established by the legislature." Idaho Const. art V, §2. Cases may be assigned 
to the magistrate court as provided in the "rules promulgated by the supreme court, the 
administrative judge in each judicial district, or any district judge in the district designated by 
him" or as provided in that statute. Idaho Code § 1-2208. The Idaho Court Administrate Rules 
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authorizes civil actions to be assigned to the magistrate court where the amount of damages does 
not exceed $10,000. I.C.A.R. 5(c)(l). This rule does not contain any language to limit the nature 
of the civil action. Id. Finally, the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for 
the Fourth Judicial District ("District Four Local Rules") provides the assignment of cases to the 
magistrate division will be pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho 
Criminal Rules. District Four Local Rules, Rule 13. 
Workman raised the issue of the magistrate court's authority in his response to 
Respondent IDOC's Motion to Dismiss. The magistrate court noted its jurisdiction in civil 
proceedings is limited to matters where the damages sought do not exceed $10,000. Order, p. 4. 
Workman did not indicate a specific amount of damages claimed and has not provided the 
amount of funds that have been garnished from his inmate account to pay towards the restitution 
order. Id., p. 5. In his Complaint, Workman merely stated "[d]amages are requested for funds 
deducted after April, 2008 up onto the present." Complaint, p. 5. Workman now argues that his 
Complaint clearly stated he was seeking "both the moneys already collected after the five (5) 
year expiration date and the total amount of the restitution order itself." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. 
Even if that is what the Complaint asserted, Workman has not provided any basis to support his 
argument that he is entitled to the entire amount of the restitution that was ordered, even if he has 
not paid the entire amount. An argument that Workman would be entitled to the full amount of 
restitution that he was ordered to pay to the victims to compensate his victims for his criminal 
actions is baseless. If Workman is entitled to recover any monies, such award would be limited 
to the amount of funds that were actually deducted from his inmate account as payment towards 
the Restitution Order. Workman has not provided any evidence to establish the amount in 
controversy exceeds $10,000. 
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Even if the assignment of this case to the magistrate division was in error, it is not 
reversible error nor does it somehow render the Order void. I.R.C.P. 1.3 specifically states "[n]o 
order or judgment is void or subject to collateral attack because it is rendered pursuant to an 
improper assignment to a magistrate." In Martin v. Spalding, the magistrate court dismissed an 
action after finding the request for compensatory damages exceeded the monetary limit for civil 
actions assignable to the magistrate court. Martin v. Spalding, 133 Idaho 469, 988 P.2d 695 
(Ct.App.1998). The Idaho Court of Appeals found that although the case should have been 
transferred to the district court rather than dismissed, "[t]his error will not call for reversal of the 
summary judgment, however, if the magistrate's decision can be sustained on alternative 
grounds." Id at 471, 988 P.2d at 697. The court noted "[t]he magistrate division is not an entity 
wholly separate from the district court." Id., quoting St. Benedict's Hosp., v. County of Twin 
Falls, 107 Idaho 143, 146, 686 P.2d 88, 91 (Ct.App.1984). Similarly the Idaho Supreme Court 
has "narrowly construed the ability to void a judgment [ ] on the basis of a defect in a court's 
subject matter jurisdiction." Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 346, 366 P.3d 275, 279 
(2014) citing Department of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 90 P.3d 321 (2004). 
When deciding the authority of a court to hear a particular matter, Idaho courts have looked to 
see if the court has authority to hear a class of cases. "[E]xcept for the rare case where power is 
plainly usurped, if a court has the general power to adjudicate the issues in the class of suits to 
which the case belongs its interim orders and final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not 
subject to collateral attack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned." fa., 
quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 118 Idaho 804, 807, 800 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1990) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 341, 344, 882 P.2d 996, 
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999 (Ct.App.1994) (finding the IRCP "prescribes a division of labor between the district judges 
and magistrates rather than a limitation upon lawyer magistrates' subject matter jurisdiction.") 
The assignment of this case to magistrate division of the district court was not in error 
and as explained below, the magistrate court's decision can be sustained on other grounds. 
II. 
THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FINDING THE RESTITUITION 
ORDER WAS STILL OWING 
A. Introduction 
Workman appeals the magistrate court's Order granting judgment in favor of 
Respondents and dismissing his Complaint. Workman argues the clerk of the court and the 
victim for whom restitution is ordered were both required to renew the Restitution Order entered 
against Workman after five (5) years. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. Workman argues the magistrate 
court ignored Idaho law and the judgment should be reversed. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review is set forth above in Section LB. 
C. The Magistrate Court Did Not Err in Its Interpretation and Application of the Statutes to 
the Issue 
In the Complaint, Workman argued that pursuant to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 
a judgment must be renewed within five (5) years to remain enforceable.2 Complaint, p. 4. 
Therefore, the Restitution Order entered against him in Ada County Case No. H0101303 expired 
on April 28, 2008, as it had not been renewed. Id. 
2 Idaho Code § 10-1110 was amended during the 2015 Legislative Session to specify a lien from an order of 
restitution continues for twenty (20) years. See 2015 Session Laws, ch. 139, § 1 and ch. 278, § 4. Idaho Code § 10-
1111 was amended during the 2016 Legislative Session to extend the time to continue a renewed judgment from five 
(5) years to ten (10) years. See 2016 Session Laws, ch. 269, § 1. These amendments do not impact this case. 
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In the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) 
submitted by Respondent Rich ("Rich Memorandum"), Respondent Rich argued Workman 
failed to distinguish between a criminal restitution order and a civil judgment. Rich 
Memorandum, p. 4. 3 It was also argued that just because the victim of a crime may file the 
restitution order as a civil judgment, does not mean "all restitution orders are civil judgments." 
Id., p. 6. 
In reaching its decision, the magistrate court reviewed Idaho Code §§ 19-5304(4), 19-
5305, 19-4708, 20-209H, and found restitution may be paid to the victim by court order pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 19-5304 or by a civil judgment pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1). Order p. 
15. The magistrate court found Workman's reliance on Idaho Code§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 was 
not "applicable to the situation here, which involves a court order of restitution being utilized as 
a basis for garnishing a portion of his prisoner account, not the execution of a civil judgment." 
Id., fn 20. 
The magistrate court's interpretation and application of the relevant statutes was not in 
error. The two avenues by which restitution may be collected identified by the magistrate court 
are not mutually exclusive. As explained by the magistrate court, simply because an order for 
restitution may also be recorded as a civil judgment, does not mean the court order becomes 
unenforceable and only the civil judgment may be pursued. Order, p. 16. Workman argues Idaho 
Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 are applicable because a court order of restitution in a criminal 
case is essentially a civil judgment. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. Workman admits the function Jr 
! 
collecting restitution is left to the victim or the clerk of the court. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. 
However, he fails to recognize the victim and the clerk of the court have different avenuJs 
! \ 
3 Defendant IDOC joined Defendant Rich's argument than an order of restitution does not expire. Memorandum in 




governed by separate and distinct processes set forth in statute in which collection efforts may be 
undertaken. As the magistrate court determined, the reliance on the court order of restitution by 
the clerk of the court and IDOC to collect restitution does not invoke Idaho Code§§ 10-1110 or 
10-1111. 
The legislature specifically established separate methods by which the clerk of the court 
and the victim may collect restitution that is owed. See State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 172, 345 
P.3d 226, 231 (Ct.App.2014) (the function of enforcing a restitution order is "specifically 
entrusted" to the victim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-5305(1) or the clerk of the court pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-5305(2).) Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) allows the victim to "execute as provided 
by law for civil judgments." Idaho Code§ 19-5305(2) provides the clerk of the court may collect 
restitution on behalf of the victim as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. The clerk of the court 
was not the victim in the underlying criminal case and therefore is not bound by Idaho Code § 
19-5305(1).4 Neither Idaho Code §§ 19-4708 nor 19-5305(2) requires the clerk of the court to 
take any steps to execute the Restitution Order as provided by law for civil judgments. Instead, 
any collection efforts by the clerk of the court are to be undertaken in the same manner or 
fashion as other "debts owed to courts" as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. See Idaho Code§ 
19-5305(2). The recently enacted Idaho Code§ 20-209H, which authorizes the IDOC to garnish 
20% of funds in an inmate's trust account to be paid to the clerk of the court for restitution, 
provides the clerk of the court with another avenue to collect restitution on behalf of the victim. 5 
This supports the magistrate court's conclusion that the execution processes for civil judgments 
are not applicable to the clerk of the court when collecting restitution pursuant to an order for 
4 Idaho Code § 19-5306(5)(a) defines "victim" as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial 
or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime or juvenile offense." 
5 Idaho Code§ 20-209H was added during the 2014 Legislative Session and was effective March I, 2015. See 2014 
Session Laws, ch. 150, § 6. 
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restitution. Idaho Code § 20-209H only requires that the restitution is ordered pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 19-5304 and, like Idaho Code § 19-4708 that debt must still be owing. It is undisputed 
that Workman has not satisfied his obligation to pay the restitution in full and there is no 
requirement in either statute that IDOC or the clerk of the court renews the judgment. These 
statutes also do not impose any time restrictions on the clerk of the court or the IDOC to fulfill 
the statutory obligations imposed therein. See State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 172, 345 P.3d 
226, 231 (Ct.App.2014) (holding the clerk of the district court is authorized to determine how 
and when a restitution order is collected.) Further, to allow the clerk of the court to collect 
restitution on behalf of the victim in the same manner as other debts owed to the court supports 
the long-standing policy of "favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic 
loss" and to "obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a separate civil 
action in order to gain compensation for their losses." State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 397, 271 
P.3d 1243, 1543 (Ct.App.2012) (citations omitted). 
The statutory language of Idaho Code§§ 19-5304(4), 19-5305, 19-4708, and 20-209H is 
not ambiguous and Workman has not provided any legal basis to conclude the magistrate court 
improperly interpreted or applied these statutes to the issue before it. Workman does not provide 
any argument that the magistrate court's interpretation of the the statutes based upon the plain, 
usual and ordinary meaning of the words used produced a "palpably absurd" result. Poison 
Creek Publishing, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426,429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 
(2000). The statutes governing the collection efforts by the clerk of the court pursuant to a court 
order of restitution unambiguously do not require the clerk of the court or the IDOC to utilize the 






The magistrate court did not commit err by presiding over this manner, and if any error is 
found, it does not constitute reversible error as the magistrate court correctly concluded the 
collection efforts by the Respondents pursuant to the Restitution Order are not governed by the 
execution processes as provided by law for civil judgments, including the requirement to renew the 
judgment under Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111. Accordingly, Respondent IDOC 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the magistrate court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Under well-settled and clearly established Idaho law, once a creditor is 
awarded a money judgment, they then bear the responsibility and burden to timely 
renew the judgment in order to continue collection efforts. If they fail to 
timely renew, the underlying judgment itself expires and thereafter becomes 
unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer owing. This is the law in Idaho. 
In this case, over eight (8) years ago the creditors who were legally 
authorized to collect on the. debt (i.e., the clerk of the district court and the 
victim) both failed to timely renew the underlying Restitution Order and Civil 
Judgment~· Despite this failure, Respondents now make the argument that, even 
through the restitution judgment itself expired years ago, that Respondent Rich 
should still be able to collect on the judgment "on behalf of the victim" 
because the clerk and the victim collect use· "differing methods" and because, 
years after the money judgment itself expired, a new law was passed (i.e., I.C. 
·· § 20-209H) that allows restitution orders to be deducted by Respondent IDOC from 
inmates' prison accounts. These arguments completely miss the point that in 
order to, legally collect "on behalf of the victim" under any collection method, 
the underlying judgment itself must not be expired. Further, the Magistrate 
Court below did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter below. 
1 Because Respondent:Rich's and IDOC's arguments in their respective briefs 
. on appeal are substantially the same, Workman replies to both in this single 
Reply Brief of Appellant. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Magistrate Court erred by failing to conclude that the restitution 
order is expired, unenforceable, rmcollectable and no': longer still 
owing because it was not renewed within five (5) years of its entry. 
OUr Idaho supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have already held that, 
once a money judgment is entered, the burden to keep the judgment enforceable 
through a timely motion to renew lies squarely on the creditor and that 
restitution orders are essentially civil judgments; thus, the same rule applies 
to them as well. 
Where restitution orders are at issue, Idaho law states that either the 
victim or the clerk of the court (acting "on behalf of the victim") qualify as 
the !'creditor;" either of whom may timely move for renewal of judgment (or not, 
at their choosing), but both of whom are responsible for and bear the burden of 
doing so if they want the restitution order to remain enforceable for over five 
(5) years. Indeed, not only have Idaho's appellate courts repeatedly held that 
this is the law of Idaho, but Idaho's legislature has also explicitly recognized 
that this is the law of Idaho when it recently amended the law so that a twenty 
( 20) year renewal rule now applies to restitution orders ·ente.red on or after 
July 1, 2015. 
Notwithstanding this, Respondents try to confuse and deflect the question 
entirely. Respondent Rich argues that I.e.§§ 19-5305(1) and 19-5305(2) create 
two separate collection processes and that I.C. ~ 10-1110 and 10-1111 would 
only apply to collections under§ 19-5305(1). See Brief of Respondent Rich at 
4. Likewise, Respondent IDOC argues that "[t]he legislature specifically 
established separate methods by which the clerk of the court and the victim may 
collect restitution that is owed." See Brief of Respondent IDOC at 8. However, 
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these arguments thernsel ves are contrary to prior holdin9:> ,of the Idaho Supreme 
Court. , 
"Idaho Code§§ 19-5302, 19-5304, and 19-5305 provide that'the court in a 
criminal case can enter what is, in essence, a civil judgment for restitution 
against the defendant." State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 P.3d 291, 293, 
2004 Ida. LEXIS 34, *6 (Idaho 2004). While Respondents have sought to emphasize 
that the clerk's collection methods lie under I.C. § 19-5305(2) rather than 
§ 19-5305(1), the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that "an order of restitution 
provided in Idaho Code§ 19-5304(2) becomes, in essence, a civil judgment for 
the amount of such restitution." McCool, 139 Idaho at 806, 87 P.3d at 293. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that "[t]his Court has previously 
held that an order for restitution is separate and apart from a criminal 
sentence." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886, 292 P.3d 273, 277, 2013 Ida'r 
LEXIS 4, *7 (Idaho 2013); citing State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 
95 (2012); State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004) (An 
"order for restitution provided in Idaho Code & 19-5304(2) becomes, in essence, 
a civil ·judgment for the amount of such restitution." 
Respondents' arguments miss the point~ The question is not whether 
different methods of collection exist but whether the restitution order itself 
is expired and therefore no longer subject to any collection methods by either 
the clerk of the court or the victim. Respondent Rich seems to forget that the 
clerk is only able to collect "on behalf of the Nictim." See I.C. § 19-5305(2). 
Thus, the clerk's legal ability to collect on the restitution order is inherently 
connected to the victim's legal ability to do so. It is undisputed that neither 
the clerk of the court nor the victim timely moved to renew the Restitution Order 
' 
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and Civil Judgment within five (5) years of its entry. Thus, the Restitution 
Order and Civil Judgment expired on April 28, 2008 and,,due to this expiratiov, 
neither the victim no-:S the clerk acting "on behalf of the victim" are legally 
authorized to collect on the expired judgment no matter what collection method 
is utilized. 
Respondent IDOC argues that "[t]he recently enacted Idaho Code§ 20-209H, 
which authorizes IDOC to garnish 20% of funds in an inmate's trust account to be 
paid to the clerk of the court for restitution, provides the clerk of the court 
with another avenue,to collect restitution on behalf of the victim." Brief of 
Respondent IDOC at 8. 
Respondents are essentially arguing that Idaho Code Section 20-209H, a law 
that went into effect years after Workman's restitution order expired, gives IDOC 
and Clerk Rich the present authority to resurrect and collect on the expired 
restitution order. Respondents' argument attempts to avoid the fact that I.C. 
§ 20-209H only applies to restitution orders "still owing" and Workman's expired 
restitution order, by definition, is no longer "still owing." 
* * * 
Idaho law sets forth that money judgments, including restitution order~ 
that are in essence a civil judgment for the amount of restitution, must be l:i, ,,1 
timely renewed. 
Idaho Code Section 10-1111:(11,) :states that "[u]nless the judgment has been 
satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of the lien created by Section 
10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court which entered the judgment, 
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other than a judgment for child support, may, upon motion, renew such judgment. 2 
The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same manner as the original judgment, 
and the lien established thereby shall continue for five (5) years from the date 
of the judgment." Id. (emphasis added). 
"By its own terms, § 10-1111 provides for the renewal of judgments, not j:ust 
judgment liens." Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
"In short, in civil judgment - whether or not a lien is actually recorded -
will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court." 
Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237, 239, 268 P.3d 1189"(Ct. App. 2012) (citing Smith 
v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669 (section 10-1111 provides for renewal 
of-judgments, not just judgment liens)). 
, 
"We view I.C. § 10-1111 ·to be in the nature of a statute of limitation; 
it sets the time limit for a judgment creditor to take action to renew the 
judgment." Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d 667. "Under Idaho's 
renewal statute, for non-child support judgments, the motion to renew must be 
made within five years of the date of the judgment[.]" Grazer v. Jones, 154 
Idaho 58, 65, 294 P.3d 184 (2013), citing I.e.§ 10-1111(1). 
Thus, under well-settled Idaho law, the burden of timely renewal of a money 
judgment lies upon the creditor. In the case of a restitution order (as in this 
case), that burden lies upon the clerk of the district court (acting "on behalf 
2 Except where specifically identified otherwise herein, references to I.e. 
§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 and·their subsections refer to those versions of these 
statutes that were in effect before the 2015 amendments to them. 
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of the victim") and the victim owed the restitution. See I.C. §§ 19-5305(1) and 
19-5305(2). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently emphasized that the burden to timely renew 
a Itioney judgment lies squarely upon the creditor. In Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 
58, 294 P.3d 184, creditor Grazer had engaged in other, prolonged and extensive 
litigation against the debtor, but "had never attempted to renew the judgment[.]" 
' 
Id., at 62. The Grazer Court held that "[t]he judgment lien expired five years 
after entry of judgment, and none of Grazer's excuses for allowing his lien to 
expire are persuasive, primarily because he never attempted to renew the lien or 
obtain a new lien." Id., at 64. 
"Under Idaho's renewal statute, for non-child support j udgrnents, the motion 
to renew must be made within five years from the date" of the judgment. Id., at 
65. "It is undisputed that Grazer has never attempted to renew his lien. 
Nevertheless, Grazer asks this Court·to disregard the fact that his lien has 
expired. We shall not do so." Id., at 68 ( emphasis added). 
Idaho's legislature also recently acknowledged that this is the law in 
Idaho in the First Regular Legislative Session of the 2015 Legislature. In this 
session, the legislature introduced and passed into law 2015 House Bill No. 62, 
specifically amending Idaho Code Sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 to extend, as to 
restitution orders in particular, the former five (5) year renewal period to a 
new twenty (20) year renewal period, beginning with all restitution orders entered 
on or after July 1, 2015. 
Indeed, the legislature specifically acknowledged in its Statement of Purpose 
No. SB23375 that "the lien arising from a judgment must be renewed every five 
years, or that the judgment must be executed upon within five years, unless the 
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court grants a motion to extend that time" and stated its intent to lengthen that 
time by "extending the five year limitation to twenty years[.]" See Statement 
of Purpose No. SB23375, attached as Addendum A to the Brief of Appellant. The 
legislature did not "perfonn[] an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision" 
when it amended the renewal period from five (5) years to twenty (20) years for 
restitution orders in 2015. Roberts v. Board of Trustees, Pocatello School 
District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000). It amended the·, 
law because it intended to extend the five-year, rule that then applied to~,·-·; 
restitution orders to a new twenty-year rule. 
Thus, under the Idaho law applicable to Workman's restitution order, the 
clerk of the court or the victim were required to renew the restitution order 
within five (5) years of its entry on April 28, 2003, that is, before April 28, 
2008. They both failed to do so. 
Workman's restitution order itself expired after five (5) years on April 28, 
2008, not just the ability to secure a lien or to conduct execution of a civil 
judgment against Workman. Since the restitution order itself expired, the 
restitution itself is no longer "still ~ing;" a prerequisite for legal 
garnishments from the inmate account under I.C. § 20-209H. 
Idaho's legislature, which makes the law, and Idaho's appellate courts 
which interpret ~e l<:lw, have both detennined that the failure to timely move.for 
renewal of judgment makes Workman's restitution order expired, unenforceable, 
uncollectable and no longer owing as of April 28, 2008. The magistrate court 
ignored this critical fact. But this Court must follow the law, must follow the 
direction of the Idaho Supreme Court, and shall not do so." Grazer, 154 Idaho 
at 68. 
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The magistrate court should be reversed and Mr. Workman should receive the 
relief that Idaho's law provides: the legal declaration that his un-renewed 
restitution order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no longer still 
owing. Pursuant to the authority granted the Court under I.R.c.P: 56(c) that, 
on any party's motion for summary judgment, that "[s]uch judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the action;" the Court 
should enter surnmary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Workman and against · · ·., 
Respondents in this matter. 
B. 'fue Magistrate Court erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over 
this matter. 
Plaintiff's Complaint specifically invoked the jurisdiction of the district 
court, not the magistrate court, pursuant to I.C. § 1-705. Id., at 2, § c. 
Jurisdiction. The 'jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division is set forth and 
limited by I.C. §§ 1-2201 et seq.; Rule 1.2 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 13 of the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division of the 
Fourth Judicial District; and Rule 5(c)(1) of the Idaho Court Administrative 
Rul~s. 3 
The Magistrate Division's jurisdiction is specifically limited to civil 
actions "where the amount of damages or value of the property claimed does not 
exceed $10,000." See Rule 5(c)(1), I.C.A.R.; see also I.e.§ 1-2208(1)(a) 
·. ' 
3 '· 
Fonner Rule 82 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing magistrates 
was completely recodified and placed in "reserved" status effective July 1, 2016. 
Thus, the underlying record on appeal refers to Rule 82 on this issue, but 
Workman's appeal briefing will refer to the current rules. 
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(limiting magistrate jurisdiction to matters where the value "does not exceed 
five thousand dollars ($5,000)."). 
In the magistrate court's Memorandum Decision and Order, it noted "that it 
has jurisdiction in all civil proceedings where the amount of money or damages 
claimed does not exceed $10,000." Id., at 4, citing I.C. § 1-2208; Rule 13 of 
the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division of the Fourth 
Judicial District. In a footnote, the magistrate court said that "[t]he plaintiff 
contends "the restitution order at issue in this civil case is $32,391.44 plus 
applicable interest," ••• [h]owever, the plaintiff has not asserted that 
$32,391.44 has been garnished from his prisoner account, nor has he asserted, in 
his complaint, that more than $10,000 has been garnished." Id., at 5, n.6. The 
magistrate court then concluded that "[t]here is no indication that the amount of 
money or damages claimed here exceeds that amount." Id., at 5. 
This is error. The magistrate court has· incorrectly equated the amount of 
. money that has been collected to date on a total amount of money or damages 
claimed as the basis to grant itself jurisdiction in a matter that exceeds the 
scope of the jurisdiction of the magistrate division. 
But Workman's Complaint is clear that the amount of money or damages claimed 
in this case is not merely the amount that has been collected tbJ date. Rather, 
Workman's Complaint sets forth that "[t]he order for restitution and civil 
judgment in the amount of $32,391.44 was ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 in 
· plaintiffs case No. H0101303 on April 28, 2003 over 13 years ago." Id., at 4. 
Workman's Complaint further alleges that "[u]nder I.C. § 10-1110 and 10-1111, a 
money judgment must be renewed within five (5) years of the judgment to remain 
enforceable[;]" that "[t]he record shows conclusively.that there has been no 
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motion to renew filed in this case[;]" and that [t]he failure to timely file a 
motion to renew judgment makes the debt uncollectable, expired and unforceable." 
Id. 
Plainly, Workman's Complaint has alleged that "the amount of money or damages 
claimed" includes both the moneys already collected after the five ( 5 )1 f year 
expiration date and the total amount of ,the restitution order itself. 
The total amount of the restitution order - $32,391.44 plus applicable 
interest (minus the amount paid before the restitution order expired on April 28, 
2008 and application of the correct statute of limitation) - exceeds the $10,000 
' 
jurisdictional limit of the magistrate court. The magistrate court below erred 
in concluding that it had jurisdiction over this matter. 
C. Respondent Rich is not entitled to attorney fees. 
Respondent Clerk Christopher Rich also seeks attorney fees on appeal. See 
Brief of Respondent Christopher Rich at 6. This should also be denied. 
Respondent Rich has not pointed to any Idaho Supreme Court decision that he 
asserts the position.taken by Plaintiff~Appellant Workman conflicts with. To 
the contrary, the position(s) asserted by Respondent Rich (and IDOC) conflicts 
with a number of Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals decisions, which 
have been cited by Workman herein. Respondent Rich is not entitled to prevail in 
this appeal and Workman's claim and his appeal are not frivolous. 
Indeed, the magistrate court below specifically found that it was not 
"otherwise apparent, that this action was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. In other words, the action was not 
plainly falacious." Memorandum Decision and Order at 17. Therefore, Respondent 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 12 
000310
Rich is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
D. Workman is entitled to his costs. 
As set forth above, the magistrate court should be reversed and Mr. Workman 
should receive the relief that the law provides: the legal declaration that his 
un-renewed restitution order is expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no 
longer still owing. Workman should prevail in this appeal and thus, should also 
be awarded his costs pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P.; Rule 40, I.A.R.; and all 
other la~s and rules authorizing the award of such costs. 
III. CDNCLUSION 
As set forth above, the.magistrate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain 
this matter. Workman has stated a cognizable claim against Defendants up:,n:, 
which relief may be granted,and, based up:,n the undisputed facts, he is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. This Court should rule that Workman's . 
restitution order expired on April 28, 2008,?and enter surrmary judgment in favor 
of Workman and against the Defendants in this case. 
Since the applicable and correct statute of limitations was not determined L 
in the magistrate court below, further proceedings should be scheduled in the 
district court to determine the correct statute of limitations and the amount 
that Mr. Workman is entitled to recover for Resp:,ndents' illegal garnishments 
from his Inmate Trust Account. 
The magistrate court erred in granting dismissal and surrmary j udgrnent in 
favor of the Defendants and should be reversed. Workman should be awarded his 
costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P.,and Rule 40, I.A.R •• 
II 
II 
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Respectfully submitted this 9 cr+I> day of September, 2016. 
~!;~~ 
Appellant, prose 
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FILED By: ,A Deputy Clerk . 
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, Ada County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the Fourth 
District Court, IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS 
Defendants-Respondents, 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUAL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
OPINION ON APPEAL 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: PRO SE1 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: KAREN MAGNELLI 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Kenneth M. Workman appeals the decision of a magistrate granting the 
defendants' motion to dismiss/summary judgment.2 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 30, 2015, the appellant, a state prisoner, submitted a "Prisoner[']s 
Civil Complaint," wherein he essentially asserted the defendants improperly garnished 
1In Idaho, "[p]ro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an 
attorney." Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 393, 797 P.2d 95, 101 (1990). See a/so State v. Sima, 98 
Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977) ("A litigant appearing prose is held to the same standards 
and rules appearing with counsel."). 
2The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See I.R.C.P. 83(p) ("Appellate Argument." Appellate 
argument may be heard by the district court after notice to the parties in the same manner as notice of 
hearing of a motion before a trial court under these rules.") (emphasis added). 
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money from his inmate account in order to pay court-ordered restitution. The appellant 
asserted this garnishment was improper because the court order of restitution had 
expired and was no longer valid. 
Christopher Rich and the other named defendant, Idaho Department of 
Corrections (hereinafter "IDOC"), each filed motions to dismiss. The IDOC's motion was 
supported by a memorandum, affidavit and additional materials. The appellant filed 
responses to these motions. 
On May 18, 2016, the magistrate filed a memorandum decision and order 
granting the defendants' motions to dismiss/summary judgment. On May 25, 2016, a 
corresponding judgment was filed. 
The appellant filed a notice of appeal to the district court. 3 
3The underlying facts of the appellant's criminal case were recounted in Judge Winmill's September 22, 
2011 Memorandum Decision and Order in a case the appellant brought in federal court: 
In 2001, Plaintiff was the driver of a vehicle on Interstate 84 that crashed into two pickups 
that were legally parked, one in front of the other, on the shoulder of the highway. Diane 
King and Anthony Barton were standing between the pickups when they were struck, and 
both were seriously injured. Plaintiff had high levels of heroin, amphetamine, and 
methadone in his blood at the time of the crash, and the State charged him with two 
counts of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, and a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator of the 
law. 
Plaintiff eventually agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated DUI counts and to the 
persistent violator charge, in exchange for the State's dismissal of the possession count 
and its agreement to recommend a sentence of life in prison with 25 years fixed. Ada 
County District Judge Deborah Bail did not follow the recommendation and instead 
sentenced Plaintiff to life in prison without the possibility of parole on each count. 
Under the plea agreement, the State was also allowed to seek restitution, and the 
prosecutor [sought restitution] in the amount of $700,000. Plaintiff was represented by 
counsel at a restitution hearing, after which Judge Bail ordered him to pay $32,391.44 in 
restitution, with interest accruing annually. Judge Bail's order also serves as a civil 
judgment against Plaintiff. Memorandum Decision and Order, at 1-2. 
This is also consistent with the magistrate's notation that it "appears to have been Judge Bail's intent in 
fashioning the order as she did and in captioning it [her restitution order] as an 'order for restitution and 
civil judgment."' Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary 
Judgment, at 15 n. 21. 
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Ill. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The appellant asserts the following issues in this appeal: (1) the magistrate court 
erred in concluding it had jurisdiction over this matter; and, (2) the magistrate court 
erred by failing to conclude that the restitution order has expired, is unenforceable, 
uncollectible and no longer still owing because it was not renewed within five (5) years 
of its entry. Brief of Appellant, at 7. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving 
a trial de nova), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. 
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of 
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 
134 Idaho 458,462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Assignment to Magistrate 
The appellant's first contention is the magistrate court erred in concluding it had 
jurisdiction over this matter. The appellant asserts that the magistrate should not have 
presided over this action since he sought declaratory relief and the court-ordered 
restitution is more than $10,000. 
The issue of the propriety and sufficiency of an assignment of a case to a 
magistrate is not a question of jurisdiction. Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 341, 344, 882 
P.2d 996, 999 (Ct. App. 1994); "[l]rregularities in a magistrate's assignment to a 
particular case or in the scope of the assignment are procedural errors which may be 
waived, not jurisdictional deficiencies which can be asserted for the first time on appeal 
or in a collateral attack on the judgment[;]" also noting that filing a motion to disqualify a 
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magistrate pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d) "was inadequate to raise the question of the 
magistrate's authority to preside" over the action. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 82(c)(3), now I.R.C.P. 1.3, "Objection to 
assignment to magistrates," provided: 
Any irregularity in the method or scope of assignment of a civil action or 
proceeding to any magistrate under this rule 82, and sections 1-2208 and 
1-2210, Idaho Code, and all objections to the propriety of an assignment 
to a magistrate are waived unless a written objection is filed before the 
trial or hearing begins. No order or judgment is void or subject to collateral 
attack merely because rendered pursuant to an improper assignment to a 
magistrate. 
While the appellant filed a motion to disqualify the magistrate without cause 
"pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1),"4 he did not file a written objection to the magistrate's 
assignment, timely or otherwise, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 82(c)(3). Consequently, any 
irregularity in the method or scope of assignment to the magistrate was waived. In 
addition, no order or judgment is void merely because rendered pursuant to an improper 
assignment to a magistrate. See Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct. 
App. 1987), finding no timely objection to assignment asserted prior to summary 
dismissal of post-conviction petition. See also State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 652, 115 P.3d 
743 (2005). The appellant raised the issue of the magistrate's "jurisdiction" in this action 
in his response to the defendants' motions to dismiss/summary judgment (see Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant IDOC's Motion to Dismiss, at 4-5) but not in a written objection 
or motion filed pursuant to then I.R.C.P. 82(c)(3). 
Even had the appellant filed a timely written objection to the magistrate's 
assignment to the case, his assertion that the assignment was improper is without merit. 
4See February 5, 2016 Motion to Disqualify Judge Without Cause. See also March 1, 2016 Motion to 
Reconsider. 
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The appellant contends that the magistrate lacked "jurisdiction" in this case 
because, he asserts, this is a declaratory judgment action and magistrates possess no 
"jurisdiction" in declaratory judgment actions. See Brief of Appellant, at 11. The 
appellant has cited no Idaho appellate case holding that a magistrate has no jurisdiction 
or authority in an action where declaratory relief is requested. There are several 
published appellate cases where magistrates presided over cases where declaratory 
relief was requested. For example, in Loftus v. Snake River School District, 130 Idaho 
426, 427-28, 942 P.2d 550, 551-52 (1997), "Loftus filed a complaint against the District 
requesting the magistrate division of the district court award Loftus three times the 
amount of Loftus's unpaid wages and enter declaratory judgment that the Board did not 
have the power to suspend Loftus without pay pursuant to I.C. §§ 45-609(1) and 33-
513." See a/so Benewah County Cattlemen's Association v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209,211,668 P.2d 85, 87 (1983); "This 
is an appeal from a judgment in an action brought in the nature of a declaratory 
judgment seeking to have declared invalid a county ordinance which prohibited livestock 
from running at large, from grazing on property other than that of the owner, and 
requiring the erection and maintenance of fences by owners of livestock. The magistrate 
court found the ordinance to be valid, which holding was affirmed on appeal to the 
district court. Likewise, we affirm." 
The only limitation imposed by the statute ("Declaratory Judgments Authorized") 
upon courts hearing declaratory judgment actions is that they be brought before courts 
of record." I.C. § 10-1201. Magistrate division courts are courts of record. See State v. 
Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 290, 668 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct. App. 1983): "With the advent of 
the magistrate division system ... those courts became courts of record." 
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The appellant also alleges that his complaint is clear that the amount of money or 
damages claimed in this case is not merely the amount that has been collected to date. 
Brief of Appellant, at 12. In his complaint he asserted "[a]s a matter of law, defendants 
order for restitution became unenforceable as of April 2008. All funds deducted must be 
returned after this date and all future attempts to deduct funds must cease and desist." 
Prisoner Civil Complaint, at 3. 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 5(c)(1), formerly I.R.C.P. 83(c)(2)(A), provides 
magistrates may be assigned "[c]ivil actions regardless of the nature of the action, 
where the amount of damages or value of property claimed does not exceed $10,000." 
The gravamen of the appellant's complaint was that IDOC had improperly garnished his 
inmate account. Nowhere in his complaint, as noted by the magistrate, did the appellant 
assert that more than $10,000 had been garnished from his inmate account. 
The appellant's assertion that the amount of damages at issue is the total 
amount of the court-ordered restitution of $32,391.44 is without merit. He had not paid 
that amount at the time of the filing of his complaint, and his effort to keep from having 
to pay any more restitution, or have it garnished in the future, was the basis for his 
request for declaratory relief. 
B. Restitution Order 
The appellant next asserts the magistrate erred by failing to conclude that the 
restitution order expired, is unenforceable, uncollectible and no longer owing because it 
was not renewed within five years of its entry. Brief of Appellant, at 14. 
In his complaint the appellant stated he is a state prisoner who owed restitution 
from an order handed down by the Fourth District Court in April of 2003. In February of 
2014, the Idaho Legislators enacted a new law, I.C. § 20-209H, to provide for the IDOC 
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to mandate the withdrawal of Inmates' owed restitution. The law went into effect on 
March 1, 2015 and has now become a statewide practice by the IDOC. Prisoner Civil 
Complaint, at 3. The appellant contends this statute is not applicable to him on the basis 
that his court order for restitution became unenforceable as of April 2008, relying on I.C. 
§ 10-1110 and I. C. § 10-1111 to the effect that to keep the restitution order or judgment 
an active, collectable order, the parties must file a timely motion to renew judgment 
within five (5) years from the date of the entry and thereafter every five (5) years. 
Further, the court must grant the motion to renew to make it valid. The appellant asserts 
the record in this case shows that no motion to renew judgment has been filed in the 13 
years this case has lingered. Consequently he argues, the order for restitution became 
unenforceable as of April 2008, and all funds deducted must be returned after this date 
and all future attempts to deduct funds must cease and desist. Id. 
The magistrate determined that the appellant's contention that he could no longer 
be required to pay restitution was without merit, concluding "the legislature provided two 
different avenues for crime victims to receive restitution from the perpetrators of the 
crime: (1) by a court order of restitution (pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304), and (2) by a civil 
judgment (pursuant to I.C. § 19-5305(1)) that can be executed on or result in a lien 
being placed on the perpetrator's real property." Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, at 15. 
In support of its motion, Idaho Department of Correction provided a copy of the 
district court's (Judge Bail's) April 28, 2003 "order for restitution and civil judgment." 
IDOC's Exhibit A. 
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That order set forth: 
[W]hereas, on the 5th day of August, 2002, a Judgment of Conviction was 
entered against Kenneth M. Workman; and therefore pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 19-5304 and based on evidence presented to this Court, it is 
hereby ordered, that the defendant, Kenneth M. Workman, shall make 
restitution to the victim(s) in the following amounts of: Diane King . . . 
$12,516.99 ... Anthony Barton ... $19,874.45 ... total: $32,391.44 ... 
Interest on said restitution shall be computed at 7.29% per annum. 
Further, this Order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the defendant, 
Kenneth M. Workman. Order for Restitution and Civil Judgment 
(Workman), at 1-2. 
Idaho Code§ 19-5304(4) provides where "a separate written order of restitution 
is issued, an order of restitution shall be for an amount certain and shall be due and 
owing at the time of sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is determined, 
whichever is later. An order of restitution may provide for interest from the date of the 
economic loss or injury." 
The Court notes, as did the magistrate, the restitution statute is silent concerning 
the expiration of an order of restitution, rather, stating it "shall be due and owing at the 
time of sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is determined, whichever is 
later." 
Idaho Code§ 19-5305 ("Collection of Judgments.") states: 
(1) After forty-two (42) days from the entry of the order of restitution or at 
the conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of restitution, 
whichever occurs later, an order of restitution may be recorded as a 
judgment and the victim may execute as provided by law for civil 
judgments.5 
(2) The clerk of the district court may take action to collect on the order of 
restitution on behalf of the victim and, with the approval of the 
administrative district judge, may use the procedures set forth in 
section 19-4708,6 Idaho Code, for the collection of the restitution. 
5The Court agrees with the magistrate that this language would not be necessary if all orders of restitution 
were civil judgments. 
6"Collection of Debts Owed to Courts - Contracts for Collection." 
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Idaho Code § 19-4708 ("Collection of Debts Owed to Courts - Contracts for 
Collection") specifies its purpose is to provide for collection of debts owed courts and it 
also specifies "debts owed to courts" includes "restitution." I.C. § 19-4708(2)(c). 
The appellant contends "the magistrate court's statement that I.C. § 19-5304(4) 
'says nothing about the expiration of the order of restitution' is error because it is 
I.C. §§ 10-1110 and 10-111 that speak of the expiration of civil orders and money 
judgments .... " Brief of Appellant, at 22. The appellant cites Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 
800, 964 P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998); Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237,268 P.3d 1189 (Ct. 
App. 2012); and Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013), in support of his 
contention. However, none of these cases involve restitution or restitution orders. 
The appellant asserts State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,292 P.3d 273 (2013); State 
v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012); and State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 87 
P.3d 291 (2004) "have established that restitution orders are essentially civil judgments 
.... " Brief of Appellant, at 22. While these cases do involve restitution and one notes a 
restitution order can become "in essence, a civil judgment for the amount of such 
restitution," where "recorded as a judgment," (McCool, 139 Idaho at 806, 87 P.3d at 
293), none of these cases hold that all restitution orders are civil judgments and none of 
them hold that all restitution orders are civil judgments that must be renewed or they 
become uncollectible or unenforceable. 
The appellant also asserts I.C. §§ 10-1110 ("Filing Transcripts of Judgments -
Lien Acquired") and 10-1111 ("Renewal of Judgment - Lien") are applicable "because 
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garnishments from inmate accounts made under I.C. § 20-209H7 can only be made for 
restitution that 'is still owing."' Brief of Appellant, at 22. This is an effort by the appellant 
to restate his previous argument that all restitution orders are only civil judgments, an 
argument the magistrate rejected. This Court agrees with the magistrate that neither 
I.C. §§ 10-1110 nor 10-1111 are applicable. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, at 15 n.20. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant Rich seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal, "[p]ursuant to 
I.C. §§ 12-117 or 12-121." Brief of Respondent Christopher Rich, at 6. 
'"An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 is not a matter of right to 
the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with 
the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation."' Shea v. Kevic Corporation, 156 Idaho 540, 552, 
328 P.3d 520, 532 (2014). 
"[A] suit is not frivolous or groundless merely because the [party] loses ... we 
have held that attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 only if the position 
advocated by the nonprevailing is plainly fallacious and, therefore, not fairly debatable." 
71.C. § 20-209H ("Duty to Establish Inmate Accounts - Payment of Restitution.") states: 
The state board of correction shall establish an account in the name of each inmate 
confined in a correctional facility. All moneys in the inmate's possession upon admission, 
all moneys earned from institutional employment and all moneys received by the inmate 
from any other source, other than money that is contraband, shall be deposited in the 
inmate's account. If the court ordered an inmate to make restitution under section 
19-5304, Idaho Code, and the restitution is still owing, then twenty percent (20%) of each 
deposit in the inmate's account shall be paid to the state board of correction who shall, 
within five (5) days after the end of the month, pay such moneys to the clerk of the court 
in which the restitution order was entered for payment to the victim. The provisions of this 
section shall apply to any inmate confined in a correctional facility on or after the effective 
date of this section. 
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Associate Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
The Court declines to award attorney fees to defendant Rich, pursuant to 
I.C § 12-121, as it is not left with the abiding belief that this action was frivolously 
brought. 
The Court also declines to award attorney fees pursuant to I. C § 12-117. An 
award of attorney fees pursuant to that statute "requires a losing party to have acted 
frivolously or without foundation before fees may be awarded." City of Osburn v. 
Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 910, 277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012). 
While the Court agrees with the magistrate's decision, it is not convinced that this 
appeal was frivolous or without foundation, particularly since there is no published Idaho 
appellate case directly on point which has been identified. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's decision to grant the defendants' motions to dismiss/summary 
judgment is hereby affirmed. 
I?
,,,-
Dated this __,_ _ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed or emailed, one copy of the OPINION ON APPEAL as notice pursuant to the 




PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
VIA EMAIL: Karin.magnelli@labor.id.gov 
HON. DAVID MANWEILER 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Date: --------
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UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS OF ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Defendant. 
) 
) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
tc.l'ICE OF APPEAL 
'ID: THE ABOVF.:-NAMF.D RESPONDENTS, CHRISTOPHER 'RICH, Clerk of the Fourth District 
Court and the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CDRRECI'ION, AND THE PARTY'S ATIO'RNEYS, THE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIDimEY AND THE IDAHO ATID'RNEY GF.NERAL, AND THI!: CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
tc.l'ICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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1. The above-named Appellant, KENNP.l'H M. \'OR'KMAN, appeals against the 
above-named respondents to the Idaho SUprerne Court from the final OPINION ON 
APPEAL entered in· the" above::enti tled action on the 16th day of November, 2016, 
by Honorable Senior District Judge Gerald F. Schroeder. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho SUpreme Court, and 
the judgment or orders described in Paragraph 1 are appealable orders tmder 
and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant . 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on 
appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
That the District Court erred by failing to oonclude that the restitution 
order is expired, and is lmenforceable, uncollectable and no longer still 
owing because it was not renewed within five years of its entry. 
4. A 'Reporter's Transcript is not requested because, to appellant's 
knowledge, there were no proceedings in either the Magistrate Court or the 
District Court below that 'lol19re recorded, reported or transcribed. 1 ~ · · ·-:__: 
5. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the 
Clerk's Record in addition to those autoIIatically included tmder Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules: 
All documents lodged or filed in the Magistrate Court and/or the District 
Court in this case. 
6. I certify: 
( a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on the 
Court 'Reporter because no transcript is being requested and no 
proceedings were recorded, reported or transcribed. 
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(b) ( 1) That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative 
agency has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the Reporter's Transcript. 
(2) ..1L That the appellant is exempt fran paying the estimated 
(c)(1) 
(2) 
( d) ( 1 ) 
(2) 
transcript fee because he is unable to pay it due to his 
indigency and because no transcript is required in this 
appeal. 
__ That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's 
Record or agency's record has been paid • 
..1L That the appellant is exempt fran paying the estimated 
fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record because of 
his indigency and inability to pay it in full at this time. 
Appellant is filing a Motion to Proceed on Partial Payment 
of Court Fees (Prisoner), contemporaneously herewith. 
_ That the appellate filing has been paid. 
_ That the appellant is exempt fran paying the appellate 
filing fee because of his indigency and inability to pay 
it in full at this time. Appellant is filing a Motion to 
Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees (Prisoner) , 
contemporaneously herewith. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to 
be served pursuant to 'Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 
67-1401(1), Idaho Code. 
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' . ~ 
Idaho's Prisoner Mailbox Rule is hereby invoked. 
DATED this 'f"#I. day of December, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
eth M. Workman 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
KENNEI'H M. WOR'KMAN, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all 
statements made in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of 
his knowledge and belief. 
.~,,,,# m . (, }L., 
'Ki eth M. Workman 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
CER.rlFICA'l'E OF SERVICE 
(Prisoner Mailbox Rule Invoked) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOl'ICE OF APPEAL on the following named persons at their last known addresses, 
via the ISCI Prison Legal Mail System and the U.S. Mail, 1st class postage 
prepaid, on December .!:1:f1:i.., 2016: 
Karin Magnelli, ISB #6929 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
R1.l'ICE OF APPFAL - 4, 
Kale D. Gans, ISB #9013 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
Full Name of Party Filing Document 
ISCI Unit 9 
~i~d~is (Street or Post Office Box) 
Boise, IO 83707 




A.M, _____ FIU!D..r-.M, __ Cf.,,,_,. __ 
DEC 1 lf'2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ROSE WAIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ___,;A=D=A ____ _ 
KENNETH M. li\ORT<MAN, 
Petitioner, -Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER 'RICH, et al., 
Respondent.s-Appellees, 
Case No. CV-QC 2015-20864 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
RE: APPEAL '10 IDAHO SOPR'EME CDURl' 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document 
Ix] Petitioner D Respondent asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) civil appeal to Idaho Supreme Court . I 
believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for. 
2. D I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [xi I have filed this claim against the 
rty I . b d th t· f t . t t ~-..1 I rt in the Magistrate same pa or a c aim ase on e same opera Ive ac s m a s a e or ·~era cou . and District Courts 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current below· 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months, 
whichever is less. 
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ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by.. making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "NIA". Attach additional pages if more space is 
needed for any response.) 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: Kenneth M. Workman Other name(s) I have used:_..!.:N"'-/~A ____ _ 
Address: ISCI P.O. Box 14 Boise, Idaho 83707 
How long at that address? 5 years Phone:. __ ...IJNL.L./...,A _____ _ 
Year and place of birth: 5/6/53 Morton, Washington 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am I!] single D married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: _________________________ _ 
My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: __ _ 
N/A 
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ 12, 00 per D week [xi month 
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ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011 
PAGE2 
000330
Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: get ~iodic gift money from 
usually $80.00 of which $20,00 is deducted for restitutioll 
My spouse's income:$ NIA per D week D month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property {land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City State 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 




Notes and Receivables __________________ _ 
Vehicles _______________________ _ 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts __________ _ 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit. __________ _ 
Trust Funds -----------------------
Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s _______________ _ 
Cash Value Insurance. ___________________ _ 
Motorcycles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles ______________ _ 
Furniture/Appliances. ___________________ _ 
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles"-----------------
Descrlptlon (proVide description for each item) 
TVs/Stereos/Computers/Electronics. ______________ _ 
Tools/Equipment. _____________________ _ 
Sporting Goods/Guns ___________________ _ 
Horses/Livestock/Tack. ___________________ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 





















Other (describe) _____________________ _ 




Rent/House Payment _____________________ _ 
Vehicle Payment(s). ___________________ _ 
Credit Cards (List last four digits of each account number.) 
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Auto Insurance 0 -----------------------
Life Insurance 0 -----------------------
Medical Insurance 0 ----------------------
Medi ca I Expense _____________________ _ 0 
Other ___ ...,,,._,,...._ _________________ _ 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
How much can you borrow? $ ___ 0 ______ From whom? __ N....;/_A ______ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? N / A Amount of refund: $._N.;..:/_A __ _ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.) 
Name Address 
Kenneth Michael Workman 
Typed/printed 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Phone Years Known 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this q day of Ur.u-e-mb~ Uri "7 
N~ho J 
Residing at J 
Commission expires ,@4fe;J. 
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= IDOC TRUST=========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 12/08/2016 = 
Doc No: 61342 Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
Account: CHK Status: INDIGENT 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-17 
Transaction Dates: 12/0l/2015-12/08/2016 
Beginning Total Total current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
7.03 889.01 881.20 0.78DB 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
12/01/2015 II0736262-025 223-IMF PAYROL 
12/01/2015 HQ0736264-005 063-COURT ORDR 
12/04/2015 II0737043-009 072-METER MAIL 
12/07/2015 II0737272-558 099-COMM SPL 
12/11/2015 II0737992-002 070-PHOTO COPY 
12/14/2015 II0738093-507 099-COMM SPL 
12/14/2015 II0738186-002 071-MED CO-PAY 
12/21/2015 HQ0739016-009 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/21/2015 HQ0739017-003 063-COURT ORDR 
12/21/2015 II0739147-015 072-METER MAIL 
12/24/2015 HQ0739600-003 061-CK INMATE 
12/28/2015 II0739799-490 099-COMM SPL 
01/04/2016 II0740560-004 223-IMF PAYROL 
01/04/2016 HQ0740562-003 063-COURT ORDR 
01/04/2016 II0740687-341 099-COMM SPL 
01/08/2016 II0741453-007 072-METER MAIL 
01/11/2016 II0741610-626 099-COMM SPL 
01/12/2016 HQ0741808-001 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/12/2016 HQ0741810-002 063-COURT ORDR 
01/15/2016 II0742446-004 070-PHOTO COPY 
01/18/2016 II0742513-503 099-COMM SPL 
01/25/2016 II0743145-454 099-COMM SPL 
01/25/2016 II0743207-020 071-MED CO-PAY 
02/02/2016 II0744095-014 223-IMF PAYROL 
02/02/2016 HQ0744097-002 063-COURT ORDR 
02/03/2016 II0744387-028 072-METER MAIL 
02/08/2016 II0744967-557 099-COMM SPL 
02/09/2016 HQ0745144-007 011-RCPT MO/CC 
02/09/2016 HQ0745145-003 063-COURT ORDR 
02/12/2016 II0745612-003 070-PHOTO COPY 
02/15/2016 II0745689-517 099-COMM SPL 
02/15/2016 II0745689-518 099-COMM SPL 
02/22/2016 II0746599-426 099-COMM SPL 
02/26/2016 II0747217-005 072-METER MAIL 
02/29/2016 II0747364-396 099-COMM SPL 
03/01/2016 II0747604-008 223-IMF PAYROL 
03/01/2016 HQ0747606-005 063-COURT ORDR 
03/04/2016 II0748224-007 070-PHOTO COPY 



























































FEB PAY 69.60 
CRFE-01-13 13.92DB 
244583 2.l0DB 
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= IDOC TRUST ----------- OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ---------- 12/08/2016 = 
Doc No: 61342 Name: WORKMAN, KENNETH MICHAEL 
Account: CHK Status: INDIGENT 
ISCI/UNT09 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-17 
Transaction Dates: 12/0l/2015-12/08/2016 
Beginning Total Total current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
7.03 889.01 881.20 0.78DB 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
---------- ------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------
03/09/2016 HQ0748901-011 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 80.00 86.99 
03/09/2016 HQ0748902-002 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 16.00DB 70.99 
03/14/2016 II0749500-488 099-COMM SPL 47.48DB 23.51 
03/21/2016 II0750604-457 099-COMM SPL 22.l0DB 1.41 
03/29/2016 II0751503-027 072-METER MAIL 251723 7.12DB 5.71DB 
03/31/2016 II0751729-004 223-IMF PAYROL MAR PAY 74.40 68.69 
03/31/2016 HQ0751731-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14.88DB 53.81 
04/01/2016 II0751880-001 070-PHOTO COPY 251972 11.70DB 42.11 
04/11/2016 II0753150-578 099-COMM SPL 41. 91DB 0.20 
04/13/2016 II0753652-005 072-METER MAIL 245455 0.21DB 0.0lDB 
04/15/2016 II0753950-005 070-PHOTO COPY 251898 1.30DB 1. 31DB 
04/21/2016 II0754864-011 071-MED CO-PAY 693602 5.00DB 6.31DB 
04/29/2016 II0756057-015 223-IMF PAYROL APR PAY 72.00 65.69 
04/29/2016 HQ0756059-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14.40DB 51.29 
05/02/2016 II0756260-426 099-COMM SPL 21.20DB 30.09 
05/09/2016 II0757474-543 099-COMM SPL 29.98DB 0.11 
05/17/2016 II0758460-020 071-MED CO-PAY 811236 8.00DB 7.89DB 
06/01/2016 II0759885-017 223-IMF PAYROL MAY PAY 74.40 66.51 
06/01/2016 HQ0759887-007 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 14.88DB 51. 63 
06/06/2016 II0760886-540 099-COMM SPL 50.71DB 0.92 
06/10/2016 HQ0761708-015 011-RCPT MO/CC MAILROOM 30.00 30.92 
06/10/2016 HQ0761709-003 063-COURT ORDR CRFE-01-13 6.00DB 24.92 
06/13/2016 II0761906-504 099-COMM SPL 24.00DB 0.92 
06/17/2016 II0762434-002 070-PHOTO COPY 246772 1. 70DB 0.78DB 
I hereby cE:i1ify tt-iat the:~:i:' 1:_~,_1 ;.~ ~-:. 1, 
rect copies of official i'.t'.:~'. ,J rtc'i.:vits er 
therein cf the ld".ho De? : .tn'.-'!'i'. cf Gorreclion. 
Dated: l- 1/ 
Sig11s~ure: ---.~~- -- --
000335
Offender Account Activity 
(7/1/2016 -12/8/2016) 
Offender Living Starting Trans Ending 
Trans Date Trans Type Number Offender Name Unit Received From Paid To Balance Amount Balance 
12/06/2016 Keefe 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Diana Morrison $1.92 $80.00 $81.92 
12/05/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 CenturyLink $13.90 ($1.17) $12.73 
12/02/2016 Court Ordered Felony - 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 00 IDAHO DEPARTMENT $18.89 ($2.40) $16.49 
RCR MICHAEL OF CORRECTION 
11/28/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Commissary Sales $14.84 ($7.95) $6.89 
11/20/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Commissary Sales $28.91 ($10.18) $18.73 
11/13/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 00 CenturyLink $62.34 ($3.89) $58.45 
MICHAEL 
11/09/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 CenturyLink $68.82 ($2.59) $66.23 
11/05/2016 Court Ordered Felony - 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 IDAHO DEPARTMENT $145.02 ($16.00) $129.02 
RCR MICHAEL OF CORRECTION 
11/04/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 CenturyLink $68.26 ($3.24) $65.02 
11/04/2016 Other 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 226-0ther $58.66 $12.00 $70.66 
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Offender Account Activity 
(7/1/2016 -12/8/2016) 
Offender Living Starting Trans Ending 
Trans Date Trans Type Number Offender Name Unit Received From Paid To Balance Amount Balance 
10/19/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Centurylink $13.32 ($3.50) $9.82 
10/10/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 00 Commissary Sales $114.48 ($76.32) $38.16 
MICHAEL 
10/09/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 Centurylink $121.87 ($3.50) $118.37 
MICHAEL 
10/08/2016 Court Ordered Felony - 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 IDAHO DEPARTMENT $144.20 ($20.00) $124.20 
RCR MICHAEL OF CORRECTION 
10/07/2016 Phone Credits 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Centurylink $48.05 ($3.85) $44.20 
10/07/2016 Photocopies 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Idaho Dept. of Correction $52.95 ($4.61) $48.34 
10/04/2016 Janitor 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 223-Janitor ($4.65) $72.00 $67.35 
09/07/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 Commissary Sales $45.67 ($45.61) $0.06 
09/01/2016 Janitor 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 
MICHAEL 
00 223-Janitor ($13.85) $74.40 $60.55 
08/26/2016 Photocopies 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 Idaho Dept. of Correction ($5.15) ($8.18) ($13.33) 
MICHAEL 
08/08/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 I hereby ~rtlt&ktuyr.saa,rd2 ere !rut: u, $50.60 ($49.78) $0.82 
MICHAEL rect copies of official rec"G~rls or reports or entrieti 
therein of the Idaho epmtmnnt of Correction. 
Idaho Department Of Correction - II Page 2 of3 Dated: f 12/8/2016 09:21 AM -Signatur 
000337
Offender Account Activity 
(7/1/2016 -12/8/2016) 
Offender Living 
Trans Date Trans Type Number Offender Name Unit Received From 
08/03/2016 Court Ordered Felony - 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 
RCR MICHAEL 
07/28/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 
MICHAEL 
07/19/2016 Photocopies 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 00 
MICHAEL 
07/15/2016 Commissary Sale 0061342 WORKMAN.KENNETH 00 
MICHAEL 
07/06/2016 Janitor 0061342 WORKMAN, KENNETH 00 223 - Janitor 
MICHAEL 
Idaho Department Of Correction • II Page 3 of 3 
Starting Trans 




Commissary Sale;S ($0.27) $2.12 
Idaho Dept. of Correction $0.03 ($0.28) 
Commissary Sales $56.82 ($52.87) 
($0.78) $72.00 
I hereby certily t'. '.'.i: :,:,c:,id:• rn., true c1i ic: 
rect co~es of official r1.;.;0;tis or reports or entries 
therein of the Ida o n ps.r;:rient ol Correction. 








12/8/2016 09:21 AM 
000338
Kenneth M. Workman #61342 
ISCI Unit 9 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Plaintiff-Appellant, prose 
NO·----=--rt,~---
A.M. ____ FIU!D_,p&,4 + 
DEC 1 -'r· 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Sy ROSE WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTR.Icr CDURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRicr 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO~ THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNEl'H M. VORKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 










) ________________ ) 
case No. CV-OC-2015-20864 
SCJPPLEMli.ffl' DEI!LARATION OF KENNE'm 
M. v«>RKMAN IN SCJPPORI' OF Kn'ION AND 
AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION 'ID .l:'RU.!EED 
00 PARI'IAL PAYMENI' OF CXXJRl' FEES 
(PRISOOER) RE: APPEAL 'ID IDAOO 
SlJPRFJIJE CXXJRl' 
I, Kenneth M. Workman, being competent to make this declaration and having 
personal knowledge of the matters herein, hereby declare under penalty of perjury 
pursuant to I.e.~ 9-1406(1) as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff-Appellant in the above-entitled action. I make 
this supplemental declaration in support of the Motion and Affidavit for 
Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees (Prisoner) 'Re: Appeal 
to Idaho supreme Court, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
SCJP.PIBl.ll!Nl DEllARATION OF KENNE'm M. l«>RKMAN IN SOP.EOR.r OF Kn'IOO AND 
AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSIOO 'ID PRCX!EED 00 PA'Rl'IAL PAYMENI' OF CXXJRl' FEES 
(PRISOOER) RE: APPFALS 'ID IDAID SUPREME CXXJRl' - 1 
000339
2. By way of this declaration, I hereby give this Court notice that, 
since my last application for waiver of fees/to proceed on partial payments 
of court fees, that significant negative changes to my financial earnings 
ability and situation has occurred. These changes have gone into effect and 
drastically reduce my current monthly income. 
3. As of October of 2016, I no longer work at my fonner prison job where 
I was making approximately $75.00 per month. 
4. Now I am employed as a "wheelchair pusher" and make $12.00 per month. 
Of that $12.00 a month, $2.40 (i.e., 20%) is deducted for Court ordered 
restitution. 
5. The Inmate Account Banking Statement that is attached to the Motion 
and Affidavit for Pennission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees 
(Prisoner) Re: Appeal to Idaho supreme Court, which is filed contemporaneously 
herewith, shows that my family sends me $80.00 per month, $20.00 of which (i.e., 
20%) is also deducted for restitution. 
6. Thus, my monthly earning are not less that $70.00 per month. I request 
that the Court consider this in evaluating my pending motion to proceed on 
partial payments of court fees in my appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
I hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the state 
of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this q-fh day of December, 2016. 
th M. Workman 
SCJPPLEMERl'AL IJEllARATION OF KffiNEl'H M. 1iDRKMAN IN SOPOORI.' OF lCI'ION AND 
AFFIDAvrr FOR PmMISSION '10 PRCX!EED ON PARl'IAL PAYMENI' OF axm FEES 
(PRISCnER) RE: APPEAL '10 IDAID SUPREME axJRl' - 2 
000340
Nl), ____ :;:o:"':::=:---"-=-c~rr::=;;...._-
A.M. ____ F_~.~ 9lr, 
JAN 1 7 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 









) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
) FOR FEE WAIVER 
) ON APPEAL 
) ________________ ) 
Presently pending before the court is the plaintiffs motion for a fee waiver, with 
supporting materials, in his appeal of a decision and judgment of this Court to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
A review of the plaintiffs supporting materials reveals that he is indigent and without 
funds to pay the requisite fee for filing such an appeal. 1 See LC.§ 31-3220A; I.A.R. 23(a). 
The plaintiffs motion for fee waiver on appeal is granted. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS "' 2-ctay of January 2017. 
1There also is a fee for the filing of the clerk's record and that fee is also waived. See I.A.R. 27(t). 
Order Granting Motion for Fee Waiver on Appeal I 
000341
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the above ORDER as notice pursuant to the Idaho 
Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
KENNETH WORKMAN 
!DOC #61342 
ISCI UNIT 9 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
KARIN MAGNELLI 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD ST., SUITE 110 
BOISE, ID 83706 
Date: JAN 1 7 Z017 
Order Granting Motion for Fee Waiver on Appeal 2 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Id 
000342
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the 
Fourth District Court, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
Supreme Court Case No. 44701 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED 
INDIVIDUAL OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 16th day of February, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
,,,, ...... ,,, ,, ,,, 
.... ,, \~DICJ-4l •,,, 
......... ~~ •·•··•·• .(); ,, .. "' •• •• 'J> .... I~:-· . ~ ':,-tt>.'\:E hf$i\TOPHER D. RICH 
€ ~ : "~ , cr;~1 the District Court 
- u • ~ o<c • -
- • 0 -~-:.~\ ~ : -
t½."•, .,~1- ,l c S •I?~ 
.... r.r. •• 'e':O '-' X-
'•~;~(/ ··••••••• ~ty Clerk 
'•,.. IN AND fO~ &,, .. ,, . ...,. . ~ •. , ... _,·•.l•'· 
000343
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaii:itiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the 
Fourth District Court, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED 
INDIVIDUAL OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44701 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN 
APPELLANT PRO SE 
BOISE, IDAHO 
RAY J. CHACKO 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT RICH 
BOISE, IDAHO 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 






,,, , \ 'U DICJ,1l ,,, 
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- ~. .,... • ·r:. -
-: ::::, • ~v •,... • 
.i 8 : ~" o<.:, CHR}s:f~PH~R ?· RICH 
,,: \:'"": ' ~Qleri qf!B,e D1stnct Court 
~ v •. \~~ • ~: 
CLB 1 6 20\1 ~ ~ ••• ••• .. . -~ ~.·. -·~-
ri:. . ", :..r... ••••••• <::)"t- .... e~ D t f S . .,, "(] n..~ , a e o erv1ce: ________ · ,,,,, IN A-ND riu>{,.,..1/t'""""'-=---------
,~,.~,.,!~-'-9'-eputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
000344
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KENNETH M. WORKMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Clerk of the 
Fourth District Court, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED 
INDIVIDUAL OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44701 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
14th day of December, 2016. 
'\ \' 111111 f' ,., ' 
,_,, 11 01·· ,. ,,, .... ·: \ ~- . ~!11. . .,,,, 
,, ,._'\~ e••••••e f_ .A ,., 
., "' •• • <.J~ , 
·~ f..., .•• 1:.·· <<f> -:. 
_f ~ l · ~~ ':>ttBRI~iER D. RICH 
· ·: 8 : ~"' perk o:l!t~ lpistrict Court 
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-:. ~. -\~ ,<: -
~~·•.. R ·• ~.., {2~ 
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,,,, 1.v 4 Nn~h\~ erk ,,, • i u ,;,, ,,,,,., .. ,,, 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
